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The systematisation of deductive inference can yield an account of the structure of sentences 
(propositions, thoughts) involved in such inference.  In mainstream contemporary analytic 
philosophy, the idea of “logical form” is linked, explicitly or implicitly, with the idea of such a 
systematisation—paradigmatically, with translation into a notational system whose grammar is 
designed to track valid inference patterns.  But this is not the only thing one might mean by 
“logical form”.  An enquiry into the structures of thoughts can be motivated by considerations 
besides inferential behaviour.  In this dissertation I adduce reasons for doubting that inferential 
systematisation can capture all of what we might want from the notion of logical form, and I 
sketch an alternative conception according to which the uncovering of the logical structure of 
discourse proceeds from no single principle (such as deductive inferential potential), but rather 
piecemeal, from region of discourse to region of discourse.  In this sense the investigation of 
logical form does not proceed fully independently of subject matter, but it is nevertheless non-
empirical and structural.  Inference can be relevant to this investigation, especially negatively—
(roughly,) we can show that two classes of judgment do not share a form by showing that their 
members do not exhibit the same patterns of inferential behaviour—but the availability, even in 
principle, of a syntactic characterisation of the valid inference patterns in which a judgment 
participates is not a necessary criterion for the attribution to it of a certain logical form. 
 
I argue that Frege’s revolutionary application of function-argument analysis to logic plays a 
central rôle in his equation of the categories in terms of which to ascribe structure to thoughts 
with the syntactic categories needed for the systematisation of inference.  Though the application 
is plausible when the subject matter under investigation is mathematical, I argue that function-
argument analysis is ill suited to the analysis of predicative structure generally.  As an illustration 
of this claim, following Michael Thompson’s lead, I discuss “natural-historical judgments,” a 
certain type of generic judgment about living things.  I walk through a series of formal-semantic 
 iv
proposals for generic sentences: approaches  drawing on relevant quantification, notions of 
prototypes and stereotypes, probabilistic analyses, approaches using the apparatus of modal and 
situational semantics, analyses of generic sentences as nonmonotonic inference licenses, and 
several others.  I argue that each of these founders, in one way or another, on its imposition of 
function-argument analysis on natural-historical judgments: for the function-analytical 
interpretation of natural kind terms is bound to fail to capture the dual rôles these terms play in 
generic and in singular sentences.  The unique logical form of natural-historical judgments is not 
to be understood on the functional model; the categories deployed in their grasp are not 
explained by their use in codifying inference patterns.  I conclude that the gap between a Fregean 
conception of logicality and the one exhibited in Thompson’s work is even wider than Thompson 
recognises. 
 
The view that the uncovering of logical form is a piecemeal, unprincipled affair is distinct not 
only from the broadly Fregean conception but also from Kant’s notion of transcendental logic.  I 
associate it, instead, with the later work of Wittgenstein.  I bring out how Wittgenstein’s 
engagement in the Tractatus with Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of logic paves the way for 
his later development of the notion of grammar in the Investigations, in order to show how the 
broader conception of form I advocate has a genuine claim to logicality.  I also argue against 
Sebastian Rödl’s claim that Wittgenstein in the Investigations is (unwittingly, and incompletely) 
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Perhaps partly due to a certain promiscuity in my interests, I have a tendency to begin, in my 
work, from a diversity of ideas, only later imposing on them what I hope constitutes a sort of 
order.  When casting about, some years ago, for a dissertation topic from among my then current 
objects of interest, I was happy to hit on the notion of form, precisely because of the way in 
which it appeared to present just the sort of unifying effect that would allow me to continue to 
pursue as many of those interests as possible under the head of a single project.  The notion of 
form in philosophy and logic, reflection on which appeared to pay such rich philosophical 
dividends in the work of, say, Kant, seemed to me to have become narrower with and after 
Frege’s formalisation of quantification, in such a way that, though our formal apparatus for 
studying logical consequence had become extremely powerful, the notion of the form of a 
thought seemed to have had much of its philosophical interest sucked out of it.  The pursuit of 
the question how this had happened, and whether we had in the process lost anything of 
significance, would, I thought, allow me to bring together several of my interests.  One of these 
was in the work of Kant, and in particular in his application of the notion of form to the practical 
realm, an interest which several stimulating seminars on Kant’s ethics led by Steve Engstrom 
produced in me.  (It will be observed that Kant’s name hardly appears in the sequel; the two or so 
originally projected chapters on his work were an early casualty of the clash between the hotch-
potch approach to work I am describing and the requirements of a doctoral dissertation.)  
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Another was in the work of Wittgenstein, especially his Tractatus logico-philosophicus; reading 
that book with Ben Laurence was one of the more exciting and productive experiences of my 
graduate student career, and though my thinking about the notion of form deployed in the 
opening pages of that work has changed since then, I would not have embarked on this project 
had it not been for that experience.  The years-long, always fruitful and soul-soothing 
conversation David Berger and I engaged in about a wide range of topics, including Michael 
Thompson’s work on the logic of discourse about life, showed me what a genuinely 
philosophical exchange of ideas could be; it was this work of Thompson’s that allowed me to put 
in its clearest form the question at the heart of this dissertation.  Finally, it was in the study of 
truth and meaning directed by John McDowell which I pursued with Ben Laurence and Evan 
Riley that I began to think seriously about the notion of logical form in twentieth-century 
philosophy of language.  I am afraid that the present work still bears the marks of the sort of 
fusion of initially disparate interests that the story I have just told betrays—but on the other hand, 
for what it’s worth, this lack of unity may in fact itself present a certain kind of harmony with the 
conception of logical form I begin to articulate in the Coda. 
 
My style of work, exacerbated by my familial obligations and inclinations, led me to draw on the 
expertise of my dissertation committee members much less than I should have.  (For this reason, 
the now proverbial qualification to an acknowledgement of scholarly debt, to the effect that 
“Any errors that remain are solely my responsibility,” is especially applicable in the case of this 
dissertation.)  But it is still true that I owe a great deal of thanks to each of them.  John 
McDowell, beginning with the directed study I mentioned above but also whenever I gave him 
the chance throughout his tenure as my dissertation director, was extremely generous, as well as 
acute and thorough, with his feedback on my work.  Michael Thompson’s name, as will be seen, 
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is sprinkled liberally throughout this dissertation; the article I alluded to earlier, as well as several 
seminars he gave on his work, influenced my thinking greatly.  In addition to the seminars on 
Kant’s ethics I’ve already mentioned and his thoughtful responses to my work, Steve Engstrom 
always stood ready to give me whatever help I asked for.  Anil Gupta was extremely 
conscientious, kind and encouraging in his feedback; the example he set of a graduate student 
advisor is one I aim to emulate, though I can hardly hope to meet it.  Although I have not yet 
mentioned his name, Sebastian Rödl’s work, and especially the seminar he gave at Pittsburgh in 
2003, had an enormous influence on me, and I am very grateful to him for the generosity with 
which he indulged me when we met to discuss my research.  And finally, though he was not on 
my committee, I must mention Nuel Belnap as perhaps the single most influential faculty 
member on my graduate student career, both through the many graduate seminars of his I 
attended and through the very generous support he gave me in the form of his Alan Ross 
Anderson Fellowships. 
 
It feels to me rather odd to thank on paper the friends I made in graduate school for their 
“support,” which is to say for their friendship (even when that friendship has included, as it often 
has, philosophically stimulating conversation); I would much rather acknowledge it, naturally, 
with the friendship of my own, in the hope that it means to them something approaching what 
theirs has meant to me.  So I shall refrain from listing the names of the people whose 
companionship has been dear to me during my time in grad school.  I feel this even more acutely 
with respect to my family, Akiko and Lia: though I owe the world to them, I can hardly imagine 





Chapter One.  Logic and the study of formal systems. 
 
The present study is an enquiry into the notion of logical form.  My starting point is a conception 
of that notion prevalent in twentieth-century philosophy of language and logic, according to 
which the inferential behaviour of sentences, or of the thoughts they express, in one way or 
another holds the key to their logical form.  This conception is closely associated with the 
tradition in philosophy called “analytic.”1 
 
Now, there are those who conceive of logic as, fundamentally, the mathematical study of 
systems of the sort formal logicians devise.  On this view, the “application” of these systems to 
natural-language discourse, though perhaps sometimes philosophically interesting, is 
nevertheless a merely pragmatic matter—that is to say, that some such system is applicable in a 
given case to some stretch of discourse is not to be understood as revelatory of “the real logical 
structure” of the discourse in question. On the contrary, on this sort of view, quite different 
systems may be applicable, for different analytical purposes, to the same stretch of discourse—
                                                 
1 I shall not engage directly with the use the phrase ‘logical form’ (or, more often, ‘Logical Form’) has acquired in 
recent years in empirical linguistics.  As Stanley (2000: 392) explains, “Talk of logical form in this sense involves 
attributing hidden complexity to sentences of natural language, complexity which is ultimately revealed by empirical 
inquiry.”  But it would not be surprising if there were connections to be drawn between that notion and the one 
currently under discussion: for one thing, a canonical explication of the rôle of Logical Form in transformational-
generative grammar is as the level of linguistic description at which “all grammatical structure relevant to semantic 
interpretation is provided” (Hornstein 1995:3); Davidson (1970a: 63), many years earlier, had already remarked that 
“it would be strange if the structure essential to an account of truth were not effectively tied to the patterns of sound 
we use to convey truth,” and indeed Hornstein himself proposes understanding “semantic interpretation” in a 
Davidsonian framework.  (Hornstein and Davidson here put the other term of the contrast in terms of semantics 
rather than inference; we shall consider the relation between these two in Chapter II.) 
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indeed, systems different enough that no single “real logical structure” attributed to that stretch 
of discourse could explain the various systems’ applicability to it. 
 
Thus, consider the following expression of what at first may sound like this view: 
 
[T]he axiomatic development of a science presupposes, apart from those things involved in the actual subject 
matter, three other things: (1) a language, (2) a system of deductions, and (3) a system of interpretations.  This 
three-part structure has been called [by Church] the underlying logic of the science.  In my view the aim of 
the science of logic is the understanding both of underlying logics and of theories which presuppose them.  
Logic is the science of axiomatic sciences.  Logic must produce theories of ‘propositional forms’ to account 
for the ‘linguistic’ phenomena.  It must produce theories of deduction to account for the phenomenon of 
deduction and it must produce theories of semantics to account for the phenomenon of reinterpreting 
languages and satisfying or falsifying sentences….  (Corcoran 1973: 27) 
 
Here, Corcoran places ‘propositional forms’ and ‘linguistic’ in scare-quotes because he is 
speaking not about natural-language contexts but about the formal languages used in the 
axiomatic treatment of a science.  This seems like a perfectly clear expression of the view of 
logic described above, as the mathematical study of formal systems and their formal 
interpretation.  But now consider what the same author writes a couple of pages later: 
 
The construction of mathematical models not only increases clarity and precision but it also relieves two 
pressures—the pressure to be right in every detail and the pressure to give an account of the ontological status 
of the subject.  Today the value of idealized models is widely accepted and hardly any of the current logicians 
feel pressure to decide the relation between the logical and the mental, to give an account of propositions, to 
explicate the ground of logical consequence, etc. 
Incidentally, with the possible exception of modal logics, hardly any worthwhile logical doctrines seem to 
have started from any analysis of ordinary language or from analysis of reasoning outside of mathematics and 
science.  The reason is not hard to find: if one wants to study a certain phenomenon then one seeks places 
where the phenomenon occurs repeatedly and clearly.  The reasoning which occurs in mathematics and 
science is frequently free of the emotionalism and sectarianism which infects other areas.  (Corcoran 1973: 
29-30) 
 
This passage betrays the thought that there may be more to logic than merely the study of formal 
systems and their interpretation.  Indeed, the last paragraph quoted here would appear, according 
to the official definition of ‘logic’ from the first quotation, wildly off-topic: for if logic really 
simply were “the science of axiomatic sciences,” then there would be absolutely no reason to 
have expected any “worthwhile logical doctrines” to have arisen from the “analysis of reasoning 
2 
outside of mathematics and science.”  But the very idea of modeling brings with it the idea of 
something modeled: and if logicians do not currently “feel pressure to decide the relation 
between the logical and the mental, to give an account of propositions, to explicate the ground of 
logical consequence, etc.,” it need not be because such questions have no sense. 
 
And indeed, the idea that the notion of logical form might apply to something beyond formal 
languages is not at all unfamiliar.  For one explicit example: 
 
… much of the interest in logical form comes from an interest in logical geography: to give the 
logical form of a sentence is to give its logical location in the totality of sentences, to describe it in 
a way that explicitly determines what sentences it entails and what sentences it is entailed by.  
(Davidson 1970b: 140) 
 
Davidson is here speaking of the logical form of natural-language sentences; specifically, 
sentences about actions.  Now, Davidson quickly adds that the notion of logical form at play here 
is “relative both to a theory of deduction and to some prior determinations as to how to render 
sentences in the language of the theory” (ibid.); but he does not take this to impugn the very idea 
of ascriptions of logical form to such sentences, especially since he considers the theory of 
deduction he favours, classical first-order quantification theory, to be “a good theory.”  And 
Gareth Evans (1976) has argued that we ought to demand, and can provide, a more robust—more 
“transcendent,” as he puts it, in Quine (1970)’s sense—conception of the structure in virtue of 
which formal inference is valid.  We are to sort expressions into semantic categories according to 
their inferential properties, but we are to posit a new such category only when we can assign to it 
an “underlying real essence” (a type of entity, such as a set, an object, a function of a particular 
type, or whatnot) which explains the logical behaviour of the expressions in that category. 
 
For one more example, consider the following words from Anil Gupta’s (1980) study of common 
nouns: 
3 
My aim in this essay is to explore the logical role of an important class of concepts—concepts that 
are expressed by common nouns (“sortal concepts”)—in a fragment of our conceptual scheme.  It 
seems to me that this exploration is essential not merely for purely logical purposes but for certain 
philosophical and linguistic purposes as well….  And it provides material that I think will lead to a 
better understanding of the relationship of logic to ontology….  (Gupta 1980: ix) 
 
It is the logical rôle of the concepts in question “in a fragment of our conceptual scheme” in 
which Gupta is interested: not merely the logical rôle the corresponding concepts play in the 
systems he designs to model that scheme.  He goes on to say that “there are important logical and 
semantic differences between common nouns and predicates” (ibid., p. 1) which standard 
systems of quantified modal logic fail to capture.  Again, his language is unequivocal: common 
nouns of natural language have logical properties, and a given formal system is inadequate to 
them as long as it fails to model those properties. 
 
Now, it may be, in fact, that a great many logicians, as well as (perhaps fewer) philosophers of 
logic and language, do have views closer to those articulated in our first quotation from 
Corcoran.  I do not mean to claim that such views are incoherent, but only to draw attention to 
the way in which even some of their clearest advocates can betray traces of the opposing view. 
 
And it is worth adding that the idea (which Beall and Restall (2000) call “widespread” among 
philosophers of logic) that there is “one true logic,” like the idea that (one) logic is normative for 
thought, appears to presuppose something like the view under discussion, that the proper object 
of the study of logic is not merely formalisms and their formal interpretations but the language or 
thought of which they are models.  Indeed, even the acknowledgement of certain kinds of logical 
pluralism is compatible with this view, as long as one believes that each of the plurality of logics 
is true of, or normative for, its respectively appropriate field of application. 
 
The present dissertation will not address head on the question which of these views is justified.  
The purpose of the preceding discussion has just been to show that the idea is not entirely alien 
4 
to contemporary logic and philosophy of logic and language that the study of logic is, at least in 
part, the study of thought (or at least of language), and not merely the investigation of the formal 
models of language which, after all, are models.2 
 
But it is noteworthy that each of the exemplars I have cited of the view that there is more to logic 
than formal models has nevertheless made quite clear that it is through the use of those formal 
models that we are to carry out our logical investigations.  Thus Davidson holds that one gives a 
sentence’s logical form by giving a deductive theory for (at least a part of) the language of the 
sentence—and further, though the ascription of logical form to sentences will therefore be 
relative to that theory, first-order logic is “a good theory” for this purpose precisely because 
(thanks to Tarski) we have a formal semantics for it, and that is to say, if we can paraphrase a 
sentence in quantificational idiom, we can explain why it has the inferential properties it has.  
Evans, as we saw, made it quite explicit that a necessary condition of entitling oneself to a claim 
about a sentence’s structure in the relevant sense was, in effect, to locate it in a formal semantic 
theory.  And Gupta, too, though he does give philosophical arguments for his conception of the 
distinction between common nouns and predicates, places at the centre of his treatment the 
“construct[ion of] systems of quantified modal logic in which a categorial distinction is made 
between common nouns and predicates…. [such that t]he syntactic and semantic behavior of 
common nouns in these logics is quite different from the behavior of predicates” (1980: 4). 
 
As long as (in accordance, for instance, with Corcoran’s official line) we understand it as a 
definitional matter that logic’s proper object is formal systems, it will emerge as analytic that 
                                                 
2 This can be taken as a modest corrective of Rödl’s (2005: 8) claim that “‘logic’ in the analytic tradition now only 
designates the science of formal calculi.”  Of course, Rödl’s main point is that “the analytic tradition” has not 
entitled itself to a conception of logic beyond this; that some scholars nevertheless employ such a conception does 
not tell against this point. 
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formalisability is constitutive of the matter of logical study.  But on the opposing view that we 
have been discussing, there is room for a question: what is the relation between formalisability 
and the study of logic?  What rôle do formal systems play, and might logic perhaps outstrip 
them?  Of course, it is still open, on this conception, to answer the last part of the last question 
negatively: it may be that the structure of thought (as we might call the subject matter of logic on 
this broader conception) can adequately be captured by a formal system or systems.  The point is 
that on this second conception of logic, but not on the first, the question is an intelligible one.3 
 
It is this question with which the present dissertation will be more directly concerned.  Supposing 
that there is sense to be made of the idea that the notion of logical form has applicability to 
language or thought, I shall begin, in Chapter II, by describing in greater detail the conception of 
logical form that associates it with formalisability, of which we have considered the cases of 
Davidson, Evans and Gupta as illustrations, and which is in any case the mainstream view (at 
least among those who do not conceive of logic as confined to the study of formal systems to 
begin with).  I shall explain how it arises in tandem with Frege’s development of his own formal 
treatment of inference.4  Next, in Chapter III, I shall argue, following Michael Thompson’s lead, 
that that mainstream understanding cannot give a satisfactory account of the structure of natural-
historical judgments.  In Chapter IV, I shall make a modest attempt to cast doubt on a proposal of 
Rödl’s to understand the sense of “logical form” at issue in Thompson’s work, as well as the idea 
of grammar as it is deployed in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations, as having its home 
                                                 
3 There are those who do not see a significant disanalogy between formal and natural languages (Quine is a notable 
instance; for one example, his discussion of grammar in his (1970) evinces this attitude).  I shall (henceforth 
silently) take this view to be of a piece with the conception of logical form that associates it with formalisability, 
since it holds natural languages (or anyway natural languages submitted to a spot of regimentation) to be, in effect, 
formalised already.  (Thanks to Thomas Ricketts for reminding me of, and pushing me on, this.) 
4 I shall not lay much emphasis on the historical claim that the conception originates with Frege, mainly because I 
shall not do any of the archæology that would be required to substantiate such a claim.  But given the connection 
between the conception and the idea of a begriffsschrift, the historical claim does have a certain plausibility. 
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in the Kantian notion of transcendental logic.  In Chapter V, I  shall argue that the trajectory from 
Wittgenstein’s early work to his later constituted not so much a radical break with “Fregeanism” 
after the Tractatus as a development of a nonFregean conception of logical articulation already 
present, if muted, in that work.  And finally, in a Coda, I shall make some modest remarks about 
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§1.  The begriffsschrift as a system of purely syntactically definable inference. 
 
Begin with the fact that Frege’s overarching project was to answer the question on what rested 
the truths of arithmetic.  His purpose in devising his begriffsschrift1 was to clarify fully the 
chains of inference involved in mathematical proof, in order to expose every unproven premise 
and every mode of inference, so as to determine whether (as the claim that arithmetic depends on 
intuition seems to assert) anything on which arithmetic rests is peculiar to arithmetic, or whether 
all the premises and modes of inference necessary for the successful implementation of 
arithmetic are in fact fully general, that is, applicable to any subject matter indifferently. 
 
The way in which the begriffsschrift “clarifies fully the chains of inference” in question is by 
rendering inference mechanical, in the sense that whether a step in such a chain is correct is 
                                                 
1 As this word cannot be alleged to have entered the English language, it really ought to be in italics—but then, since 
German nouns are capitalised, it would be indistinguishable from the title of Frege’s first book.  For the sake of 
disambiguation, then, when using it as a common noun I shall proceed typographically as though the word were 
thoroughly familiar to speakers of English (as it surely is at any rate to my readers). 
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easily—mechanically—checked.2  He does this by defining his inference rule(s) in purely 
syntactical terms.  As he puts it in his Foundations of arithmetic: 
 
[My begriffsschrift] is designed to produce expressions which are shorter and easier to take in [than those 
of natural language], and to be operated like a calculus by means of a small number of standard moves, so 
that no step is permitted which does not conform to the rules which are laid down once and for all.  It is 
impossible, therefore, for any premiss to creep into a proof without being noticed.  (1884: §91) 
 
What Frege flags as his single inference rule, modus ponens, is implemented in his system in 
such a way that an application of it involves merely, as it were, copying and pasting from 
formulae already derived, having inspected them to ensure that their parts match appropriately.3  
Similarly, Frege’s (implicit) rule of substitution is equally (if a little more complicatedly) 
syntactically characterisable. 
 
That Frege’s system only employs these modes of inference is not intended to suggest that 
modus ponens and substitution are somehow the only real or correct forms of inference, of 
course; Frege himself frequently draws attention to the decisions he has made in setting up his 
system, and (though he sometimes gives (often merely practical) reasons in support of his 
decisions) to the fact that he could just as well have made them otherwise.  (Thus he discusses 
the flexibility involved in the choice of primitive symbols at, for instance, (1880-81: 37); in the 
choice of axioms, at Begriffsschrift §13; and as for the inference rule of modus ponens itself, he 
places emphasis on the following entire sentence: “This restriction to a single mode of inference, 
however, is in no way intended to express a psychological proposition, but only to settle the 
                                                 
2 Of course, it emerged from later work in metalogic, especially Church’s and Turing’s (drawing on Gödel’s), that 
neither Frege’s begriffsschrift nor any even first-order system of relational logic is successful at rendering inference 
mechanical in the sense of providing an effective procedure for the generation of a proof of the validity of a given 
chain of valid inference.  But though Frege was innocent of this work, it is notable that he did not make the claim for 
his begriffsschrift that this later work was to show unrealisable: on the contrary, Frege wrote: “our thinking as a 
whole can never be coped with by a machine or replaced by purely mechanical activity” (1880-81: 35). 
3 The observation that the two-dimensionality of Frege’s system particularly suits it to the copy-and-paste approach 
is Robert Brandom’s.  Van Heijenoort makes a brief remark to the same effect in his introduction to Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift (1967a).  Of course, the general point about the “mechanical” nature of formal systems will apply 
equally to linear systems. 
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question of formulation to maximize effectiveness” (Begriffsschrift, §6).  It is true that he argues 
that all other modes of inference can be reduced to it; but on the other hand, he does not argue 
explicitly that the same is not true of any other candidate mode of inference.  In any case, it is 
clear that it is in the interests of (mere) perspicuity that he refrains from building other modes of 
inference into his system—not because they would be any less correct than modus ponens.)  
What he emphasises is that it is important for his purposes that the modes of inference be few; 
and it is likewise crucial for those purposes that they be mechanical. 
 
The description of Frege’s project in the paragraph before last was, in fact, at the same time a 
(rough) description of the very notion of a formal system.  Though the syntactic manipulations 
necessary for carrying out inferences in some formal systems can be substantially more 
complicated than those required in Frege’s begriffsschrift, every formal system begins with a 
recursive characterisation of the formulae of the system, on the basis of which are then laid down 
the inference rules of the system—where by “on the basis of which” is meant that the rules are 
defined purely syntactically. 
 
(I say “rough” because, though van Heijenoort (1967a), for instance, credits Frege with the 
invention of the idea of a formal system (and see also Dummett (1973/1981: 82), where the same 
view is taken for granted), Frege’s system does not quite fulfil the now standard definition of this 
idea.4  For Frege’s system allows the introduction of new symbols through definitions, whereas a 
formal system’s recursive characterisation of the notion of ‘formula of the system’ is to be 
formulable in terms of vocabulary laid down once and for all.  However, it should be clear that 
permitting the definitional introduction of new notation does not threaten the mechanical 
checkability I have been discussing: for one can always simply cut out a defined symbol and 
                                                 
4 I owe this observation to Thomas Ricketts, who made it to me in conversation. 
10 
paste its definiens in its place (and Frege emphasises the importance of this at §24 of 
Begriffsschrift); once one has done this for every defined symbol in a proof, one will have a 
parallel proof framed in the original vocabulary of the system.  In addition, the typical 
requirement on a formal system—that there be an effective procedure for determining whether a 
given string is a formula—is left intact even when the expansion of the alphabet by definitions is 
permitted, so long as the definitions themselves are available to the checker.  If, when all defined 
symbols in a string have been eliminated in favour of their definientia as described above, the 
result is an admissible formula, then the original string will be held to inherit that admissibility.) 
 
In short: Frege was the inventor of the formal system (or close enough), and its purpose, for 
Frege, was to represent, with no gaps—no implicit appeals to tacit premises or modes of 
inference—and in a way mechanically characterisable and checkable, the inferences made in 
arithmetic.  (Frege of course envisioned the further application of his methods to fields besides 
arithmetic; recall the passage in the Preface to Begriffsschrift in which Frege mentions the 
calculus, geometry, mechanics and other fields as potential future objects of begriffsschriftliche 
systematisation.  However, arithmetic was clearly his first, and a perennial, concern.5)  The 
validation, in the begriffsschrift, of a given chain of inference can be carried out purely by means 




                                                 
5 This idea, of expanding the begriffsschrift further by adding to its material vocabulary in order to apply it to fields 
of enquiry beyond arithmetic, might appear to generate a greater obstacle to viewing the begriffsschrift as formal in 
the standard sense than the definitions discussed above, since this sort of introduction of new vocabulary would 
presumably not proceed by definition in terms of existing vocabulary.  But it would probably be better, and would in 
any case be natural, to think of each such enrichment of the vocabulary as resulting in a new system with different 
primitive symbols, rather than thinking of both the starting-point and the result as the same system and worrying 
about its formality.  In any case, the system presented in Begriffsschrift includes no provision for this kind of 
material enrichment of vocabulary, despite the remarks in the book’s front matter, so this obstacle is not a reason to 
doubt the formality of the system of Begriffsschrift itself.  Both §24 of Begriffsschrift and §27 of Grundgesetze 
present definitions as, in the words of the latter, the introduction of “new signs by means of signs already known.” 
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§2.  Inference and categorial structure. 
 
Near the surface of the discussion of the previous section, though perhaps left somewhat implicit, 
was the fact that a begriffsschrift is used to represent propositions already expressible in another 
system of representation.  This is not to deny that someone might express in begriffsschrift a 
proposition never before expressed in the course of producing a proof of some (say) arithmetical 
claim (or even, conceivably, as the claim to be proven); indeed in such contexts there surely 
appear in Begriffsschrift begriffsschrift propositions whose ordinary-language (or better, 
arithmetic) equivalents had never before been written down.  But Frege himself recognises, 
indeed emphasises, the awkwardness of his notational system for the purposes of creative proof 
(cf. the analogy with the microscope in the Preface to Begriffsschrift (p. V)).  In any case, all I 
want is this point: the begriffsschrift is not, in the first instance, a means of expressing new 
ideas—ideas, say, inexpressible in ordinary language—but a better means (for Frege’s limited 
purposes) of expressing the same ideas already expressible by other means. 
 
But this of course requires some attention to the question of the application of the notational 
system: of the relation between the (syntactic) form a thought takes when expressed in the 
begriffsschrift, and the form it takes when expressed, say, in ordinary language, or in the 
standard notation of arithmetic.6  There is at any rate one notion of element implicit in the 
grammar of the begriffsschrift (as our discussion of the idea of a formal system implies, through 
its reference to recursive characterisation).  And there is an analogous notion of element which 
comes with ordinary language (or with arithmetic notation): namely, the notion of a word (or 
                                                 
6 It will be noted that I am here taking for granted, what is in fact a quite contentious claim, that to natural-language 
and begriffsschrift sentences there correspond thoughts into whose structure we may enquire.  It helps a bit to point 
out that I am currently engaged in Frege exegesis, and it is anyway uncontroversial that he assented to this claim.  
(But it is also true that I go on, in this dissertation, to take the results of the reflections contained in this chapter to 
apply to conceptions beyond Frege’s own; and I cannot deny that the assumption this footnote records will remain 
undischarged.)  If you are less bothered by the term ‘proposition’, please feel free to substitute it. 
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symbol).7  But the grammar of ordinary language comes with no guarantee that its elements (in 
that surface-syntactic sense) would be suitable for the development of an inferential system such 
as Frege envisaged; indeed it is precisely his claim that it is not.  (Consider again the analogy 
with the microscope; compare also Frege’s remarks on the subject-predicate distinction in 
contrast with the function-argument distinction, e.g. at Begriffsschrift §3.)  And likewise even for 
the standard notation of arithmetic.  (Thus Frege points out (of the theory of magnitude more 
generally) that the distinction between constant and variable is not consistently maintained, e.g. 
as concerns the symbols 1, log, sin, Lim: Begriffsschrift §1.)  Meanwhile, of course, the grammar 
of the begriffsschrift is, precisely, meant to serve as a framework for such an inferential system: 
as we saw, the idea behind Frege’s begriffsschrift, and the general idea of a formal system, is that 
of a notational system in terms of whose grammar the modes of inference are defined.  Again, 
since (for the purposes of making the expression of chains of inference gap-free and 
mechanically checkable) the modes of inference will be (as discussed above) of a copy-and-paste 
form, it will be appropriate for the begriffsschrift to render with a separate syntactic element each 
part of a thought (using ‘part’ in a so far metaphorical and unexamined way) that might be 
relevant to the thought’s inferential behaviour.  In short, it can seem, at least, as though, when 
translating a familiar thought from ordinary language, or arithmetic notation, into one’s 
begriffsschrift, one faces the question of what elements that thought consists. 
 
(By the way, this conception of the “parts of a thought” need not violate Frege’s own “context 
principle”—as should be plain from the fact that it echoes Frege’s own language: 
 
It is astonishing what language can do.  With a few syllables it can express an incalculable number of 
thoughts, so that even a thought grasped by a human being for the very first time can be put into a form of 
words which will be understood by someone to whom the thought is entirely new.  This would be 
                                                 
7 However, as Anscombe discusses in her (1981), the division of (spoken) natural language into words is not simply 
to be taken for granted. 
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impossible, were we not able to distinguish parts in the thought corresponding to parts of a sentence.  
(“Compound thoughts,” p. 36)8 
 
We are after all envisioning the train of thought here sketched as accompanying the creation of a 
begriffsschrift, that is, of a whole system of notation.  The point is just that once one has 
available a (quite possibly systematically, that is holistically, motivated) parsing of a thought, 
one can conceive of each element’s contribution to that thought independently, just in the sense 
that, for example, one can recognise that element again as it appears in other thoughts having (by 
the lights of the system) no elements but that one in common with the first.  –And ‘recognise that 
element again’ may well just mean: recognise that the thoughts in question are inferentially 
related, through their possession of that shared element.) 
 
A possible objection to this jump—to the jump from the idea of establishing a connection 
(however holistic) between the syntactic elements of one notational system and those of another, 
to the idea of positing elements in the thoughts themselves, in abstraction from their expression 
in any given notational system—may arise from the idea that, after all, the need to systematise 
inference does not have to amount to the need to systematise all inference.  Indeed, this is not an 
unfamiliar attitude in the philosophy of logic.  It finds clear expression in, for example, Belnap, 
Perloff and Xu’s (2001) discussion of the relation between their proposal for the logic of action 
sentences and Davidson’s (1966).  The two proposals appear to be quite incompatible, in the 
sense that one could not construct a “bigger system” for action sentences true at once to both 
proposals.  (Contrast, for example, the sense in which sentential logic, although it posits no 
internal structure in the atomic sentences of which it treats, is nevertheless plainly compatible 
with predicate logic—plain because the latter after all contains the former.)  However, rather 
                                                 
8 This is of course a different reason for introducing the idea of parts of a thought from the one under discussion 
above. 
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than feeling obliged to argue for the falsity of Davidson’s proposal (though they do offer some 
considerations in that direction as well), they write: “[Davidson] objects that modal constructions 
do not solve his problems, for example variable polyadicity.  We concur, noting only that we are 
concerned with different problems…” (2001: 79).  One might, that is, hold that the project of 
“systematising” inference needn’t be global; indeed the view expressed by Belnap, Perloff and 
Xu suggests that it can’t be global.  On this view, we can create a system of structures designed 
to track a certain sort of inferential behaviour exhibited (perhaps only somewhat fuzzily) by 
natural-language sentences; but doing so has no implications for the structure of those sentences 
themselves—nor for the structure of the thoughts expressed by them—since, after all, if we had 
wanted to track some other sort of inferential behaviour exhibited by those same sentences, we 
might have had to create a different and incompatible system. 
 
As I say, this is not an unfamiliar view; but nor is it universally held, nor again is it, in any case, 
Frege’s.9  As we saw, Frege’s purpose is to establish for certain on what arithmetic rests; and to 
that end, but also more generally, he aims with his begriffsschrift to render inferences fully 
explicit and gap-free.  Now, a “partial” system (in the sort of sense we have been considering) 
may of course be enough to accomplish this task for some given inference: as, for instance, 
sentential logic suffices for establishing the validity of certain classes of inference.  But of course 
the idea of a begriffsschrift as Frege envisions it is the idea of a system which enables the 
                                                 
9 It is perhaps telling that pressure is put on it by the very considerations Belnap, Perloff and Xu raise in their more 
positively anti-Davidsonian remarks: thus they point out that, when Davidson proclaims his intention to examine 
what rôles the parts of simple action sentences have with respect to those sentences’ inferential properties, “[h]alf 
the compositional problem has been left out” (p. 78)—that is, he neglects the question how such sentences 
themselves embed in larger contexts; and later, when he does address this latter question to some degree, they jib at 
the fact that his remarks bear little relation to his overall account, “since generally in compositional semantics a view 
about the logical form of a ‘part’ of a certain kind both constrains and is constrained by a view about the logical 
form of an expression that embeds just that kind of part” (p. 79).  This sounds rather like a demand for a “global” 
conception of the semantic project.  (But perhaps their idea is simply that any given account must be as it were 
harmonious, not that it must purport to capture everything about the phenomena.) 
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explicit and gap-free representation of all (formal) inference; for after all, if it were “partial” in 
the above sense, an enquirer into the basis of arithmetic, for instance, might be left wondering, 
about a given inference not sanctioned as formally valid by the begriffsschrift in use, whether it 
might not after all still be formally valid, but on the basis of some inferential property not 
captured by the present begriffsschrift.10 
 
But how can one be certain that one’s system “enables the explicit and gap-free representation of 
all (formal) inference”?  Van Heijenoort (1967b) argues that Frege’s own “universalist” 
conception of logic prevents him from framing a question like this, at least in the way that 
contemporary metalogic would: he cannot, that is, hold his proof theory up against an 
independently conceived model theory to determine whether it is complete.  Instead, Frege must 
proceed “experimentally”, by canvassing the modes of inference actually used in arithmetic (for 
instance) and determining whether he can reduce them to those sanctioned by his system (or 
whether he can expand his system to encompass them while holding on to the conception of his 
system as a system of logical inference). 
 
Now, though van Heijenoort is certainly right that Frege lacks the contemporary conception of 
model theory (whose initiation van Heijenoort attributes to Löwenheim)—and that this lack is 
not merely accidental, but is essential to his conception of the quantifiers (in turn essential to his 
conception of logic) as always ranging over everything there is (so that the idea, central to model 
                                                 
10 Could it be that arithmetic rested on some proper part of formally valid inference, and that Frege would content 
himself with capturing that part of it?  But compare the passage from the Preface to Begriffsschrift alluded to above, 
where he gestures at the application of the begriffsschrift to fields besides arithmetic.  (Note that, though he foresees 
the need for “a further development of the symbolism” to facilitate this application, he is not envisioning a 
development of the logical structure of the symbolism, nor (hence) of the range of types of formal validity it 
sanctions: for ‘further’ here appears to hark back to the previous paragraph, where he says that, to accommodate 
geometry, “[o]nly a few more symbols would have to be added for the intuitive relations that occur here” 
(Begriffsschrift, Preface, p. VI, emphasis added).) 
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theory, of “varying the domain” is unintelligible to him)11—it might be pointed out that Frege 
does, nevertheless, have what can perfectly well be called a formal semantics.12  Thus (to give a 
brief and very partial sketch, or rather, a pair of examples) it is a famous doctrine of his that 
singular terms refer to objects (when they refer at all, as they do in a properly scientific notation) 
and predicates to concepts; and that this distinction between object and concept, located as it is in 
the realm of reference, is “founded deep in the nature of things.”13  Herein, indeed, lies the core 
of the solution he proffers to the problem of predication: concepts, being a special case of 
functions, are “unsaturated” (ibid, p. 6), and are completed by objects to yield a unified whole. 
 
But where does this doctrine come from?  How does Frege know that the analysis of sentences 
into names and predicates, referring to objects and concepts (indeed concepts of varying levels 
and taking varying numbers of arguments), yields a correct account of the unity of those 
sentences?  One answer to this question places primary emphasis back on Frege’s attention to 
inference.  Thus Thomas Ricketts (1985, 1986) has argued that Frege distinguishes between 
singular terms and predicates on the basis of the differences in their respective rôles in inference: 
from a sentence containing a singular term one can in general infer another sentence, derived 
from the first by replacement of the singular term by another co-referring term in accordance 
with Leibniz’s Law; and these same terms play a distinctive rôle in inferences concerning 
generality.  Given this inferentially grounded account of a singular term, one can then formulate 
a corresponding account of a predicate: it is that which is left when a singular term is elided from 
                                                 
11 and this in turn is of a piece with Frege’s thinking of the formulae of his begriffsschrift as meaningful rather than 
as schematic (hence the title of van Heijenoort’s article).  I am setting aside many such details in the text. 
12 As Dummett notes:  “Frege did not explicitly state the modern distinction between the semantic (model-theoretic) 
and the syntactic (proof-theoretic) treatments of the notion of logical consequence: but it is implicit in his writing….  
[for in addition to the formal system,] the semantic explanations of the sentences of the formalized language [are] set 
out, clearly separated from the formal development, in German in the accompanying text” (1973/1981: 81-82). 
13 “Function and concept” (1891: 31).  In the sentence from which I have quoted, Frege is actually speaking of the 
distinction between first- and second-level functions; but it is manifest that his view carries over to the distinction I 
discuss in the text. 
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a sentence.  Meanwhile, Dummett (1973/1981: Ch. 2) has argued that the metaphor of 
“unsaturatedness” favoured by Frege when speaking of the contrast between functions and 
objects has its home in the notion of a “complex predicate”, which is needed not to account for 
the internal structure of atomic sentences but for the behaviour of quantified sentences built up 
from them. 
 
It is of course undeniable that inference is of great and perennial concern for Frege; as we have 
seen, from the beginning of his first published work he emphasises that the design of his 
begriffsschrift was controlled always and only by the consideration that it be suited to the 
perspicuous representation of inferential behaviour.  And there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that this concern was sidelined in his later work (where his attention to semantics becomes more 
prominent).  Nevertheless, Ricketts’s reading of Frege is not uncontroversial.  It has been 
observed, first of all, that distinguishing between singular terms and predicates on the basis of 
their rôles in inferences involving generalisation, instantiation and Leibniz’s Law, for example, 
is not as simple as Ricketts suggests.14  A perhaps deeper worry concerns the imputation to Frege 
of a contentious answer to the question of the relative priority of inference and semantics.  For if 
Ricketts is right, a prior conception of correct inference is what enables Frege to develop a 
posterior conception of the semantic values of expressions, together with a conception of their 
truth.15  But one may well wonder whether the notion of correct inference is available to one 
who lacks the notion of truth and hence of truth preservation.  One may wonder, that is, whether 
it makes sense to imagine a thinker who has, first, a conception of the inferential relations in 
                                                 
14 Thus e.g. Dummett himself, in “Proper names” (1973/1981: Ch. 4), goes to extreme lengths to elucidate Frege’s 
notion of a proper name along the sort of lines Ricketts has in mind here, and in the end leaves the account a little 
schematic (though he does conclude that “the Fregean notion of a proper name is in principle capable of being 
supplied with precise criteria which are formal and linguistic” (p. 80)).  (Thanks to M. Valaris for drawing my 
attention to the relevance of this reference here.) 
15 This may not be quite fair to Ricketts; see the second paragraph of footnote 18 below for a qualification. 
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which her judgments stand to one another, and only later extracts from this a conception of 
objects as that about which her judgments are true or false.  One might argue, rather, that to 
engage in the practice of judging is to take one’s judgments to be true, and to recognise that (in 
general) the truth or falsity of one’s judgments is independent of the fact that one is making them.  
But this is to say that they are objective, that is, that they are about objects.16  And one might 
argue, in opposition to the view Ricketts ascribes to Frege, that the inferential relations in which 
one’s judgments stand to one another derive from these prior facts about their content: good 
inferences are truth-preserving. (Indeed, the analogue of this view in the field of formal logic 
appears to be the default position, as witnessed by the use of the terms ‘soundness’ (or 
‘consistency’) and ‘completeness’ to describe how well a proof theory for a formal language 
measures up to the language’s semantics.)  If all this were so, we might find room for a sense in 
which Frege’s logic—the systematisation of inference constituted by his begriffsschrift—is 
accountable to semantics after all (even if not to model theory): for if Frege has this independent 
conception of the structure of thoughts, he may take it to be something to which he can hold up 
for comparison the structure his begriffsschrift itself imputes to thoughts on the basis of their 
inferential behaviour.17 
 
However, confronted by these competing claims of priority, it ought to become clear that there is 
a third alternative.  If, on the one hand, to infer is to infer correctly, where that involves (at a 
                                                 
16 This move may appear to consist in nothing more than word play; and no doubt it is too quick.  It would take work 
to show that the idea of an object (in anything like the sense in which Frege means the word) is presupposed by the 
very idea of objectivity.  (Indeed Ricketts himself argues, in his (1986), that Frege’s notion of objectivity, too, is 
prior to his semantic conceptions.)  I mean the remark in the text just as a programmatic indication of an alternative 
motivation for a categorial analysis, not as a full spelling-out of such a motivation. 
17 One might here compare Evans’s (1976) suggestion, which we discussed in Chapter I, that we are only entitled to 
treat differences in inferential behaviour among classes of expression as structurally grounded, and hence to treat the 
classes as distinct semantic categories, when we can find a distinct “underlying real essence” (a set, an object, a 
function of a particular type, or some such) for each class that can explain the inferential differences.  Similarly, one 
might think of Davidson’s (1970) complaint against Cargile’s calculus for action sentences, to the effect that he 
gives (indeed can give) no semantics for it, and hence cannot explain its correctness even qua inferential calculus. 
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minimum) truth preservation, at the same time (it might be held) one cannot be said even to have 
understood a sentence, much less to have judged of its truth, if one has no inkling of its 
inferential connections to other sentences.  In other words, rather than affirming the priority of 
inference over semantics or vice versa, one might hold inferential and semantic notions to be 
equally basic and interdependent.18 
 
For my purposes here, it is not necessary to resolve this issue.19  We began, after all, with a 
discussion of the views of Frege, not of the truth of the matter.  But further, it’s not even 
necessary for me to resolve the question how best to read Frege: for what is in any case common 
to all three of these views of the relation between inference and semantics is the idea that the 
(formal) inferential properties of judgments are tightly connected with—that is, stand in 
something like a one-one relationship with—their semantic structure.  
 
Now, if I have a conception of the semantic structure of a sentence, or of the thought a sentence 
expresses, as settled by its (formal) inferential behaviour—whether I mean by that 1) that the 
inferential behaviour is determined by, and hence acts as evidence of, that structure, in principle 
graspable independently, or 2) that the categories in whose terms I articulate the notion of 
structure derive their very intelligibility from the prior notion of inference, or finally 3) that the 
categorial structure of a sentence is neither graspable independently of inferential notions nor 
                                                 
18 Here compare John McDowell’s (2005) critique of Robert Brandom’s Making it explicit (1994).  Brandom 
champions the former priority claim over the latter, and claims to find supporters of each among major authors in 
the history of the philosophy of logic; but McDowell argues that Brandom misses the third possibility alluded to in 
the text, and that this in turn distorts his readings of some of those authors. 
To be fair, by the way, it is perhaps more charitable to read Ricketts’s reading of Frege as in this camp than 
as in the “inferentialist” camp with Brandom.  Ricketts’s central concern is perhaps not so much with the priority of 
inference over semantics as with the priority of inference over ontology; and indeed Ricketts tends to group assertion, 
judgment and truth together with inference, and in contrast with ontology, as notions hanging together in an 
interdependent system in Frege’s thought.  (But since the ontology in question is precisely that in terms of which 
Frege articulates his semantics, it is tricky to keep them separate in the way that this concession to Ricketts would 
seem to require: hence my use of Ricketts’s work in the text.) 
19 Indeed, as will emerge, I’m not convinced that there is a straightforward resolution to be had—at least not in the 
terms here laid out. 
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simply constituted by them, but is coeval and interdependent with them—a structural description 
of a sentence on that conception will at once yield an account of its inferential behaviour.  
Frege’s conception of a perspicuous notation, a begriffsschrift, is as one which at once represents 
perspicuously sentences’ inferential potential and captures their categorial structure. 
 
The bare idea that inference is related to structure is of course not new with Frege.  What I want 
to suggest is new with Frege is the thought that a complete, systematic treatment of inference, of 
the sort that we have been exploring, will at once yield full insight into propositional structure.  
This claim has a very close affinity to a thesis of Sebastian Rödl’s, who claims that “Frege’s 
central thought was that a certain deductive order characterizes thinking as such” (2005: 8).  In 
what has preceded, I have been trying to give an account of Frege’s arrival at this “central 
thought”.  We shall return to Rödl’s thesis in Chapter IV. 
 
§3.  One mode of combination. 
 
Now consider the sentences ‘Caesar is dying’ and ‘Caesar was dying’: consider, in particular, 
trying to regiment them in a begriffsschrift of the sort we have just explained Frege’s to be.  Now, 
it seems intuitively clear that these two sentences share another common element besides the one 
whose presence is indicated by ‘Caesar’: viz., the one whose presence is indicated in each case 
by a conjugation of the verb ‘to die’.  This is of course contestable; that is to say, one could insist 
that there are reasons for finding no common element indicated by both ‘is dying’ and ‘was 
dying’.  In particular, in view of the connection we have seen between inference and categorial 
structure underlying the notion of a begriffsschrift, we may believe ourselves forced to a view 
such as this if we cannot devise a satisfactory regimentation of the inferential behaviour of these 
sentences that imputes to them this common element.  But the natural hypothesis with which to 
begin is the one just recorded; and after all it would be a quite drastic measure to deny it, since 
21 
there do after all appear to be what look like structural inferences hanging on the reappearance 
from one of these judgments to the other of a common element.  (For instance, it would seem 
that the following inference form is valid:  (φ)(F)((x)[whenever x is φ’ing, x is F] → (y)(y was 
φ’ing → y was F)).)  Let us therefore work, for the moment, with the supposition that ‘is dying’ 
and ‘was dying’ indicate the presence in the respective judgments of a common element. 
 
Now, though in our example the string ‘dying’ appears in both of the sentences under 
consideration, in many languages it is by means of a difference in inflection that it is indicated 
that the two elements we are supposing to be common to both of these sentences are nonetheless 
combined in different ways in each: and that is to say that there is no one string of symbols that 
invariably indicates the presence of the second element under discussion.  But it would clearly be 
no less plausible prima facie that there is indeed a common element.  A begriffsschrift meeting 
Frege’s desiderata—one in which correct inference can be delineated by purely syntactic 
means—would therefore incline us to rewrite sentences of such languages in such a way as to 
represent the second element, too, consistently by a single symbol or string, so as to fit it for such 
syntactically definable manipulation.   
 
(I do not mean to imply that the idea of a notational system in which inference is definable 
purely syntactically is flatly incompatible with the phenomenon of inflection (for instance): since, 
for one thing, an inflection can itself, presumably, be characterised by purely syntactic means.  
(The presence of irregular verbs makes this difficult, but surely not impossible; and in any case, 
since the idea of a language with no irregular verbs is manifestly consistent, the fact (if it were 
one) that irregularity might rule out the possibility of characterising inflection syntactically 
would not show that inflection itself is directly incompatible with the idea of a Fregean 
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begriffsschrift.)  But I want to bring out as clearly as possible the consequences of treating 
sentences such as these as containing more than one element in common, and abstracting from 
the phenomenon of inflection helps to do this.  In any case, since (for the reasons already 
canvassed) Frege wanted to keep his modes of inference as simple and few in number as possible, 
it is plain that he would prefer a system in which each element were represented consistently by 
a single symbol over a system countenancing a special and highly complex characterisation of 
substitution tailored to the irregularities of German or English.) 
 
But we will certainly not represent both sentences as, say, ‘Caesar—dying’—that is, using 
identical strings of symbols—since, given that a begriffsschrift is such as to characterise 
inference syntactically, this would force the system to treat the two sentences as inferentially 
indistinguishable, but they are not so (for from ‘Caesar is dying’, but not from ‘Caesar was 
dying’, one can infer, for instance, ‘Caesar is dying’20).  A begriffsschrift requires a further 
symbol, or at least some sort of typographical distinction21, to mark the difference.  We might 
thus write the two sentences as, for instance, ‘Caesar / dying’ and ‘Caesar \ dying’, or perhaps 
just as ‘Caesardying’ and ‘Caesardying’. 
 
                                                 
20 If I report at 4:00 that Caesar was dying when I visited him at 3:00, I do not thereby commit myself to the claim 
that he is now dying; he may have already died (or alternatively the blood-letter may have since arrived and cured 
him). 
21 The idea of employing a typographical distinction may remind us of Sellars’s “Jumblese”.  And of course, it 
would be closer to Jumblese to write these sentences as, say, ‘CAESAR’ and ‘ ’ than to include an element 
‘dying’: for Sellars’s (putatively neo-Tractarian) idea was that predicating something of an object is most 
perspicuously represented not by the concatenation, with the name of the object, of a further symbol for the 
predicate but by a modification of the name.  So it may seem (now that I point this out) that I was too hasty when I 
moved from the thought that the forms of the verb ‘to die’ indicate the presence of an inferential commonality to the 
thought that they recommend the introduction into our begriffsschrift of some string, say ‘dying’, to mark that 
commonality, rather than this sort of Jumblese-style typographical quirk.  However, I think that the point to be made 
four paragraphs below in the text will discharge whatever potentially illegitimate hypothesis this move rested on.  
(In any case, we shall discuss Jumblese in a little more detail in Chapter V.) 
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Now, it may be that one of these signs serves to convey nothing more than that the two elements 
represented by ‘Caesar’ and ‘dying’ are to be combined (since, after all, ‘Caesardying’ would be 
hard to read).  Thus Frege himself uses parentheses to enclose the names for arguments of a 
function, and the comma to separate them when there are more than one.  But it cannot be that 
both signs do this; if they both “conveyed nothing more than that the two elements were to be 
combined” (tout court), then we might as well represent both sentences, once again, as ‘Caesar—
dying’, falsely to the differences in their inferential behaviour.  Instead, one of the signs, at least, 
must contribute something further of its own.  And if the pressures of begriffsschriftliche 
systematisation have in this way driven us to include among our symbols ‘/’ and ‘\’, then our 
earlier train of thought—according to which the begriffsschrift represents at once the categorial 
structure of thought—will lead us to suppose that (again, at least one of) these symbols 
represents a further element of thought. 
 
But now note, in connection with our earlier remarks about the formal-semantic interpretation of 
the begriffsschrift, how apt this system is for a functional interpretation.  Just as, at the linguistic 
level, ‘Caesar / dying’ can be viewed as the value of a function applied to the words ‘Caesar’ and 
‘dying’ as arguments, and ‘Caesar \ dying’ as the value of a different function applied to the 
same arguments, so ‘\’ and ‘/’ themselves (or, again, at least one of them), which (according to 
that earlier train of thought) have now emerged as representing further elements of the thoughts 
expressed with their aid, must represent elements whose (ordered) combination with the 
elements represented by ‘Caesar’ and ‘dying’ yields a unique thought.  (Unique for the same 
reason for which we couldn’t have represented both sentences in the begriffsschrift as, say, 
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‘Caesar—dying’, as discussed above.)  But then, again, there is no bar to our conceiving of the 
sort of combination at issue at the semantic level as functional.22 
 
Thus, for instance, we might understand ‘/’ as it appears in our rendering of ‘Caesar is dying’ as 
mere combination (and think of “mere combination” as expressing present-tense combination), 
and ‘\’ as an operator on sentences shifting them into the past; this would yield a tense-logical 
approach to the difference between the two sentences.  Alternatively, we might suppose both ‘/’ 
and ‘\’ to indicate, implicitly, the moment at which (as we might in this case try to put it) the 
combination of Caesar and dying obtains, something along the lines of standard quantificational 
semantics for tense logic; we might then be encouraged to insert into our formal rendering of 
such sentences an explicit argument place for moments in place of the crude ‘/’ and ‘\’: thus e.g. 
‘Caesar—t dying’ (which we would introduce into our begriffsschrift together with quantifiers 
and the sort of apparatus necessary for expressing indexical reference to moments such as the 
present).  Either way, the result would be a pair of sentences each of which is intelligible as a 
functional combination of its elements. 
 
 (What about the case where we represent the difference between ‘Caesar is dying’ and ‘Caesar 
was dying’ not with distinct symbols such as ‘/’ and ‘\’ but rather with a typographical distinction 
such as the superscript/subscript distinction?23  First of all, I hope it is clear that in the present 
case, the two are mere notational variants, so that what follows about the interpretation of the 
system with ‘/’ and ‘\’ will surely hold too of the system with the typographically represented 
                                                 
22 Just what function is at issue in a given case is not to be supposed to be too easily read off from the formalism: in 
∀xFx, ‘∀x’ does not denote a truth function of Fx, for example, and likewise for e.g. ◊ and □ in modal logics.  But 
the meaning—in some sense—of ∀xFx is a function of the meaning of Fx: just what sense of ‘meaning’ is at issue is 
to be spelled out by the semantic apparatus; but on whatever parameters the semantic value of the compound ends 
up depending, that dependence will be construable functionally. 
23 And ditto for the even more Jumblese approach of writing ‘CAESAR’ and ‘ ’ rather than introducing a 
symbol ‘dying’: see note 21 above. 
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distinction.  And in general, there would only be an obstacle to our recasting a notational system 
making use of such typographical distinctions to represent differences in modes of combination 
of elements as a system representing those differences using further symbols, if the typographical 
distinctions in question were as it were continuous: if they were used to represent a range of 
distinctions so fine-grained that even, for instance, a range of marks with numerical subscripts 
that could take any rational value would not suffice to represent the same distinction.  (Thus 
imagine that, again Jumblese-like, we say that an object has a certain colour by writing its name 
in that colour.)  But it should be clear that, whatever the interests of such a system might be, it 
would no longer be a begriffsschrift in our (that is, Frege’s) sense; for inference rules making 
substantive use of such a typographical phenomenon would not be characterisable in the sort of 
recursion on the grammar constitutive of a formal system.24) 
 
At this point we may retract, if we wish, our hypothesis that ‘Caesar is dying’ and ‘Caesar was 
dying’ share not one but two common elements (though, for the reasons adduced earlier, it is an 
awfully plausible hypothesis).  The moral at which we have arrived—namely, that, when we do 
find ourselves treating distinct judgments as composed, in our begriffsschrift, of common 
elements, we must find as well a further element in at least one of the judgments, construable in 
functional terms, representing (what we might otherwise have wished to call!) the mode of 
combination in question—is one which will hold for any such case, whichever cases those turn 
out to be.25 
                                                 
24 This point will become crucial—and will be expounded with a little more care—in chapter V, in our consideration 
of the development from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to his paper “Some remarks on logical form” and beyond. 
25 This “moral” is, I take it, expressed in the penultimate paragraph of (the version I have seen of) the introduction to 
Thompson’s forthcoming book.  However, it is there simply asserted; I have here attempted to argue for it.  (A 
quibble:  Thompson puts the point in this way:  The idea that some signs might be “‘syncategorematic’ in the 
classical sense” is “unknown in Frege’s actual system of representation, in which every elementary sign purports to have 
a ‘reference’” (forthcoming: Introduction).  But as we have seen, Frege uses parentheses and commas, which have no 




§4.  Predication as functional. 
 
We have seen that Frege’s conception of a begriffsschrift—and in general, the idea of a formal 
system—brings with it (at least as a guaranteed-to-be-viable option) the conception of the 
thought-elements denoted by the grammatical elements of the system as functionally 
composed.26  In particular, for instance, we arrive at Frege’s own theory of predication.  In 
“Function and concept,” Frege announces that he will broaden the notion of a function (as it was 
used in his time in mathematics) from what are in effect operations (or constructions out of 
operations) on numbers27 to something closer to the modern conception of a function, namely, 
any mapping from elements of one set to those of another, without restriction on the nature of the 
elements.28  In particular, he proposes to supplement the battery of operations already recognised 
from which functions may be constructed, such as + and -, with the signs  =, < and > (which do 
not, it is important to see, stand for operations), so that in addition to functions such as ‘ζ + 2’, 
                                                                                                                                                             
is placing a lot of weight on ‘in the classical sense’.  In any case, I think the point is put more perspicuously by 
saying that in Frege all combination is functional, and so there is no need for the syncategorematic except in so far 
as it helps to make clear the functional structure (as parentheses do).  Again, Thompson has (something close to) the 
point about functional combination too; I take myself not to be making a wholly new point, but to be trying to give 
an account of it.) 
26I do not of course claim that everyone who so much as puts forth a formal system at once presents a “conception of 
the thought-elements denoted by the grammatical elements of the system,” whether as functionally composed or 
otherwise: a notable (indeed obvious) counterexample is Hilbert’s doctrine of formalism.  The qualification “at least 
as a guaranteed-to-be-viable option” is meant to accommodate this. 
27 Perhaps ‘operation’ (or even ‘construction out of operations’) does not cover the case Frege describes, as already  
extant in mathematical practice, “of a function whose value is 1 for rational and 0 for irrational numbers” (“Function 
and concept,” p. 12); but in any case what I want is just that this function’s domain and range, like those of the 
others he canvasses, consist only of numbers.  Still, it’s interesting that this function is awfully close to what Frege’s 
own treatment of the concept ‘ζ is a rational number’ would be (differing only in that i) it’s defined only for 
numbers as arguments, and ii) its range is {1, 0} instead of {the True, the False}). 
28 Actually, Frege’s is not quite the modern conception of a(n extensional) function, according to which, after all, 
any set of ordered pairs can be taken as a model of a function.  In contrast, Frege’s remarks about functions would 
seem to exclude, for instance, one presented by {<2, the True>, < ζ is red, the Sun>, <&, ζ ≤ 3>}, for two reasons: 
both because of his “requirement for functions in general that they must have a value for every argument” (1891: 20), 
and because Frege insists, in addition, that “functions whose arguments are and must be functions are fundamentally 
different from functions whose arguments are objects and cannot be anything else” (1891: 26-27).  (Indeed, this 
second reason tells us something about how we are to understand the first one: when Frege speaks of “a value for 
every argument,” we are to hear that generality as restricted to a particular logical type.)  We shall be reminded of 
this characteristic of Frege’s view of functions as in this sense typed when we come to consider his treatment of 
quantification, as contrasted with Wittgenstein’s in the Tractatus, in Chapter V. 
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we have ones such as ‘ζ = 2’.29  As ‘ζ + 2’ yields a number as value for any number taken as 
argument, Frege must explain what values ‘ζ = 2’ yields.  As he puts it: “I now say, ‘the value of 
our function is a truth-value’, and distinguish between the truth-values of what is true and what is 
false” (“Function and concept,” p. 13).  That is to say, he introduces truth values as possible 
values (and also arguments) of functions.  And he goes on to propose to treat (first-level) 
predicates as referring to functions taking objects generally as arguments and mapping them into 
the set containing these two new objects. 
 
This is a rehearsal of a familiar theme; my purpose in presenting it is to bring out how congenial 
this conception of the semantic value of predicates is to the conception of a begriffsschrift we 
have been examining.  Conceptualising predication as functional in this way meshes perfectly 
with the idea of a begriffsschrift: for a function just is something which, fed a given argument, 
yields a given value: the notion as it were embodies the idea, emerging from our discussion in §3, 
that the referents of the symbols of a given begriffsschrift proposition combine in only one 
way.30 
 
I should emphasise that, as will emerge more clearly in the next section, Frege’s decision to treat 
predicates, in particular, as standing for functions into the set of truth values is simply one way 
of precisifying the general idea of a semantics based on the idea of functional application.  It is 
that general idea, and not merely Frege’s particular way of spelling it out, that I am saying is 
                                                 
29 Anscombe (1987-1988) highlights the momentousness of this move. 
30 By the way, note that the claim is not that, since (in a linear notational system) there is only one form of 
combination, viz., concatenation, there can only be one form of combination at the semantic level.  On the contrary, 
Frege is at pains to point out the essential difference between, e.g., the relation between a concept and an object that 
falls under it, on the one hand, and the relation between a second-level concept and the concept that “falls within” it, 
on the other (“On concept and object,” p. 201)—both of which relations, one might say, are represented in the 
begriffsschrift by concatenation.  (I am abstracting from the use of parentheses.)  But where the mode of 
combination is, as here, distinct, this is indicated, even if not by a difference in the syntactic expression of 
combination, yet by a difference in the expressions for the combinants: for the notation is typed.  What is essential is 
that, given a string of begriffsschrift symbols (and, hence, given their types), what concatenation represents in their 
case is settled.  Thus combination is in every case functional. 
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congenial to the notion, under discussion in this chapter so far, of a begriffsschrift.  Frege 
himself sometimes articulates the very general idea: for instance in “Compound thoughts” (1923-
26: 37): “… it is natural to suppose that, for logic in general, combination into a whole always 
comes about by the saturation of something unsaturated.” 
 
(To forestall a misunderstanding, perhaps I ought to add that when I claim that Frege is here 
presenting a “theory of predication”, I do not mean anything which would stand in tension with 
Frege’s own disavowal of the traditional approach to logic resting on the surface-grammatical 
distinction between subject and predicate.  Granted, it would be a violent misreading of Frege to 
take it that his innovative application of function-argument analysis to logic consisted in his 
taking all of and only what had hitherto been regarded as predicates to be functions, and all of 
and only what had hitherto been regarded as subjects to be arguments.  For one thing, one of the 
cardinal differences between Frege’s and the traditional approach is that function-argument 
analysis allows, in general, multiple analyses of a given proposition, as Frege repeatedly 
highlights: in ‘22 = 4’, we may think of the function now as ‘ζ2 = 4’, now as ‘2ζ = 4’, ‘22 = ζ’, or 
‘ζζ = 4’, and so on (and of what fills ‘ζ’ in each case as argument).  For another, a fundamental 
insight of his into the nature of quantification is that quantifier phrases must not be run together 
with proper names, as the traditional subject-predicate distinction may tempt us to do.  
Nevertheless, we can see that we have in Frege’s semantics a “theory of predication”, indeed a 
functional theory of predication, if we consider first, sloganistically, that he does after all, as we 
observed, understand predicates to refer to functions—specifically, to functions into {T, F}, 
which he calls concepts; and secondly, less sloganistically (and more generally), on whatever 
parsing of a judgment you like, such as one where the argument is a concept and the function a 
second-level concept, still the mode of combination of the elements of the judgment is 
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understood in functional terms (and indeed, on Frege’s specific conception of this idea, the 
function in question will always be such as to map its argument onto an element in {T, F}).  In 
short, we may say that by “a theory of predication” we mean something like “a theory of the 
unity of the thought,” such that both the traditional subject-predicate analysis and Frege’s 
function-argument analysis constitute theories of predication—theories of the constitution of 
thoughts and of how their elements hang together.  It is in this sense that I say that Frege’s 
“theory of predication” is functional.) 
 
§5.  Suspicion of the functional theory of predication. 
 
Now, it is worth noticing, first, that Frege’s introduction (by fiat) of nonoperations such as =, < 
and > to the set of building blocks from which functions may be constructed leads him 
immediately to have to countenance as grammatical propositions, indeed in some cases as 
expressions of truths, strings which would hitherto have been taken for gibberish, such as ‘(22 = 
4) = (2 > 1)’.  I do not mean to imply that this practice is unintelligible or incoherent, but simply 
to highlight the revisionism it involves. 
 
This revisionism becomes more acute (even if still soft-pedaled) when, after a handful of 
arithmetical examples, Frege writes: 
 
If the value of the function x2 = 1 for an argument, e.g. for 2, is the False, we can express this as follows: … 
‘2 does not fall under the concept: square root of 1’.  We thus see how closely that which is called a 
concept in logic is connected with what we call a function.  Indeed, we may say at once: a concept is a 
function whose value is always a truth-value.  (“Function and concept,” 15) 
 
Now, we may be inclined to “say this at once” if the only examples we have before us are 
mathematical.  But remember: a function is a one- or many-one relation: that is, it is something 
which, when applied to a given argument (or, in general, to a given n-tuple of arguments), 
consistently yields the same one value.  Again, this does jibe well with the concepts used in 
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mathematical cases.  But there is in fact a great range of concepts—the vast majority of them, 
one wants to say—which don’t, prima facie, appear to be modeled quite this well by the notion 
of a function.  Any concept whose predication of the same object(s) is now true, now false would 
seem, again prima facie, ill-suited for modeling by a one- or many-one relation: thus ‘ζ is 
pleased’, ‘ζ is cloudy’, ‘ζ is grateful to ξ’,and so on.  The only predication of a nonmathematical 
concept Frege invites us to consider over the course of the entire lecture (namely, ‘Caesar 
conquered Gaul’) is one which has obtained for some two millennia, so it does not invite 
immediate reflection on its temporality—but the point remains that it is obscurantist to declare 
that “we may say at once” that concepts are functions without even a nod in the direction of the 
great many concepts for which the functional theory appears at first glance quite hopeless. 
 
§6.  Response to the suspicion. 
 
Of course, the previous section articulates a naïve view; it will be obvious how the 
“functionalist” will respond.  Indeed, we have provided the materials for a response already: for 
we pointed out at the beginning of §3 above that mere intuition does not constitute sufficient 
grounds for finding a given compositional structure in a judgment; and we pointed out in the 
penultimate paragraph of §4 that Frege’s is just one way of giving a functional model of the 
semantics of predicates.  In particular, in this case, if we are pressed to fit our judgment into a 
function-argument mold—and the whole force of this chapter has been to show why Frege’s 
overarching project, and the conception of a begriffsschrift which serves as his means for 
carrying it out, does press him in this direction—then we can insist that, despite appearances, the 
relevant concept at issue in ‘Caesar conquered Gaul’ is not ‘ζ conquered ξ’ but, for instance, ‘ζ 
conquers ξ at τ’.  (Or we might consider finding in the judgment a predicate ‘ζ conquers ξ’ where 
what fills the place of ζ is not the name of an individual but the name of a “time-slice” of an 
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individual.  Or again, we might consider ‘Caesar conquered Gaul’ itself a function from times to 
truth values.  In this case, too, we preserve the claim that ‘ζ conquered ξ’ is a functional element 
in the judgment, though notice that in this case it no longer denotes a concept in Frege’s sense, 
but rather a function from pairs of objects to functions from times to truth values31.  And such an 
approach can be generalised, to yield a conception of meanings of sentences as (still 
functionally) dependent on a wide range of contextual factors for completion.)  Indeed, if for any 
of various reasons we find ourselves dissatisfied with Frege’s idea that the Bedeutung of a 
thought is a truth value, we may stray even further from his specific approach to predication—
while all the while holding firm to the notion that propositional unity consists in functional 
combination—by understanding a predicate as referring to a function from the set of possible 
worlds into the set of objects, or by thinking in terms of situations instead of possible worlds, for 
instance. 
 
Such a response to the objection that predication is not in fact perspicuously modeled as 
functional—namely, the proffering of further, tacit argument places, and further types of possible 
argument, by means of which some element in any given judgment can be made out to stand for 
a function after all—can seem obligatory, again precisely because of the pressure that the idea of 
a begriffsschrift puts on us to find function-argument structure in the judgments we regiment, 
combined with the idea that our judgments must indeed be susceptible of such regimentation.  A 
rejoinder to the response, demonstrating that this is not always possible, will have to be long and 
                                                 
31 as we would put it; Frege would not speak of “functions from times to truth values,” since a function for him must 
be defined over everything in the logical category of its inputs.  Thus if we had been persuaded to introduce “times” 
into our ontology, as this approach presupposes, then that is to say that (as Frege would see it) we would have come 
to consider times “objects”, and we would thus consider not “functions from times to truth values” but functions 
from objects to truth values—or indeed, functions from objects to objects, which latter happen always to be truth 
values—that is, first-level concepts.  (Cf. how quickly Frege infers that his newly discovered “truth values” are 
objects.)  But of course we capture the intended idea in Frege’s framework by stipulating, for instance, that such a 
function yield the False as value for any argument that is not a time. 
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detailed; the following chapter will attempt to provide one for the case of what Thompson calls 
“natural-historical judgments.”  But let the dialectical situation be registered: Frege starts out 
with what Wittgenstein might have called a one-sided diet of examples, on the basis of which 
(though of course not simply gratuitously, as we have seen) he offers a theory of predication 
which appears singularly unsatisfying for virtually any example of a concept besides those from 
the field in which he is primarily interested.  The defender of the theory attempts to fit the 
apparent counterexamples—that is, again, the bulk of what would ordinarily be considered 
concepts—into the Procrustean bed, by searching for hidden arguments in the judgments at issue.  
If she is successful, the rewards are rich: we can assimilate more and more swaths of discourse to 
the regimentations of the begriffsschrift.  But it is worth enquiring into the question whether the 
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§1.  Introduction:  Thompson on “natural-historical judgments.” 
 
In “The representation of life” (1995), Michael Thompson undertakes an investigation of the 
expression of what he calls “natural-historical judgments,” that is, judgments describing the 
natural history of a kind of living thing.  He claims that sentences expressing such judgments—
paradigmatically, sentences with the form “The S is F”, which he calls “Aristotelian 
categoricals”, such as ‘The bobcat breeds in spring’—exhibit a distinct logical form: distinct 
from that of any other kind of sentence, and in particular not resolvable into the kind of 
quantificational forms familiar to logicians since the work of Frege.  He claims, however, that his 
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investigation is nevertheless in the spirit of Frege: for, just as Frege taught us to distinguish the 
logical categories object and concept, so Thompson is drawing our attention to the logical 
categories life form, vital operation and so on.  Thompson writes: “It is one of the lessons taught 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein, if I understand him, that we must recognize many intuitively more 
determinate distinctions of the sort Frege introduced” (1995: 249n4, his emphasis). 
 
This claim will surely be met with raised eyebrows by most logicians.  There is of course a range 
of opinions as to the proper demarcation of logic; but the criterion by which Thompson singles 
out his favoured class of judgments seems so palpably to be a matter of content that the 
attribution to them of a unique logical form will just seem to rest on a confusion.  In particular, I 
suspect that most logicians will only see promise, if in anything, in the attribution of a unique 
logical form to generic sentences generally.  That is, they may be willing to be persuaded that 
generic sentences such as ‘The bobcat breeds in spring’ or ‘Polar bears are at risk of extinction’ 
or ‘Canadians favour the social safety net’ can’t be recast faithfully in classical first-order 
predicate logic unsupplemented; but however they are to be understood, they are all to be 
understood in the same way—or, if divisions are to be made, they should be made along more 
obviously logically salient grounds, such (perhaps) as the syntactic distinction between the 
(apparent) singular predication of the first example as contrasted with the indefinite plurals in the 
second two1, or (perhaps) the semantic distinction between predicates that seem to hold only of 
kinds (such as that in the second example) and predicates that hold of a kind’s instances (such as 
those of the first and third examples)2.  But the isolation of a subset of generics on the grounds 
                                                 
1 Thus Ariel Cohen (2001), for instance, argues that the logical behaviour of generic sentences with bare plural noun 
phrases in subject position differs systematically from that of those with singular descriptions—or, more precisely, 
that the former class of generics exhibits an ambiguity not seen in the latter.  (We shall examine his work in a little 
more detail below.) 
2 Though they do not put the point in quite the same way as I have here, this is in effect the same distinction as that 
drawn by Gerstner and Krifka, who call sentences containing the former “D-generics” and those containing the latter 
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that their subject is a form of life will seem gratuitous to them.  (This is so partly because it will 
cut across the boundaries that will appear more natural: thus the sentence about bobcats could, it 
would seem, be indifferently expressed in the indefinite plural: ‘Bobcats breed in spring’.3) 
 
Thompson anticipates something like this train of thought, and has this to say in response (I shall 
quote at length): 
 
Perhaps then our sort of proposition [viz., expressions of natural-historical judgments] should be brought 
under the linguists’ rubric generic sentence, and we should follow them in their attempt to supply a 
‘semantic’ analysis.  Here, though, we meet with a different sort of problem.  It is not that the suggestion is 
simply false.  If the class of generic sentences is marked off by possession of some such outward form as 
the unquantified ‘bare’ plural ‘Ss are F’, then there is no question that a natural historical judgement can be 
expressed in a ‘generic’ sentence.  But is there any reason to think that the class of generic sentences, so 
understood, is not a rag-bag covering many forms of conjunction of subject and predicate—our own type 
just one among them?  …  [A] similarly identified class of ‘statements with a definite description as 
subject’ would have to constitute a merely surface-grammatical category: it is clear that the words ‘The 
domestic cat has four legs’ contain a syntactical ambiguity, and that the natural reading is not the one 
Russell attempted to explain.       
It is implicit in Aristotle’s remarks that inferences involving judgements hōs epi to polu should mirror those 
involving universal judgements.  And it does seem true that, just as ‘All As are F’ and ‘All As are G’ 
together entail ‘All As are both F and G’, so also ‘The S is F’ (or ‘Ss are F’) and ‘The S is G’ (or ‘Ss are G’)  
together entail ‘The S is both F and G’ (or ‘Ss are both F and G’)—if it is our sort of combination that is 
expressed.  The inference would obviously be invalid for any sort of statistical generalization.  And it 
would be too bold to claim that it holds for generic statements or bare plurals generally, if only because the 
bare plural can presumably express a form of statistical generalization…  A typical page of biochemical 
exposition exhibits none of the inferential anxiety that would be called for if the propositions it contains 
expressed mere statistical generalizations or if they were to admit only the inferences that we can suppose 
hold generally among what linguists call generic propositions.  (1995: 285-286) 
 
With these paragraphs Thompson disposes, as irrelevant to his enquiry, of all investigations of 
generic sentences carried out by linguists and formal semanticists.4  But again, I suspect that 
most logicians would remain unpersuaded.  First—though there is surely something to the charge 
                                                                                                                                                             
“I-generics”.  Krifka et al. (1995), crediting Gerstner and Krifka, distinguish likewise between “sentences with kind-
referring NPs” and “characterizing sentences” (with the qualification that some sentences can exhibit both 
phenomena).  And Asher and Morreau (1995), for instance, explicitly confine their remarks to the latter class. 
3 (‘It would seem’ because, as mentioned in note 1 above, not all researchers agree that these two forms of 
expression are synonymous.) 
4 Of course, Thompson has plenty of other sorts of argument for his claim that natural-historical judgments are of a 
unique logical form (some of which will be considered elsewhere in this chapter); it is perhaps uncharitable to 
present these two paragraphs, out of context, as Thompson’s only grounds for refusing to treat them together with 
other generic sentences.  But I hope it will be agreed that the uncharitable presentation serves an innocuous purpose, 
revealed just below in the text: to urge more careful consideration of the proposals in the literature for dealing with 
generics, along the lines of the careful consideration Thompson gives to other approaches to natural-historical 
judgments alternative to his own. 
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(expressed in the first quoted paragraph) that the category generic sentence applies to a “rag-
bag” of logically distinct types of sentence—a glance at the literature will show that Thompson’s 
charge is too quick as it stands.  For the investigators of generics don’t (or at any rate don’t all) 
mark off their subject matter “by possession of some such outward form as the unquantified 
‘bare’ plural”; on the contrary, most of them recognise both that the sentences that interest them 
come in different surface-grammatical forms (notably, the two forms Thompson himself refers to 
in this passage, rendered schematically as ‘The S is F’ and ‘Ss are F’, to which we might add a 
third, ‘An S is F’) and that some sentences that don’t interest them—that aren’t generic—share 
those surface forms with those that do.  Further, even when scholars set out to discuss the “rag-
bag” of generics as a whole (as distinguished, on whatever grounds, from their syntactically 
similar counterparts), their first step is frequently to note, precisely, Thompson’s point, that the 
class is in one sense or another heterogeneous: thus (as we observed in footnote 2 above) Krifka 
et al. distinguish between “sentences with kind-referring NPs” and “characterizing sentences”; 
Koslicki (1999) gives a “two-tiered” account on which the plural predication she finds in all 
generic sentences gets different semantic treatment in different cases; Cohen (2001) claims that 
generics with bare plurals are systematically ambiguous in a way that generics with singular 
descriptions are not; and so on.  If investigators of the semantics of generic sentences recognise 
as well as Thompson does that they do not form a homogenous class, then the fact that they do 
not form a homogenous class would not appear to demonstrate that their results can be of no 
value for Thompson’s own investigation.  If they do not end up finding grounds for isolating a 
subclass as narrow as Thompson wants, it is surely worth at least looking into the question 
whether their coarser-grained analysis isn’t after all sufficient to capture all the logically 
significant differences among the sentences they investigate. 
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The point Thompson articulates in his second paragraph is subtler: for the discovery that a class 
of sentences can be subdivided into subclasses exhibiting systematically different inferential 
behaviour, as Thompson claims is so for the class of generic sentences, will certainly constitute 
strong prima facie grounds perfectly intelligible to a logician for considering the initial class 
logically heterogeneous.  The trouble in this case is that since, again, investigators of generics 
don’t isolate their subject matter on a surface-grammatical basis, they are not committed to 
lumping statistical generalisations together with, for instance, natural-historical judgments; on 
the contrary, they frequently open their discussion by distinguishing between generics and mere 
statistical generalisations.5  What Thompson observes about the inferential patterns supported by 
natural-historical judgments does appear to give good grounds for distinguishing them, logically, 
from statistical generalisations; but, again, if those working on generics have observed the same 
thing, we do not yet have a reason for dismissing their findings as having missed the mark 
Thompson has in his sights.  Again, if they can find a broader class of “generics” than 
Thompson’s natural-historical judgments but including them (and excluding, if Thompson’s 
argument is correct, statistical generalisations), whose inferential behaviour appears 
homogeneous, they will cast doubt on Thompson’s claim for the uniqueness of the logical form 
of natural-historical judgments. 
 
In short, at least some of the work that has been done on generic sentences is sensitive to the 
worries Thompson articulates, and yet persists in treating them, even if not as a merely surface-
grammatically delineated class, still as a class quite a lot broader than Thompson’s class of 
natural-historical judgments.  For this reason, I think there is some value, after all, in canvassing 
                                                 
5 Even Cohen in his “Generics, frequency adverbs, and probability” (1999), who comes closer than anyone else 
discussed in this chapter to assimilating generic sentences to statistical generalisations, presumes as obvious the 
distinction between generics and frequency statements. 
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the proposals that have been mounted by linguists and formal semanticists, to check with greater 
care whether one of them doesn’t after all succeed in capturing the “logical form” of natural-
historical judgments.  If one did, it would vitiate Thompson’s claim that their form is unique.  —
As a matter of fact, I shall argue that he is right after all—but (lest the reader here feel as though 
she is about to be asked to waste her time) it will emerge that part of what is at stake in this 
investigation is the very concept of logical form; and in particular, I shall argue that Thompson 
was wrong to claim that his conception of logical form is just the same as Frege’s, only enriched 
by a broader range of categories. 
 
Approaches to generic sentences fall, for the most part, into two types: they either treat them as 
expressing a special kind of distribution of properties over individuals, on some level analogous 
to quantification, or they treat them as predicating something not of individuals (even in some 
sort of specially distributive way) but of a(n in some sense singular) kind.  There are variations 
not falling solidly into either of these camps: for example, “hybrid” approaches, dividing the 
class of generic sentences up in one or another way and proposing a distributive reading of some 
and a kind-predicative reading of others.  But if we divide our own discussion into two sections, 
the first treating of distributive and the second treating of kind-predicative approaches, we can 
consider along the way the hybrid approaches, by discussing each “half” of such an approach in 
the appropriate section.  —Since each approach conceives of and/or divides up “the class of 
generic sentences” somewhat differently—some on syntactic, others on semantic grounds (as 
should be clear from the above discussion)—we’ll have to keep track of these differences; but all 
the while we’ll keep in mind that our main interest is in the implications each proposal has for 




§2.  “Distributive” approaches to generic sentences. 
 
A good reason to take generic sentences as subject-predicate in structure—and to take the subject 
in question to denote a kind—is that, in Gupta and Savion’s words, “the only plausible 
alternative…, that of taking generic sentences to be implicitly quantificational, can survive 
refutation only by being evasive on the nature of quantification involved” (1985: 859).  
However, since some scholars advocating such “quantificational” approaches to generics are less 
evasive than others—for one instance, Krifka et al. spend twenty pages on the question of the 
semantic treatment of a quantifier-like generic “operator”, canvassing six different approaches—
it is worth at least considering whether any of them after all succeeds. 
 
For the sake of establishing some continuity in the discussion, let us use the following notation, 
borrowed and simplified from Krifka et al. and inspired originally by Lewis’s treatment of 
“adverbs of quantification” (1975), as a framework with reference to which to expound the 
various “distributive” approaches we shall be considering6: 
 
GEN[x; y](Restrictor [x]; Matrix [{x}; y]) 
 
Here, GEN is the generic “quantifier”; x is the variable it binds; y is bound existentially, and 
appears only in the matrix; the Restrictor expresses the “subject concept” of the generic 
sentence, as we might put it; and the Matrix expresses its “predicate concept”.  The curly braces 
                                                 
6 As mentioned earlier, Krifka et al. (1995) distinguish between “characterizing generics” and sentences with “kind-
referring NPs”, where the former, such as ‘Jaguars hunt at night’, appear to distribute their predicate, in one way or 
another, over individuals, while the latter, such as ‘The dodo is extinct’, seem to predicate something directly of a 
kind (e.g., it’s not that individual dodos are extinct).  They introduce the notation discussed in the text in the course 
of their discussion of characterising generics, and limit its application to them.  But note that the intuitive distinction 
they draw between characterising generics and sentences with kind-referring NPs is optional, in the sense that it is 
open to a theoretician to insist that, despite appearances, all generics are to be analysed in the same way (or, at any 
rate, to deny that the intuitive distinction “cuts at the joints”).  I shall therefore treat “distributive” approaches as 
approaches to the semantics of generic sentences generally—as many of their proponents intend—rather than as 
approaches to characterising generics in particular. 
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indicate that x may or may not appear free in the matrix.7  We shall make frequent use of the 
vocabulary of restrictor and matrix in our discussion below.  Where an author’s semantic 
proposal rests on an essentially different initial formalisation, we shall indicate as much. 
 
§2.1.  Bacon’s proposal. 
 
John Bacon (1973) raises the question whether “generic descriptions” denote.  By “generic 
descriptions” he means expressions appearing in generic sentences which are syntactically 
similar to definite descriptions, but which appear to carry generic force: for instance, ‘the lion’ as 
it appears in the generic sentence ‘The lion is tawny’.  By the question whether they denote, 
Bacon means to ask whether the semantics of such expressions should be understood as 
analogous to that of proper names.  He argues, first, that they are grammatically similar not only 
to definite descriptions but also to indefinite singular noun phrases (such as ‘a lion’), plurals, 
mass nouns, and “abstract” singular terms, and unlike proper names.  He suggests that, on the 
basis of this grammatical similarity, they should be treated as semantically analogous to them as 
well.  And Bacon next claims, crediting Sellars, that it is a necessary condition of an expression’s 
being a proper name that it not exhibit scope ambiguities, while all these types of expression, 
generic descriptions included, exhibit such ambiguities, for instance in the ways they interact 
with negation.  (Thus, the suggestion goes, ‘The lion is not tawny’ can be understood as meaning 
that it’s not the case that the lion is tawny—making no positive generalisation about their 
colour—or else as meaning that the lion is not-tawny, i.e. that lions, generally, positively fail to 
be tawny.)  In short, they do not denote (in the sense in which proper names denote).  Instead, 
                                                 
7 The more general notation used by Krifka et al., to accommodate the possibility of many-place relational subjects 
and predicates, is GEN[x1, …, xi; y1, …, yj](Restrictor [x1, …, xi]; Matrix [{x1}, …, {xi}; y1, …, yj]).  Thus for 
instance ‘Jaguars give birth to two to four cubs’ would be rendered as ‘GEN[x; y1, …, y4](x is a jaguar and y1 … y4 
are jaguar cubs and x gives birth to y1 and … and x gives birth to y4 and y1 ≠ y2’. 
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Bacon suggests that they all be interpreted as quantificational.8  Generic sentences, in particular, 
should be understood as expressing either straightforwardly universal quantification or, 
“[o]ccasionally,” “normatively restricted” universal quantification.9  In explanation of this latter, 
Bacon quotes Frege approvingly: as Frege puts it, “‘the horse is a four-legged animal’… is 
probably best regarded as expressing a universal judgment, say… ‘all properly constituted horses 
are four-legged animals’” (1892: 196).   Though Bacon offers no further help with interpreting 
such restriction, he does point out that even explicitly universal quantification using ‘all’ or 
’every’ is in fact sometimes best understood as “hyperbolic”, and as intended to be restricted to 
some smaller domain (left implicit). 
 
Now, the negative point Bacon draws from Sellars—that the kinds of scope ambiguity visible in 
generic sentences, even those whose subject term syntactically resembles a definite description, 
stand in tension with the thought that that subject term makes singular reference—is one that any 
account of generics as (say) singular predications of kinds must come to terms with, and not 
without difficulty.10  However, it should be clear that Bacon’s positive proposals do not come to 
much.  The thought that generic sentences express straightforward universal quantification is 
palpably false; ‘The lion is tawny’ is not falsified by the occasional lion born snow white due to 
a recessive gene.11  The Fregean suggestion that some sort of restriction on the quantification is 
in play is a little more helpful; but, though the observation that even nongeneric universal 
                                                 
8 In fact he insists that the analogy between generic and definite descriptions is tight indeed: a generic description, 
he holds, is just like an ordinary definite description, but used in a situation in which the context alluded to is 
understood to be the universe of discourse as a whole, so that the sentence is true just in case everything satisfying 
the description is true—in other words, it is a universal quantification.  (I am ignoring the details of his account of 
the relations between singular and plural.) 
9 I’m setting aside cases where, as Bacon points out, an existential reading seems more appropriate: e.g. (his 
examples), ‘Chryslers are sold on the West Coast’, as opposed to ‘Chryslers are sold in North America’. 
10 Gupta and Savion (1985) made the same observation, in the review cited earlier. 
11 This point is strongly emphasised by Thompson; but further, their admission of exceptions is also the first 
characteristic of generics observed by almost all scholars working on them from linguistic and formal-semantic 
perspectives.  In this respect Bacon is unusual in his flat-footedness. 
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quantification is often “hyperbolic” is one we shall see again (in a more refined form)12, failing 
any account of the kind of restriction on quantification at issue, we are still without an 
understanding of the semantics of the sentences in which we’re interested.  Of course, we saw 
that Bacon does gesture in the direction of an account: he refers us to Frege’s thought that the 
restriction in play is “normative,” and the quotation from Frege suggests (though Bacon does not 
draw particular attention to this) that the restriction is to be interpreted as a restriction on the 
concept appearing in the antecedent of the conditional that is the object of quantification.  But so 
far, this is just a gesture: we are told nothing about the semantics of the “normative restriction” 
itself, and indeed even a crucial syntactic distinction is left unspecified by the proposal: should 
we understand the ‘properly constituted horses’ of Frege’s example as of the form ‘P(x) & H(x)’ 
or as of the form ‘(P(H))(x)’—that is, is ‘properly constituted’ a concept, or an operator on 
concepts (or indeed perhaps something else again)?  We shall consider below two further 
approaches to generics filling out these two possibilities—respectively, “relevant quantification” 
and the “prototype” approach.  But Bacon, at any rate, does not yet give us a full positive 
account of the semantics of generic sentences. 
 
There is one worry we do well to voice already, however, concerning any account of generic 
sentences having anything like the shape Bacon gestures at.  Keeping in mind that our particular 
goal in this enquiry is an understanding of sentences expressing what Thompson called natural-
historical judgments, we may ask whether any account involving universality, however 
“restricted”, has a chance of capturing the force of such judgments.  I can put my thought here a 
little paradoxically: though natural-historical judgments admit of exceptions (so that the naïve 
                                                 
12 As we’ll see in §2.11 below, Asher and Morreau (1995) appeal to this idea in defense of a (broadly) 
quantificational interpretation of generics in the face of an objection of Carlson’s (1977); however, both Carlson’s 
objection and Asher and Morreau’s reply are more nuanced than anything here in Bacon. 
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rendering of them as straightforward universal quantifications is evidently hopeless), there is a 
sense in which they are universal, and it is precisely that universality which is lost in any attempt 
to restrict their universality.  What I mean is this: any explanation of the semantics of, say, ‘The 
lion is tawny’ that has it ascribing tawny13 to (all members of) some subset of lions, or to some 
other population related in some way to the set of lions, misses the respect in which such a 
sentence has implications also for the lions that don’t fall in the favoured population.  If I am told 
that lions are tawny, I’m told something that, in some sense, has application also to this creature 
here, even if this creature here is a white lion.  (Contrast, for instance, ‘All small lions are 
tawny’: if we analyse small here as an operator on predicates (in order to capture its “attributive” 
quality), we might render the sentence as something like ‘∀x[(S(L))(x) → T(x)]’.  This looks to 
be of a form precisely analogous to the second interpretation of Frege’s suggested proposed 
earlier, but it’s clear that such a sentence as this simply has no implications for the lions that 
aren’t small.) 
 
Let me try to make this rather airy thought a little more vivid.  Consider the whole natural history 
of some species, consisting in a battery of natural-historical judgments.  Interpreted along the 
lines of the present proposal—according to which each natural-historical judgment is captured by 
a universal quantification restricted to some subset of the species—such a history seems to be 
reduced to an assortment of characteristics associated with different groups of organisms:  
“These members of this species do this; those members are like that; this other group engages in 
this behaviour; etc.”  Such a catalogue loses track of the unity that ties the whole natural history 
together: of that which makes it the history of a single species, that makes it—the whole 
history—in some sense true of every member of the species, even though (as Thompson points 
                                                 
13 (or, pleonastically, “tawniness”) 
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out) normally no single member will instantiate the matrices of all of the judgments.  —Is this 
“unity” captured, in the model, by the fact that each subgroup is generated from the species—that 
is, by the fact that each individual natural-historical judgment in the history is a quantification 
over the set of members of the species, however it is further restricted?  —But this is, formally, 
no different from, say, starting from the set consisting of the gorillas at the Pittsburgh zoo, the 
numbers one through nine, and the moons of Saturn, and producing a “natural history” of the 
members of that set by listing some universally generalised conditionals whose antecedents are 
restricted to its various subsets.  It is clear that no such conditional restricted to a subset 
excluding Titan, say, tells us anything whatsoever about Titan or its “kind.” 
 
Most scholars working on generic sentences start (as I observed in footnote 11 above) from the 
fact of their admission of exceptions.  But the way this phenomenon is conceived in the sort of 
proposal now under discussion is to begin by interpreting the generality of generics 
quantificationally, and then to interpret the presence of exceptions as an indication that they 
don’t actually speak of the whole population of things satisfying their “restrictor”.  However, 
what I’ve been trying to suggest is that the fact that they “admit of exceptions” doesn’t actually 
mean that they “don’t speak of” some of the things fitting the specification in the restrictor.  Any 
attempt to formalise generics in a way so as to make room for exceptions simply by as it were 
exempting them (in one way or another) from the range of the generality is bound to be false to 
this fact I’m trying to articulate.  Subject-predicate approaches look attractive precisely because 
they don’t work by simply leaving aside the members of the kind failing to satisfy the matrix: if a 
generic is just a predication of something directly of the (whole) kind, then there is a clear sense 
in which it’s “just as true of” any one (even a “defective”) instance of the kind as of any other 
instance.  (But such approaches raise problems of their own, as we shall see in §3 below.) 
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§2.2.  Fara’s proposal. 
 
Delia Graff Fara (2001) makes some remarks on the interpretation of generic sentences in the 
context of a broader campaign to reinterpret all kinds of descriptions—definite and indefinite, 
singular and plural, and including generic expressions—not as quantified noun phrases (as 
Russell did) but as complex predicates.  She argues that such descriptions behave in ways 
disanalogous to the behaviour of quantifier phrases in certain types of situation: in particular, 
with reference to the phenomenon of scope ambiguity and to their interaction with adverbs of 
quantification.  She urges that we can account for this behaviour by understanding descriptions 
as having predicate-like semantic values (which she supposes are sets), and she explains how 
such an account ought to go. 
 
Fara begins by reminding us of Strawson’s distinction between (what he called) “uniquely 
referring” and (what she calls) “descriptive” uses of definite descriptions: thus ‘the greatest 
French soldier’ has the former type of use in ‘Washington met the greatest French soldier’ and 
the latter in ‘Washington was the greatest French soldier’, for in the second sentence, Strawson 
held, the description is used simply to say something about Washington, while in the first, it is 
used to “mention an individual”, as ‘Washington’ is.  Fara argues that Russell’s approach to 
descriptions is to take the “referential use” as paradigmatic: thus, when he explains how to 
analyse a sentence with a description, he always presupposes implicitly that the description is in 
“argument position” with respect to the surface-level grammatical context.14  She argues that 
                                                 
14 Fara’s account of “surface-level argument structure” is a little puzzling.  The standard conception of argument 
structure, if I am not mistaken, contrasts it with surface structure.  Thus Frege introduced function-argument 
analysis into logic precisely by contrasting it with the subject-predicate distinction (see e.g. Begriffsschrift (1879: 
VII).  Frege also pointed out that until we have generality in view, the applicability of the notions of function and 
argument to the composition of a proposition is not uniquely determined: thus we can conceive of ‘Socrates is wise’ 
as the result of applying to the argument ‘ζ is wise’ the second-level function that returns the True as value for every 
first-level concept that is true of Socrates, and returns the False for all other arguments.  Fara’s decision to “leave 
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Russell wasn’t very explicit about just how to apply his analysis to cases where the description 
has a “descriptive use,” but she tries to show that a fully spelled-out account on Russellian 
principles would have to be awkward and ad hoc in places, in order to explain why descriptions 
in such uses frequently lack the sort of scope ambiguity Russell’s theory would appear to predict. 
 
Fara’s approach, in contrast, is to take the “descriptive use” of descriptions as paradigmatic; she 
groups all descriptions together as “predicate nominals”, and proposes to treat them consistently 
as having as semantic values sets whose members are the entities of which the predicate in 
question in true.  Her task is then to explain how descriptions sometimes come to have 
“referential uses.”  Her claim is that when a surface-level analysis yields a mismatch of semantic 
types—when, that is, we find what ought to have a predicate-type semantic value itself in the 
argument place of a predicate—we deploy a rule of quantifier raising, transforming the surface-
level argument structure into an argument structure at the level of Logical Form that respects the 
predicate-like semantic value of the description.  In particular, she gives the following threefold 
“LF rule”, for application to surface-level contexts Φ(PN) (that is, contexts in which a predicate 
nominal is, on the surface, the argument of another predicate): 
 
(LF1 PN) Φ(PN) ⇒ [∃x : PN(x)](Φx) 
(LF2 PN) Φ(PN) ⇒ [Gen x : PN(x)](Φx) 
(LF3 PN) Φ(PN) ⇒ [Adv x : PN(x)](Φx)15 
 
Again, one of the phenomena which, she argues, Russell’s theory of descriptions ill 
accommodates is scope ambiguity.  One of her examples is the contrast between, on the one 
                                                                                                                                                             
these notions [viz., those of argument and predicate] at an intuitive level” (p. 3) thus seems disingenuous.  
Nevertheless, since these issues do not affect the substance of our discussion here (though they are crucial to her 
own concerns), I shall set them aside. 
15 P. 26.  I have renumbered Fara’s subscripts.  Perhaps the notation requires a little comment: each square-bracketed 
string is something like a restricted quantifier, where the predicate nominal acting as the restrictor is the description 
with which we begin: thus (LF1 PN) transforms ‘The book is on the table’ into ‘[∃x : the book(x)](on the table(x))’, 
i.e., ‘There is something which is the book and which is on the table.’ 
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hand, ‘A dog rarely eats vegetables’ and, on the other hand, ‘Most dogs rarely eat vegetables’ 
and ‘Fido rarely eats vegetables’.  She argues that, while the second of these sentences, which is 
explicitly quantificational, exhibits—like the third—no scope ambiguity, the first is ambiguous 
among two or three readings: it could be read as making a generic statement about dogs (to the 
effect that they rarely eat vegetables); or as a claim that it is rare for a dog to be wont to eat 
vegetables; or even perhaps as the report that a certain dog rarely eats vegetables.16  (In general, 
a sentence with a description in surface-level argument place will be three-ways ambiguous 
when it also contains an adverb of quantification; if there is none, it will be two-ways ambiguous 
between the generic and the existential readings (which, Fara mentions in passing, could also be 
understood as involving unpronounced adverbs of quantification, yielding a slightly more unified 
account).)  She argues that Russell’s theory, which analyses descriptions as quantificational 
phrases, can only explain this disanalogy between descriptions and explicitly quantified phrases 
in an ad hoc manner, while her account, with its threefold LF rule applied to predicate nominals 
(as which all descriptions are interpreted), handles it nicely. 
 
I have left out much of the (rich) detail of her argument, because my interest here is in what she 
goes on to say about the semantics of generic sentences in particular.  (Part of her advertisement 
for the theory she presents is that it “handles generic descriptions”, which Russell’s theory 
cannot do, and moreover that it does so in a way parallel to its treatment of other sorts of 
description: p. 2.)  One might suppose that the upshot of her account for a generic sentence such 
as ‘The tiger is striped’ (her example) would be that it should first be parsed, at the surface level, 
as ‘Striped(the tiger)’, and then, since (on her proposal) ‘the tiger’ is to be understood as a 
predicate nominal having a predicate-like semantic value, it should be transformed in accordance 
                                                 
16 She concedes that the third reading here is unlikely, but suggests that it becomes recognisable when we consider 
the similar sentence ‘A dog I know rarely eats vegetables’. 
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with the rule (LF2 PN) into ‘[Gen x : x is the tiger](x is striped)’.  However, Fara introduces a 
complication: simple definite descriptions, she says, do not admit of generic or adverbial but 
only of existential readings, because a simple definite description can be true of at most one 
thing.  (The contrast is with definite descriptions containing embedded noun phrases, such as 
‘The owner of a Porsche’ (again her example), which can be used to make quantificational or 
generic statements precisely because there can in fact be more than one Porsche owner; the 
definiteness arises only from the fact that, for a given Porsche, there is (normally) only one 
owner.)  Thus in fact the LF rule deployed in the semantic interpretation of ‘The tiger is striped’ 
must be not (LF2 PN) but (LF1 PN); the result is ‘[∃ x : x is the tiger](x is striped)’.  And she 
recommends that we understand this existential quantification by giving the common noun 
‘tiger’ what genericists have called its “taxonomic” reading: that is, the reading it has in ‘There 
are two tigers native to Myanmar: the Bengal and the Indochinese’.  In short, Fara interprets ‘The 
tiger is striped’ to mean something like “There is a kind which is the tiger and which is 
striped.”17 
 
Let us reflect on these results of Fara’s; and let’s begin by noting that her account, just discussed, 
of the semantics of ‘The tiger is striped’ differs quite dramatically from what must be her 
account of the similar ‘A tiger is striped’ (which she doesn’t discuss).  Since the description ‘a 
tiger’ is indefinite, the epicycle she adds to her account in order to deal with simple definite 
descriptions does not apply, and her basic story of descriptions in surface-level argument 
position yields, for ‘A tiger is striped’, the usual ambiguity between the existential and generic 
readings.  Since we are interested in the interpretation of the sentence as generic, we get the LF 
                                                 
17 This is actually quite close to what I have called a “subject-predicate” approach, to be discussed in §3 below.  But 
since the overall structure of Fara’s account is plainly “distributive”, and since (as I shall discuss in the text 
immediately below) she offers no further details about the content of generics she gives this “taxonomic” reading, I 
am treating it here together with the rest of her account, rather than saving it for §3. 
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representation ‘[Gen x : x is a tiger](x is striped)’.  Here we have a generic quantifier, distributing 
the property of being striped generically across individual tigers.  In contrast, her interpretation 
of ‘The tiger is striped’, as we saw, attributes the same property to the kind tiger.  This should 
strike us as odd.  I do not mean to say that it is an unassailable truth that generic sentences 
employing definite articles are synonymous with those employing indefinite descriptions.18  
However, since most theorists of generic sentences do not treat them differently—and since, 
indeed, it seems after all quite natural to switch indifferently between the two, for instance in the 
narration of a nature documentary—Fara at least owes us some words in explanation of her 
surprising result that a generic in ‘The’ followed by a simple noun phrase can only be interpreted 
as a predication of a kind.  However, she doesn’t seem even to notice the counterintuitiveness of 
her result.19 
 
Moreover—and perhaps more gravely—Fara does not appear to notice the anomalous 
implications her account has for the semantics of such predicates as ‘is striped’.  Prima facie, it 
seems as though ‘striped’, at least, appears univocally in ‘The tiger is striped’ and ‘A tiger is 
striped’ (even if the descriptions are to be interpreted differently).  But as we have seen, in the 
former, on her analysis, the predicate is said to hold not of individual tigers but of the kind.  But 
what can it mean to say that a species—not the individuals of the species, but the species itself—
is striped?  The obvious answer, I suppose, is that it is, after all, just a shorthand expression 
                                                 
18 An example of a similar contrast which is argued for can be found in Cohen (2001), whose account we alluded to 
above and shall discuss in more detail below: he argues that there is a systematic difference between generics 
expressed with indefinite descriptions and those expressed using bare plural noun phrases.  Thus he would treat 
‘Tigers are striped’ differently from ‘A tiger is striped’.  We’ll examine the details below; the point here is that, 
unlike Fara, Cohen flags the disanalogy his theory implies and attempts to motivate its acceptance. 
19 Could we appeal to Fara’s own use of the “taxonomic” reading to get the interpretations of these sentences back in 
line, by understanding ‘A tiger is striped’ as speaking (existentially) of one of the kinds of tiger?  But such a reading 
of this sentence would yield, on her account, ‘[∃ x : x is a tiger](x is striped)’—which is still not quite the same as 
‘[∃ x : x is the tiger](x is striped)’; and in any case, this existential taxonomic reading, though admittedly a possible 
reading, is clearly not the typical way to hear the generic ‘A tiger is striped’, the way according to which it is (at 
least prima facie) synonymous with ‘The tiger is striped’. 
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meaning that the individuals of the species are striped—though anyone who proposes to 
understand ‘The tiger is striped’ as, at the level of Logical Form, a predication of the species 
itself surely owes us an explanation of the mechanism by which this “shorthand” is to be spelled 
out (and at what level, if not at Logical Form?), and Fara gives us none.  But in any case, what 
sort of generalisation is the statement that the individuals of the tiger species are striped?  It is 
surely not a universal generalisation20, but rather a generic claim.  In other words, the genericity 
of ‘The tiger is striped’ is, far from being explained, in fact fully obscured by her analysis. 
 
Next let us consider some of Fara’s remarks on the generic quantifier appearing in (LF2 PN).  
She writes: 
 
A number of other semantic issues remain open.  The most glaring of these is that while I have said 
what the semantic value of predicate nominals is to be, I have not assigned truth-conditions to all 
sentences containing them….  The generic quantifier I’ve helped myself to presents special 
problems….  Whether a sentence ‘[Gen x : Φx](Ψx)’ is true is not just a matter of the number or 
proportion of things in the extension of Φ that are in the extension of Ψ.  The generic quantifier is 
used to make law-like generalizations.  Other well-known problems are presented by sentences like 
‘Guppies give live birth’….  For these sentences to be true, it is not required that it be generally true 
of a guppy that it gives live birth…, but only that it be generally true of a guppy that gives birth that 
it gives live birth.  (pp. 31-32, emphasis in original) 
 
Fara adds in a note that the latter problem may be dealt with by invoking the idea of quantifier 
domain restriction, “in which case we need not view such cases as presenting a special problem 
for the interpretation of the generic quantifier” (p. 39n28, emphasis removed). 
 
It is to Fara’s credit that she admits that she has nothing illuminating to say about the semantics 
of the generic quantifier appearing in her (LF2 PN) rule, and hence in her analyses of most 
generic sentences.  Indeed it is perhaps suggestive of the direction of our own enquiry that she 
remarks (actually about adverbs of quantification generally, but in a context in which it seems as 
                                                 
20 As it happens, Fara, in order to illustrate a different point, quotes from the Encyclopædia Britannica a report of a 
“pure white”—that is, unstriped—tiger. 
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though she takes her remark to apply also to the generic quantifier21) that “It is unlikely that we 
could use such precise mathematical notions [as the set-theoretical ones used e.g. in the truth 
conditions of existential generalisations] to give truth conditions for sentences with adverbs of 
quantification… since adverbs of quantification are usually vague” (p. 32).  Now, it does not 
seem to me apt to say that the problem with trying to account for the semantics of generics in 
terms of “precise mathematical notions” is that the generic quantifier is vague.  That we cannot 
characterise the truth condition of a generic sentence in terms of an application of set-theoretical 
concepts to the set of entities satisfying its restrictor, it is quite plausible to suppose, is not 
because the quantity of restrictor-satisfiers said by the generic to satisfy the matrix is vague, but 
rather because a generic sentence doesn’t make a quantificational statement at all (though it is 
perhaps a little early in our enquiry to be insisting on this).  Indeed Fara in effect admits as much 
in the next sentences, quoted already above: “Whether a sentence ‘[Gen x : Φx](Ψx)’ is true is 
not just a matter of the number or proportion of things in the extension of Φ that are in the 
extension of Ψ.  The generic quantifier is used to make law-like generalizations” (p. 32, 
emphasis hers).  That last, positive characterisation of the nature of generic generalisations—as 
law-like—is of course not so much an illuminating remark on their semantics as a renaming of 
the problem.  But again, we can hardly begrudge Fara this, since she herself concedes in this 
paragraph that her analysis leaves the issue of the semantics of generics open.  The point is 
simply that we, in the present enquiry, cannot rest content with Fara’s analysis. 
 
It is also commendable that Fara, when she goes on to raise the question of the semantics of 
sentences such as ‘Guppies give live birth’, does not conflate this question with that of the 
semantics of generic sentences generally.  She recognises that, although an account of quantifier 
                                                 
21 especially since, as mentioned briefly above, Fara is partial to the supposition that the generic quantifier (as well 
as the existential) is in fact profitably conceived of as an unpronounced adverb of quantification 
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domain restriction such as Stanley and Szabó’s (2000) might help with this sort of sentence 
(since the sentence seems only to apply to guppies that parturiate, rather than to all guppies), 
there’s no reason to suppose that it should for all generic sentences.  This puts her ahead of 
advocates of the “relevant quantification” approach, which I shall discuss below, which offers an 
account of generic sentences as a whole on the basis of something close to quantifier domain 
restriction.  However, this insight of hers is plainly a merely negative point with respect to the 
semantics of generics generally; and even with respect to the appeal to quantifier domain 
restriction, it is so far a mere promise, not a detailed account.  (She has not told us how to extract 
the restriction from sentences such as these—how to give a systematic account of what it is about 
‘Guppies give live birth’, for instance, that settles that the quantification is restricted to 
parturiating guppies—and it is worth pointing out that Fara herself says nothing about how to 
distinguish “sentences such as these” from other generic sentences in the first place; nothing in 
her account so far could serve to do so.) 
 
Finally, I hope it is not excessively mean-spirited to wonder whether, as long as Fara has not 
given us a full semantic analysis of the constructions she describes, she is really entitled to her 
claim that they represent the structure of the sentences she’s considering at the level of Logical 
Form.  After all, the very idea of Logical Form is the idea of a level of syntactic analysis at 
which, to quote a standard treatment, “all grammatical structure relevant to semantic 
interpretation is provided” (Hornstein, 1995, p. 3); and as long as she leaves Gen as a black box, 
we seem to have no guarantee that her analyses fit this description. And in case the last few 
paragraphs really do seem unfair, in that I take Fara to task for not doing what I want her to do—
viz., account for the semantics of generic sentences—let the reader be reminded that the our 
earlier critical remarks about the odd and unexplained asymmetry her theory implies between 
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generics in simple definite descriptions and all others suggests that the problem is not simply that 
she’s missing something, namely an account of the semantics of generics which could just be 
grafted on to her theory later, but rather that she has gone substantively wrong already. 
 
§2.3.  Cohen on bare plurals. 
 
Ariel Cohen, as we have remarked above, is one of the scholars of generics who begins by 
distinguishing among them and treating different subclasses of them differently.22  As a matter of 
fact, his article “On the generic use of indefinite singulars” (2001) provides an example both of 
the subdivision of the class of generics on surface-structural grounds and of the treatment of 
syntactically parallel generics differently on semantic grounds.  He argues, first, that the 
expression of generics using indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., ‘A stork has a favourite 
nesting area’) is of much more limited applicability than the expression of generics using bare 
plural noun phrases (e.g., ‘Storks have a favourite nesting area’).  And he further maintains that, 
while generic sentences expressed with bare plurals are ambiguous between what he calls 
(adapting terminology from Carlson (1995)) “rules-and-regulations” and “inductivist” readings, 
generic sentences expressed with indefinite singulars can only be given the “rules-and-
regulations” reading.23 
                                                 
22 Fara ends up with a similar distinction, as we just saw in our consideration of her divergent treatments of definite 
and indefinite singular generics.  I single Cohen out as a clearer example only because he makes his distinction 
between indefinite singular and bare plural generics central to his account, whereas in Fara’s case the distinction 
between definite and indefinite singular generics fell out of her account, its counterintuitiveness unremarked, rather 
than driving it from the beginning. 
23 Carlson’s paper discussed the “inductivist” and “rules-and-regulations” approaches as two different theories of 
generic sentences (and advocated the second over the first).  Cohen is here recommending that we recognise that 
generics in bare plurals (though not those in indefinite singulars) are ambiguous, in such a way that the two 
approaches are each applicable, but to different readings of the sentences in question. 
Let me just observe here that the “inductivist”/“rules-and-regulations” dichotomy presents in interesting 
microcosm the problem of natural-historical judgments: for on the one hand, their factual character (as natural 
history) leads one to want something like an “inductivist” approach, while their admission of exceptions—which 
sometimes vastly outnumber the unexceptional instances—suggest some sort of “normative” or “regulative” 
character.  It could be that the first tendency inclines us toward “distributive” approaches and the second toward 
“subject-predicate” approaches.  However—to anticipate a little—what is missing in each type of approach is an 
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Let us begin by considering Cohen’s treatment of the “inductivist” reading of generics expressed 
with bare plural noun phrases; next we shall discuss his understanding of the “rules-and-
regulations” reading of generic sentences. 
 
Cohen’s account of “bare plural” generics might be considered to represent some advance over 
Fara’s initially similar treatment of definite singular generics: for while (as we saw) Fara was 
content to assert that ‘The tiger is striped’ should be analysed as “[∃x : x is the tiger](x is 
striped)”, true just in case the kind tiger is striped, Cohen observes that a similar analysis of bare 
plural generics would yield semantically unacceptable interpretations.  (Presumably he would 
say the same about the definite singular generics Fara is discussing, but they are not the topic of 
his work.)  He points out that “[m]any of the generic sentences postulated to be cases of direct 
kind predication are intuitively about individuals, not kinds” (186), and that, for instance, if 
‘Kings are generous’ is interpreted as a direct predication of the kind king, “it cannot receive a 
sensible interpretation” (189).  He argues that, as a matter of fact, this sort of interpretation is 
what “is generated by the grammar”, for he is convinced that bare plurals do unambiguously 
denote kinds24; but because of the semantic anomalousness, we “accommodate” (presumably in 
the sense of Lewis (1979)) a generic quantifier, and take the kind in question (call it K) as the 
restrictor of the quantifier, type-shifting it into the open sentence C(x, K) asserting that x 
instantiates the kind (since the restrictor of a quantifier must be an open sentence, not an 




                                                                                                                                                             
appreciation of the attractions of the other.  Natural-historical judgments are, if you like, at once “factual” and 
“regulative” (in some sense of ‘regulative’). 
24 due to what he calls (crediting Erteschik-Shir) the “topic constraint”, namely that all sentences must have a topic, 
where a topic in turn must be something specific, such as an individual or a particular kind 
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This story, as we see, is rather complicated.  In particular, it strikes me as odd that he insists on 
holding on to the claim that the bare plural “always refers to a kind” (189) even in the face of this 
type shifting.  He presents this as a virtue of his account, since it allows him to explain sentences 
such as ‘Giant pandas, which are endangered, feed on bamboo shoots’, where the same noun 
phrase seems to be both the object of a kind predication and the restrictor of a generic 
quantification.  But in what sense does a bare plural “refer to a kind” when it has been type-
shifted into an open sentence acting as the restrictor of a quantifier? 
 
Complicated or not, however, we cannot rest content with this analysis.  For even if it constitutes 
progress vis-à-vis Fara’s account of generic sentences involving definite descriptions, we are still 
left puzzled—as Fara herself observed with respect to her own (quite similar) account of generics 
involving indefinite descriptions—as to the truth conditions of such constructions as genx[C(x, 
tiger)][striped(x)].25  Cohen tells us nothing about this quantifier.  We can perhaps forgive him 
for this, since the article under discussion sets as its task the explanation of differences in the 
behaviour of bare plural and indefinite singular generics, not the articulation of a full theory of 
the semantics of the former.  But what we are enquiring into in the present work is, precisely, the 
possibility of a full formal account of the semantics of sentences expressing natural-historical 
judgments; with this article of Cohen’s, we do not yet have an answer to our question.26 
 
As mentioned above, Cohen also discusses a treatment of generic sentences expressed with 
indefinite singular noun phrases, also available for one reading of those expressed with bare 
plurals, which he calls (adapting an idea of Carlson’s) the “rules-and-regulations” reading.  
                                                 
25 The reader will have noticed that Fara’s account of indefinite singular generics is quite similar (apart from 
Cohen’s interpretation of kind predication in terms of an instantiation relation between an individual and a kind) to 
that which Cohen gives for (one reading of) bare plural generics but deliberately denies of indefinite singulars.  We 
shall consider his analysis of the latter immediately below. 
26 Cohen (1999) provides a more substantive account of the semantics of such “quantificational” generics; we shall 
consider it below. 
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Generic sentences on the “rules-and-regulations” reading “do not get their truth or falsity as a 
consequence of properties of individual instances” (p. 194); but rather are understood as of 
subject-predicate form—though rather anomalously so, since the subject in question, on Cohen’s 
account, is not a kind but a rule, and the predicate in a generic of this type is in fact always the 
same, namely, ‘ζ is in effect’.  More specifically: first, to express that a certain rule is followed, 
Cohen writes, say, “gentleman(x) ⇒ open-doors-for-ladies(x)”.  (Since this conception of the 
internal structure of a rule involves the combination of two open sentences, which in the case of 
interest to us, that of natural-historical judgments, will clearly be what we have been calling the 
restrictor and the matrix, it makes sense to consider Cohen’s “rules-and-regulations” treatment as 
a kind of “distributive” approach, even though the top-level structure this proposal assigns to a 
generic sentence is that of singular predication.)  Cohen sets aside the question how to interpret 
the ‘⇒’, leaving open the possibilities that it expresses a universally generalised conditional or 
“something more intensional”.  Next he invites us to consider an operator which, for such a 
description, yields the name of a rule: !(gentleman(x) ⇒ open-doors-for-ladies(x)).27  Then the 
form of the corresponding “rules-and-regulations” generic is: “in-effect(!(gentleman(x) ⇒ open-
doors-for-ladies(x)))”. 
 
First of all, though, as we see, Cohen has no account of the ‘⇒’, and that’s to say that there is a 
serious gap in his account of what a rule is, and thus of what the truth conditions of generic 
sentences are.  Also, he deliberately shrugs off the task of giving truth conditions for ‘in-
effect(ζ)’, suggesting that they may be different for different domains (biology; etiquette; he says 
                                                 
27 Actually, Cohen says that ‘!’ should be undefined for descriptions corresponding to which there is nothing 
“recognized as a rule that could conceivably hold” (p. 199)—as distinct from the question whether the rule is in 
effect—though this seems to me very odd.  His example is !(gentleman(x) ⇒ has-three-fingers-on-his-left-hand(x)); 
but I don’t understand why it’s wrong to find no difference between ‘A gentleman opens doors for ladies’ and ‘A 
gentleman has three fingers on his left hand’ (at least from a formal-semantic point of view) except that the first is 
perhaps true (or anyway once was) while the second is plainly false. 
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they are often linguistic, so that indefinite singular generics can express definitions; etc.).  
Nevertheless, since he claims to find ‘in-effect(ζ)’ as part of the logical form of any generic 
sentence in this class, it is not clear whether we should understand Cohen as positing a univocal, 
general (and logical?) ‘in-effect’ predicate, or a family of related ones (but how related?).  
Finally and most broadly, absent a more positive account of the nature of rules (at the very least, 
some details about the truth conditional contribution of ‘⇒’), it is not at all obvious—not even 
intuitively attractive—that what underlies the truth of a natural-historical judgment is a rule.  It 
does not seem like a rule, or even a law of biology, that wood ducks are colourful—for (with the 
exception of the occasional pigmentally-challenged male, perhaps) the ducks that aren’t 




§2.4.  Relevant quantification. 
 
We alluded above, in our discussion of Bacon, to the idea (inspired by Frege) of understanding a 
generic sentence as admitting of exceptions only because it leaves implicit a restriction on the 
range of quantification involved, such that, were the restriction to be made explicit, the sentence 
could be understood as expressing a strictly universal generalisation.  We saw this idea alluded to 
again in Fara, who suggested applying it to a subclass of generic sentences (even if she did not 
give a systematic characterisation of the subclass in question).  Krifka et al. (1995) discuss 
several versions of this approach to the semantics of generics; they attribute the first of these, 
which they call “relevant quantification”, to Declerck (1991).  Declerck understands the 




[W]hen a statement is made of a “set,” the hearer will use his or her world knowledge to restrict the 
statement to just those members of the “set” to which it can be applied in a suitable way.  For example, [the 
sentence ‘Whales give birth to live young’] will be a predication over female, nonsterile whales, as only 
they could possibly give birth to live young in the first place.  (45) 
 
More generally, if we start with our preliminary analysis of the form of generic sentences as: 
 
GEN[x; y](Restrictor [x]; Matrix [{x}; y]) 
 
the current proposal is to analyse them further as: 
 
∀x[(Restrictor [x] & R(x)) → ∃y(Matrix [{x}; y]] 
 
where R is to be understood as a restriction variable, with the semantics of a one-place predicate 
(in the more general case, a predicate with places up to the number of variables bound by the 
generic quantifier), whose interpretation is to be supplied pragmatically. 
 
Krifka et al. themselves object to this account of generics on the grounds that, unsupplemented 
by a “theory of suitable restrictions”, it would seem to allow that virtually any sentence of 
generic form could be true: for nothing would prevent us from interpreting R, in a given case, as 
coextensive with the “matrix” of the generic.  (Their example is ‘Whales are sick’: if we choose 
to interpret R as “sick”, the sentence comes out true, indeed as logically true.)  They express 
skepticism about the possibility of developing such a theory of restrictions, and hence abandon 
the proposal as hopeless. 
 
I’m not as impressed with this criticism as Krifka et al. are, at least as it stands.  Declerck’s point 
was precisely that the nature of R is a pragmatic matter: not one for which a theory of the sort of 
which Krifka et al. appear to despair should ever have been expected.  No doubt ‘Whales are 
sick’ would be taken as true (indeed trivially so) by anyone who interpreted R as “sick”; but it is 
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surely not unreasonable to expect that pragmatic considerations would rule out at least this sort 
of interpretation, even if they cannot be fully captured by a formal theory.28 
 
Nevertheless, I believe Krifka et al. are on to something.  They want a theory of R, not an 
account according to which “anything goes,” and they fail to register that the “relevant 
quantification” approach, with its appeal to pragmatics, is one according to which not quite 
“anything goes.”  But perhaps they are right nevertheless to complain about the absence of a 
(fuller) theory.  The question, in other words, is whether quantifier domain restriction by 
pragmatic supplementation really is sufficient to capture the behaviour of natural-historical 
judgments. 
 
The idea behind an appeal to pragmatics, generally, is the thought that the members of a certain 
class of sentence, if “taken literally” (in accordance with what one’s semantic theory predicts), 
are false, or at any rate peculiar, and that this provokes a pragmatic accommodation on the part 
of the hearer.  Here, presumably, the thought is that generic sentences (more specifically for us, 
natural-historical judgments) are to be interpreted as straightforward universal generalisations—
and thus as false—but that those of us with sufficient “world knowledge” to detect this 
peculiarity will recognise the need for a supplementation with some restriction on the domain of 
quantification, and indeed (in the case of fully successful communication) will recognise just 
what restriction is in order. 
 
Now, Stanley and Szabó (2000) have argued quite generally against this sort of pragmatic 
approach to quantifier domain restriction.29  (The basic idea is that sentences with more than one 
                                                 
28 It’s not clear just what sort of “pragmatic consideration” is being envisioned; but even Grice’s coöperative 
principle would seem to rule out the interpretation of an utterance of a generic sentence, in the context of an 
ostensibly informative description of a given form of life, as a logical truth. 
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quantifier expression can often only be understood on the supposition that the domain restriction 
of one such expression is represented by an index which can be bound by another such 
expression.  Thus (their example) ‘In most of John’s classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen’: 
here the restriction on the domain of quantification underlying ‘exactly three Frenchmen’ must 
refer back to ‘most of John’s classes’.  And they argue that to posit indices such as these is to 
make quantifier domain restriction a semantic, not a pragmatic, matter.)  But even if we are not 
fully persuaded by Stanley and Szabó’s general argument, it seems to me that the idea that 
expressions of natural-historical judgments in particular depend on some pragmatically supplied 
restriction is belied by what Thompson calls (in a different context) the “transparently ‘factual’ 
or ‘positive’ character” (p. 291) of these judgments.  Krifka et al. themselves elsewhere remark 
on the essential place of generic judgments30 in our knowledge: 
 
Much of our knowledge of the world, and many of our beliefs about the world, are couched in terms of 
characterizing sentences.  Such sentences, we take it, are either true or false—they are not “indeterminate” 
or “figurative” or “metaphorical” or “sloppy talk”.  After all, we certainly would want to count the classic 
Snow is white as having a truth value!  (3; emphasis in original) 
 
Now to claim that generic sentences include an essentially pragmatic component is of course not 
immediately to contradict the view here articulated.  For, after all, the thought was that 
expressions of natural-historical judgments “taken literally” (that is, ignoring the pragmatically 
provided restriction on the domain of quantification) are false, not that they lack truth values in 
some “sloppy” way.  But I think I see behind Krifka et al.’s remarks quoted here, what is 
certainly in the quotation from Thompson, the idea that what a body of (correct) natural-
historical judgments collectively expresses—the natural history of some life form—is (not 
merely either true or false but) true of that life form.  Of course, the advocate of a pragmatic 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 “On quantifier domain restriction” (2000), referred to earlier in connection with Fara’s more limited appeal to 
restricted quantification; Stanley provides further argument in “Context and logical form” (2000). 
30 In the quoted passage they speak of “characterizing sentences”, not generic sentences generally; but there is no 
reason to suppose they wouldn’t be willing to view “sentences with kind-referring NPs” in the same way.  
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approach will reply that what’s important in this intuition is captured by the fact that on such an 
approach, what such a body of judgments communicates, at least to a hearer with sufficient 
“world knowledge,” is true.  But implicit in this suggestion, it seems to me, is that generic 
sentences, understood in this way as implicit “relevant quantifications” (where the “relevant” 
element, which distinguishes them from straightforward universal generalisations, is supplied 
pragmatically), are fundamentally dispensable.  If ‘Whales give birth to live young’ is simply 
short for ‘All female whales that reproduce do so by giving birth to live young’, where the 
expansion is supplied pragmatically in virtue of the hearer’s knowledge about whales, or indeed 
in any other way—and if all expressions of natural-historical judgments are similarly short-hand 
forms of straightforward universal generalisations—then generics are not after all essential to our 
knowledge of the world. 
 
Why not simply infer in the modus ponens here, insisting that generic sentences are tacit 
universal quantifications and embracing the consequence that, qua generic, they are inessential to 
our knowledge of the world?  The problem with this—indeed, the problem with the whole 
“relevant quantification” approach—can be brought out by considering that the sentence Krifka 
et al. chose to illustrate the approach is unduly favourable to it.  Generics are, essentially, 
generalisations that admit of exceptions.  The kind of “exception” envisaged to ‘Whales give 
birth to live young’ are whales that don’t bear young: bulls, infertile cows, and so forth.  For no 
whale, indeed, has laid an egg.  In such a case, it will appear plausible to suppose that one can if 
one likes spell out the restrictions on the domain of quantification, to yield a genuinely universal 
truth; and to suppose that we express such thoughts generically simply to avoid the hassle of 
spelling out the restrictions, which will be obvious to our interlocutor in any case.  But there are 
a great many natural-historical judgments that aren’t like this.  Recall Frege’s example, 
62 
considered in the course of the discussion of Bacon above: ‘The horse is a four-legged animal.’  
It is clear that the exceptions to this generalisation are not, as they were in the whale case, 
individuals to whom it is antecedently obvious (to anyone with a basic acquaintance with 
biology) that the predicate cannot be applied.  Frege’s attempt to rephrase the sentence as an 
explicit universal quantification brings this out: for the exclusion of horses that are not “properly 
constituted” does too much, in the sense that a great many “improperly constituted” horses have 
four legs, and not coincidentally. 
 
One might try to refine Frege’s proposal: perhaps as ‘All horses properly constituted regarding 
number of legs have four legs’.  But why is this (as it surely is) a better way to rephrase the 
original judgment than (say) ‘All horses properly constituted regarding the number four have 
four legs’?  That is to say, we now need an account (and again, for the reasons adduced above, it 
had better not be a pragmatic one) of how the appropriate restriction is extracted from the matrix.  
Another way to put the point might be: we now need a new representation of natural-historical 
judgments, finer-grained than the division into generic quantifier, restrictor and matrix, in order 
to transform them into restricted universal quantifications: we need to be able to divide what was 
the matrix into that part of it which contributes to determining the restriction on the universal 
quantification, and that part which becomes the consequent of the new universally quantified 
conditional.  Needless to say, how this is to be done is something left entirely obscure by the 
proposal we are considering.  Indeed it is not even clear that this is a coherent idea: for ‘number 
of legs’ is not after all in any obvious sense a part of, say, ‘∃y1y2y3y4(y1…y4 are distinct legs and 
x has y1 and … and x has y4)’.  Even supposing that we could make out such a sense of “part”, it 
is by no means clear that in that same sense of “part”, something like ‘reproduction’ or 
‘parturition’ (or even ‘number and colour of eggs’) will be a part of ‘∃y1…y10(y1…y10 are olive-
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buff eggs and x lays y1…y10)’.  But if we have no systematic means for the recovery of the 
restriction from (what we have until now been calling) the matrix of the natural-historical 
judgment, applicable both to ‘The horse is a four-legged animal’ and ‘The ring-necked pheasant 
lays ten olive-buff eggs’, we likewise have no systematic formal account of the semantics of 
natural-historical judgments.31 
 
In short, although the “relevant quantification” approach appears to make progress with respect 
to Fara’s account in so far as it attempts to provide an analysis of the generic quantifier, whereas 
Fara explicitly left that as an open question, in fact the details of the analysis offered by the 
“relevant quantification” approach are such as to reveal that, after all, Fara’s agnosticism was 
well motivated: for she noticed, what the advocates of “relevant quantification” did not, that not 
all generic sentences, indeed not even all sentences expressing natural-historical judgments, are 
even plausibly thought of as universal quantifications over an antecedently specifiable subclass 






                                                 
31 Thompson, “The representation of life,” §4.3 (“Is natural-historical judgement ‘normative’ judgement?”) works 
through a somewhat different attempt to find a successful reductive proposal in Frege’s ‘All properly constituted 
horses are four-legged animals’.  His main objection is that no account of the “normativity” involved can be given 
that doesn’t itself draw on an understanding of the life form that is the subject of the judgment.  But this on its own 
seems unlikely to move a formal semanticist; her goal is perhaps not to give a philosophical account of the nature of 
the normativity in question, but to indicate what elements compose the judgment; so in the face of Thompson’s 
claim that the “normativity” makes ineliminable reference to the life form, she can simply represent the restriction in 
question as a function of the restrictor (as well as of the matrix)—as she would have done anyway. 
Thompson also points out at the end of the section that on such an approach, “[t]he individual variable, and 
the quantifier that binds it, are… wheels turning idly” (290), in the sense that the essential elements in Frege’s 
formulation are simply the kind (‘horse’), the predicate (‘four-legged’) and the “normativity”.  This thought, I think, 
is in quite the same spirit as the remarks with which I closed §2.1 on Bacon, to the effect that “distributive” 
approaches misguidedly locate the force of natural-historical judgments in individuals considered severally, and 
thereby miss the unity they express.  But again, the mere claim that the quantificational apparatus is idle will not 
impress a formal semanticist, especially in the absence of a concrete alternative proposal; she needs to be shown that 
the quantificational apparatus gets something wrong.  (Cf. footnote 49 below, in which I compare my remarks on the 
situation-semantic approach to natural-historical judgments to Thompson’s discussion of ceteris paribus clauses.) 
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§2.5.  Prototypes. 
 
Krifka et al. follow their discussion of the “relevant quantification” approach to generic 
sentences with a discussion of what they call the “prototype” approach.  With roots in an early 
work of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, and taking more recent inspiration from cognitive 
psychology, this approach32 treats generic sentences as involving a tacit operator on predicates 
“which restricts the extension of a predicate to the entities that are ‘prototypical’ for that 
predicate” (p. 46).  We can recognise this as another version of the Fregean idea (which we first 
encountered in our discussion of Bacon) that a generic sentence admits of exceptions only 
because it leaves implicit a restriction on the range of quantification involved, such that, were the 
restriction to be made explicit, the sentence could be understood as expressing a strictly universal 
generalisation.  Here the restriction is interpreted as an operator on predicates, in contrast to the 
“relevant quantification” approach, which presented it as a further predicate conjoined to the 
restrictor of the quantification.  This approach would render the sentence ‘A tiger is striped’ as 
∀x[(TYP(tiger))(x) → x is striped].  More generally, the schema for generic sentences Krifka et 
al. began with, 
 
GEN[x; y](Restrictor [x]; Matrix [{x}; y]) 
 
would be defined as: 
 
∀x[(TYP(λxRestrictor[x]))(x) → ∃yMatrix[{x}; y]] 
 
The reader may wonder, at first, how different this proposal is from the previous one, at least at 
the level of formal analysis: for if (as both Heyer and Krifka et al. presuppose) the predicate 
operator in question here always yields a subset of the extension of the predicate on which it 
                                                 
32 Krifka et al. cite Platteau, Nunberg and Pan, and Heyer as advocates of this approach, but add that in their 
presentation, which is closest to Heyer’s, they are modifying the details in order to render it parallel to their other 
discussions.  I shall follow them, for the same reason. 
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operates, the effect would seem to be the same as that achieved simply by conjoining a further 
condition to the predicate in question, as the “relevant quantification” approach advocated.  Are 
prototypes not, in effect, just “relevant entities”? 
 
But the formal difference between conjunction and predicate operation emerges when we allow 
the operators in question to be intensional—for, while the set of objects satisfying ‘F(x) & R(x)’ 
will be identical to the set of objects satisfying ‘G(x) & R(x)’ whenever F and G are coextensive, 
to say that TYP is intensional is just to say that TYP(F) need not be coextensive with TYP(G) 
even in such a case.  And indeed, Krifka et al., immediately after their initial presentation of the 
“prototype” approach, point out that the TYP operator will have to be intensional, simply 
because the envisioned generic quantifier to be defined in terms of TYP must itself be 
intensional.  (Their favourite illustration is that ‘Birds fly’ had better remain true even in a case 
where all birds except penguins have become extinct; and they put the point here also in terms of 
prototypes: even in the envisioned apocalyptic case, a typical penguin would not be a typical 
bird.)  In accommodating this sort of nonextensionality, the “prototype” approach is a bit more 
flexible than the “relevant quantification” approach.33 
 
However, this advance does not save the approach from objections.  Krifka et al. go on to point 
out that a prototype operator as described so far can’t yield a satisfactory account of generic 
sentences, even if it’s construed intensionally.  For, first, the advocates of the “prototype” 
approach do not tell us anything further about the semantics of TYP in turn: and that’s to say that 
all they’ve done is to convert the problem of the semantics of the alleged generic quantifier into 
                                                 
33 Well, this is a little misleading, since in saying this I’m neglecting the pragmatic aspect of the “relevant 
quantification” approach.  That is, since R itself is not constant, but is rather determined pragmatically, it could well 
be (indeed it is surely likely that a proponent of the approach would intend) that its interpretation vary not only with 
the extension of the matrix but with its intension (or its sense).  Still, perhaps it can be said that treating genericity in 
terms of an operator on predicates seems to force us more immediately to come to terms with its intensionality, 
whereas the approach conjoining R to the explicit restrictor tends to draw our attention away from that intensionality. 
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the problem of the semantics of TYP.  And then Krifka et al. give two examples illustrating how 
difficult it will be to go on to give a more substantive account of TYP: first, the pair of sentences 
‘A wood duck has colourful feathers’ and ‘A wood duck lays whitish eggs’, which are both true, 
though no “prototypical” wood duck satisfies the matrices of both of these quantifications (since 
it is the males that have colourful feathers).34  Likewise, they point out that, arguably, no human 
being is “typical” in every respect—but then the class of prototypical human beings is empty, 
making all universally quantified conditionals with ‘TYP(Human being(x))’ as their antecedent 
trivially true.  More generally, we might say that no organism at all is “prototypical” in the sense 
of instantiating all the properties a natural history of its species would include; indeed Thompson 
expressed the same point more concisely: “Nobody’s perfect.” 
 
Krifka et al. describe briefly three ways of modifying the “prototype” approach in the face of 
these objections, without critically evaluating any of them (beyond hinting that the modifications 
would likely detract “from the initial plausibility of prototypes” (p. 48)).  The first and most 
telegraphic they put as follows: “Clearly, the notion of prototypicality must be relativized to the 
property being expressed in order to save this approach” (p. 47).  The second is a suggestion that 
a theory of objects with conflicting properties (e.g. maleness and femaleness, in the duck 
example), such (they suggest) as Kit Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects, might be applied to 
prototypes, presumably to explain how, for instance, a prototypical duck might be both 
colourfully feathered and an egg layer, and hence both male and female.  The third is a similar 
suggestion, that a theory such as Landman’s of partial or underspecified objects, by allowing that 
“a prototypical object can lack specific properties in one information state, but can acquire these 
                                                 
34 I have altered slightly Krifka et al.’s example sentences so as to make them expressions of natural-historical 
judgments. 
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properties in more detailed information states” (p. 48), might analogously avoid the sort of 
contradiction they illustrated with the duck example. 
 
I am least clear on how this third suggestion can help us, unless it is also meant to involve the 
second (or the first, which I will get to in a moment).  The basic idea behind the “prototype” 
approach is to understand generic sentences as universal quantifications over prototypical 
exemplars of the restrictor of the generic sentence.  If one of our difficulties with them 
(illustrated by the duck case) is that we can find sets of true generics about a given species the 
matrices of which do not all hold of any single member of that species, how will it help to 
abstract from some of the properties of the putative prototypes?  Consider the duck example 
again.  If ‘Wood ducks have colourful feathers’ is to come out true, it must be that all of the 
prototypical wood ducks have colourful feathers.  The worry was that female ducks don’t have 
colourful feathers, so this sentence seemed to require that the prototypical ducks all be male.  
Perhaps we are to consider “underspecified” ducks, such that (in the “information state” relevant 
to the evaluation of this sentence) their gender is left unspecified—but they had better 
nonetheless all have colourful feathers.  Likewise, for the sentence ‘Wood ducks lay whitish 
eggs’ to come out true, the prototypes, however underspecified, had better all lay whitish eggs.  
The suggestion was that “a prototypical object can lack specific properties in one information 
state, but can acquire these properties in more detailed information states” (p. 48); I suppose that 
the prototypical ducks, then, lack the property of egg-laying in one “information state”—where 
they happen to have the property of having colourful feathers—but “acquire” the property of 
egg-laying in another “information state” (where, presumably, they lose the property of having 
colourful feathers).  But I cannot see how this is not simply to restate the problem of 
contradictory properties in picturesque (indeed utterly mysterious) terms.  For, first, it seems to 
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me that the appeal to “information states” is idle.  This can be made acute by considering the 
sentence (surely true if our example sentences are35), ‘Wood ducks have colourful feathers and 
lay whitish eggs’.  In what “information state” will the prototypical ducks support this claim?  
But now, once we have purged the proposal of its appeal to information states, all we have is the 
assertion that our prototypes both have and lack certain properties: hardly a solution to the initial 
problem. 
 
The second suggestion, that the prototypes of a species might be treated as “arbitrary objects” in 
the sense of Fine’s Reasoning with arbitrary objects (1985), is an improvement over the one just 
considered, in that it embraces the consequence that prototypes must have conflicting properties, 
and recognises the need for giving an account of this consequence rather than simply renaming it.  
However, if I am not mistaken, it rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Fine’s work, and is 
ultimately of no help in the face of the objection to prototype theory considered by Krifka et al..  
Fine developed his account of arbitrary objects to function as a rigorous theory limning more 
closely what he took to be the intuitive content of the rules of universal generalisation and 
existential instantiation (as they tend to be presented in natural-deductive treatments of first-
order logic).  On Fine’s account, the intuitive idea of “choosing an arbitrary object” is 
represented formally by supplementing the standard model-theoretic semantics for classical first-
order logic with a set disjoint from the domain, the set of arbitrary objects, as well as a set of 
partial functions from the set of arbitrary objects into the domain.36  The latter determines, for 
each arbitrary object, its range, that is, the objects in the (standard) domain (which Fine calls 
“individual objects”, to contrast with the arbitrary objects) for which it goes proxy; thus, an 
                                                 
35 Thompson endorses this inference at (1995: 285), as we saw in the quotation at the opening of this chapter. 
36 I am abstracting from complications in the account (such as the dependency relation on arbitrary objects) which 
don’t concern the point about its applicability to the prototype approach to generic sentences.  
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“arbitrary integer” would have in its range all the individual integers, and this would be modeled 
by there being, in the set of partial functions, for every individual integer a function yielding that 
individual integer as value for that arbitrary integer as argument.  As for how sentences involving 
arbitrary objects are to be understood, Fine explains: “An arbitrary object has those properties 
common to the individual objects in its range.  So an arbitrary number is odd or even… since 
each individual number is odd or even” (1985, p. 5). 
 
The reader will likely now be puzzled—and rightly so—about how Fine’s account yields a 
conception of objects with conflicting properties, as Krifka et al. suggested.  According to their 
gloss of his theory, “arbitrary numbers are allowed to be even and odd at the same time” (1995, 
pp. 47-48); but it is clear from the sentences just quoted from Fine that this is not at all so: 
arbitrary integers are “even or odd”, since every integer is even or odd; they are not even and 
odd, since not every integer—indeed no integer—is even and odd.  (The niceties of how Fine 
deals with the puzzle of an arbitrary integer’s being “even or odd” without either being even or 
being odd—since after all not every integer is even, nor is every one odd—need not delay us 
here, since it is beside our point.)  And there is a good reason for this: Fine, again, is trying to 
model the reasoning involved in universal generalisation37: if we can show that a given arbitrary 
object must satisfy some formula, we infer that every object in its range satisfies that formula.  
But this will be of no help for our problematic ducks.  An “arbitrary duck” will be male or 
female, and (it may be granted) an arbitrary prototypical duck will in addition be colourfully-
feathered or whitish-egg-laying; but it will not follow on Fine’s account of arbitrary objects that 
an arbitrary prototypical duck is colourfully feathered, nor that it lays whitish eggs.  The latter, 
                                                 
37 and existential instantiation (as noted above), as well as other phenomena; I single out the case of universal 
instantiation because it illustrates most clearly why Fine’s account is quite unsuited to play the rôle Krifka et al. 
propose for it. 
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for instance, would only follow, given Fine’s truth conditions for predications of arbitrary 
objects, if all prototypical ducks laid whitish eggs—but the very point of the duck example was 
that they mustn’t all do so, since some prototypical ducks must have colourful feathers, and 
hence be male, and hence not lay eggs at all.  Since Fine’s arbitrary objects were designed to act 
as bases for universal generalisation, they cannot help with the problem raised by generic 
sentences: namely, that two such sentences can be true of a given kind even though no one 
instance of the kind instantiates both of the sentences’ matrices.  This is, after all, a symptom of 
the more fundamental fact about generics that they admit of exceptions: in other words, that they 
aren’t universal generalisations. 
 
Was Krifka et al.’s reference to Fine simply a gaffe to be eliminated and replaced with a more 
suitable theory—that is, with something that genuinely yields an account of conflicting 
properties?  (Indeed, they introduce Fine’s work merely as an example of such a theory, 
suggesting that they would be as happy with any other.)  First of all, if so, it’s clear that this 
suggestion of how to mend the prototype approach to generic sentences amounts, at best, to a 
promissory note: not to a positive account of the semantics of generics.  But further, and more 
gravely: can there be a suitable theory of conflicting properties?  What this type of response to 
the duck example requires is that the prototypical ducks—or at any rate the arbitrary prototypical 
ducks, or (since that word is already taken) perhaps we should call them the conflict-ridden 
prototypical ducks—be at once male and female, colourfully feathered and whitish-egg-laying.  
But how will a theory countenancing such entities then prevent us from inferring that a typical 
duck is one which both is colourfully feathered and lays whitish eggs?  It seems that the theory, 
to meet the objection, would have somehow to partition the properties exhibited by the conflict-
ridden prototypical ducks into groups that go together.  But then how would this be significantly 
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different from simply recognising the necessity for at least two distinct prototypes?  In neither 
case does it obtain, as the essence of the prototype approach to generics requires, that a generic 
sentence is true just in case its matrix holds of all of the prototypical instances of its restrictor. 
 
In the light of this last objection, perhaps (and here I go beyond anything Krifka et al. even hint 
at) we could imagine reconceiving TYP so as to yield, when fed a kind as argument, a set of 
(distinct) prototypes of that kind: for instance, a female duck that lays whitish eggs, a male duck 
with colourful feathers, and so on.  (We might imagine that it is the task of the natural historian 
to determine just how many such prototypes suffice to encapsulate a given species’s natural 
history: a species that goes through many metamorphoses might require a great many; some 
simple asexual life form might, we could perhaps imagine, require only one.)  We could then 
revise the truth definition for GEN by replacing Krifka et al.’s universal quantifier with an 
existential: such that a generic sentence is true if and only if some prototype of its restrictor 
satisfies its matrix.  Unfortunately, however, this too will not be true to the semantics of generic 
sentences.  Returning to our ducks, the prototype laying whitish eggs will after all be female, and 
our truth definition will therefore validate ‘A wood duck is female’, a manifest falsity.  
(Similarly with life forms exhibiting metamorphosis: this is usually tied to the age of such 
creatures, but for instance, even if the tadpoles of a certain species of frog metamorphose into 
adults after fewer than three months, so that the prototype(s) exhibiting the tadpole stage of that 
frog species will be less than three months old, ‘A frog is less than three months old’ is clearly 
false, again in violation of the semantics we are considering.) 
 
Now, though, it may seem to help to revive the idea of deploying a theory of “partial objects”, 
such as Landman’s, against whose usefulness for our purposes I argued above.  It was the 
combination of partiality and universality (to put it telegraphically) that led to problems there; 
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now that we have considered revising the prototype approach so as to understand generic 
sentences as existential rather than universal quantifications over prototypes, the account may 
seem more promising.  Thus we can again imagine the natural scientist providing us with our 
several prototypes for a given species, but omitting such predicates from the description of each 
prototype as would yield false generic sentences such as ‘A wood duck is female’ or ‘A frog is 
less than three months old’.  —But this procedure, in turn, is awfully hard to envision in any 
more detail than I have just sketched.  For after all, the ducks that lay whitish eggs are female: 
this is every bit as much a truth about the natural history of ducks as the fact that they lay whitish 
eggs itself.  Landman’s account of partiality appealed to information states—but in what 
“information state” do we know that a certain duck lays eggs but not that it’s female?  How 
plausible can it be that a grasp of the truth conditions of ‘A wood duck lays whitish eggs’ 
depends on feigning ignorance of the fact that only female ducks lay eggs (since from the generic 
together with that knowledge we could, on this proposal, infer ‘A wood duck is female’)? 
 
But I have so far neglected Krifka et al.’s first suggestion for dealing with the wood ducks and 
the typical human beings: to quote it again, “Clearly, the notion of prototypicality must be 
relativized to the property being expressed in order to save this approach” (1995, p. 47).  I take 
this rather cryptic formulation to mean that we are to conceive of TYP as a function of two 
arguments—the restrictor and the matrix—rather than just of the restrictor.  Thus ‘A wood duck 
has colourful feathers’ would be interpreted as something like “Every wood duck typical with 
respect to having colourful feathers has colourful feathers.”  I have neglected this suggestion in 
my discussion of the proposals to employ theories of partial objects, or objects with conflicting 
properties, mainly because I cannot see, actually, why the latter theories would still be necessary 
if this suggestion were successfully implemented: for there is no contradiction between “Every 
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wood duck typical with respect to having colourful feathers has colourful feathers” and “Every 
wood duck typical with respect to laying whitish eggs lays whitish eggs” (no reason that the 
ducks quantified over by the former shouldn’t be male and those by the latter female); and there 
is not such a pressing worry that the set of, say, human beings typical in some one respect is 
empty as there was that the set of human beings typical in every respect might be empty.  The 
question here is simply how the suggestion can possibly be implemented.  The interpretations I 
have provided of the sentences on this new conception of TYP as a two-place function sound 
rather close to trivial, and it might be thought that I should have said, for example, “Every wood 
duck typical with respect to laying eggs lays whitish eggs.”  But it is not at all clear what 
systematic account of the behaviour of TYP would explain how that is to be derived from ‘A 
wood duck lays whitish eggs’.  In other words, the last problem we discussed for the “relevant 
quantification” approach, §2.4—the problem of extracting from the matrix just the information 
needed for the restriction on the quantification—applies here as well.  On the other hand, we may 
decide (perhaps in the face of this consideration) that my original interpretations, albeit peculiar-
sounding, were nevertheless correct: we may hold, for instance, that the true ‘A wood duck lays 
whitish eggs’ means “Every wood duck typical with respect to laying whitish eggs lays whitish 
eggs” while the false ‘A wood duck lays brown eggs’ means “Every wood duck typical with 
respect to laying brown eggs lays brown eggs,” the latter being false just because (even if there 
are occasional mutant wood ducks laying brown eggs) what it is for a wood duck to be typical 
with respect to laying brown eggs is for it to lay whitish eggs.  But surely it is clear that this is 
simply burying the problem just discussed, of how to extract something like “laying eggs” (tout 
court) from ‘lays whitish [or brownish] eggs’, rather than actually solving it, since the reason 
why “what it is for a wood duck to be typical with respect to laying brown eggs is for it to lay 
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whitish eggs” is plainly that laying brownish eggs is a way of laying eggs, and to be typical with 
respect to that, for a wood duck, is to lay whitish eggs. 
 
(A related problem arises when we consider simple matrices, such as that in ‘A wood duck is 
female’.  On the present proposal, we are to understand this as “Every wood duck typical with 
respect to being female is female.”  It is rather hard to imagine what account of TYP would fail 
to make the latter come out true—though the former is clearly false.) 
 
So much for the prototype approach. 
 
§2.6.  Stereotypes. 
 
The idea behind the stereotype approach to generic sentences is that, for instance, the reason for 
which ‘A lion has a mane’ is a true generic sentence but ‘A lion is male’ is not, though all lions 
with manes are male, is that having a mane is part of our (linguistic, cultural) stereotype of a lion 
(in a way in which maleness of course isn’t).  Krifka et al., in objection to this proposal, 
emphasise what Thompson calls the “transparently ‘factual’ or ‘positive’ character” (1995: 291) 
of natural-historical judgments, giving as an example ‘Snakes are slimy’, which is false 
regardless how widespread any stereotype to the contrary might be.38  Krifka et al. also point out 
that, since “there is little hope that we will find principles of general logical interest” underlying 
the formation of stereotypes, the interpretation of the generic quantifier in terms of stereotypes 
will yield “no general theory of the semantics of GEN” (1995: 48, 49).  Finally, they argue that 
the idea of stereotypes cannot provide a general account of GEN, since there are true generics 
whose restrictors involve complex subject classes too specific for there to be cultural or linguistic 
stereotypes associated with them. 
                                                 
38 We noted Krifka et al.’s commitment to this “realism” (as we might call it) about generics above, in our 
discussion of the “relevant quantification” approach, although they didn’t deploy it as an objection there (as we did). 
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I believe that Krifka et al.’s first objection is the deal-killer: even if some classes of generic 
sentence are tied to stereotypes in some way, the generic sentences in which we are interested in 
this enquiry—those expressing the natural history of a species—need have no connection with 
such sociological phenomena.  The observation that a stereotype approach to generics is unlikely 
to yield a formal-semantic theory is perhaps a less compelling objection, since an advocate of the 
approach might simply shrug and conclude that what’s special about generics is precisely not “of 
general logical interest.”  (And we in this enquiry may feel more of an obligation to take this 
possibility seriously than the average linguist or formal semanticist.)  The point about complex 
subject classes may also be of less relevance to us than to a scholar of generics in general: for 
Thompson’s conception of the expression of a natural-historical judgment is, paradigmatically, 
as the combination of a life form word with a predicate, and a life form word is presumably 
semantically simple.  This is not to say that natural-historical judgments with complex subject 
terms are unthinkable—it is surely also true that the male lion has a mane—but one might find 
implicit in Thompson’s remarks a suggestion that such judgments are in some sense posterior to 
ones made about a given life form tout court.39  If we are to take seriously Thompson’s claim 
that natural-historical judgments are unique, then we must also take seriously theories of generics 
which, even though they clearly don’t apply to generics across the board, seem to hold some 
promise for expressions of natural-historical judgments in particular.  However, again, of course, 
not all natural-historical judgments, indeed not even all of them with simple subject terms, can 
be understood as resting for their truth on stereotypes, for the reason already mentioned.  In 
short, it’s Krifka et al.’s first objection that warrants the rejection of the “stereotype” approach to 
natural-historical judgments. 
                                                 
39 E.J. Lowe (1989) gives a general theory of sortal predication in which reference to complex sortals is in all 
contexts eliminable in favour of reference to simple sortals. 
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§2.7.  Koslicki’s “two-tiered” approach. 
 
Koslicki (1999) considers and rejects both subject-predicate and relational (that is, in our terms, 
“distributive”) analyses of generic sentences.  She rejects the former on the grounds that some 
generics—generics whose predicates appear to attach more naturally to individuals, or “I-
generics” in Krifka’s language (mentioned at note 2 above)—have scopal properties that seem to 
be excluded by such analyses.  And she rejects the latter since other generics—“D-generics”, as 
Krifka calls them, such as predications of extinction, rarity and so on—seem unamenable to 
them.  She also rejects “non-uniform” analyses which take the former of these two types of 
approach for the sentences for which it appears to work (D-generics) and the latter for the 
sentences for which it appears to work (I-generics), because this requires positing a systematic 
ambiguity in the noun phrases appearing in such sentences.  (On such an approach, ‘The 
tyrannosaur’ in ‘The tyrannosaur is extinct’ denotes a kind, but in ‘The tyrannosaur was warm-
blooded’ it serves to express quantification over individuals of that kind.)  She recommends, 
instead, a “two-tiered” approach, involving a first level where all generics receive a parallel 
analysis in terms of plurals (understood, drawing on Boolos’s work and also on Higginbotham 
and Schein, as referring not to plural objects but to “Fregean concepts”), and a second, lexical 
level where plural predication itself is analysed, differently for different lexical contexts.  (Thus 
what it is to predicate plurally is different when the predicandum is extinction from what it is 
when the predicandum is warm-bloodedness.)  In particular, the plural predication appearing in 
first-level analyses of the sorts of generic for which a “relational” analysis initially seemed 
plausible will indeed, Koslicki suggests, be unpacked quite uniformly in terms of a generic 
quantifier, while the plural predication involved in what look like kind predications will get quite 
heterogeneous treatments depending on just what is being predicated.  She gives examples: 1. ‘A 
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dog is a faithful pet’ and 2. ‘The dinosaur is extinct’.  The first tier of analysis yields, for 1., Are-
faithful-pets((ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-dog(y)]), and for 2., Are-extinct((ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-
dinosaur(y)]).40  At the second tier, since 1. can be understood as distributing the property of 
being a faithful pet to individual dogs, we interpret Are-faithful-pets(X) as GEN(x)[X(x), Is-a-
faithful-pet(x)]; and for 2., we understand the plural predication quite differently, and for Are-
extinct(X) we get, perhaps, ∀x[X(x) → Is-dead(x)]41.  We are to take our cue from the particular 
predicate (here, ‘Are-faithful-pets’ and ‘Are-extinct’ respectively) in determining how the 
second tier of analysis should go in a particular case: as Koslicki says, it’s a lexical matter. 
 
Now, it may be that natural history has no essential need for D-generics (since facts such as that 
a species is extinct, or rare, or was introduced to Ireland in the 1700s or what have you, don’t 
seem to be part of the natural history of life forms, in the sense of ‘natural history’ at issue in 
natural-historical judgments).  If so, the motivation to move toward non-uniform approaches, and 
then to Koslicki’s two-tiered approach, may to some extent be undercut, from our point of view 
in this enquiry as interested in natural-historical judgments. 
 
However, let us set this aside and suppose that the motivation for developing something like 
Koslicki’s two-tiered analysis is compelling.  (After all, even if it is true that natural-historical 
judgments themselves are always I-generic, there is still something to be said for the thought that 
the noun phrases appearing in them should be interpreted synonymously with the 
orthographically identical phrases appearing in (ex hypothesi non-natural-historical) judgments 
of extinction, rarity and so on.)  We may nevertheless object that, though Koslicki eliminates the 
                                                 
40 The ι notation here works something like lambda abstraction, so that (ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-dinosaur(y)] is to be 
read as “the concept X such that something is in its extension just in case it’s a dinosaur”. 
41 Koslicki gives two possible unpackings of Are-extinct(X), both different from what I give in the text; the 
complication arises from the temporality of extinction, and the general question how to deal logically with this 
temporality.  However, since this is irrelevant to our present concerns, I have ignored the niceties. 
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ambiguity in noun phrases she worried about in association with the nonuniform approaches, she 
simply replaces it with an ambiguity in the very form of plural predication—which seems, if 
anything, even more disturbing.  Referring to work by Higginbotham, Koslicki explains the two-
tiered structure of her account in terms of the difference between the “combinatorial/structural” 
aspect and the lexical aspect of the theory of meaning.  That generics are plural predications, 
then, is a matter of their logical form, she says, while how plural predication itself is to be 
unpacked is a lexical matter.  But it strikes me as absurd to think that the transition from Are-
faithful-pets((ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-dog(y)]) to GEN(x)[(ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-dog(y)](x), Is-a-
faithful-pet(x)] is a lexical matter requiring attention to the particular predicate ‘Are-faithful-
pets’ rather than a matter of the form of predication involved. 
 
Now, “it strikes me as absurd” is so far not much of an argument; and perhaps Koslicki will 
respond in her defense:  If I’m told, ‘The Bandersnatch is frumious’, surely it’s true that I won’t 
know whether this is “distributive” or “kind-predicative” unless I know what ‘frumious’ means: 
whether, that is, it means something like ‘furry’ or something like ‘extinct’.  But likewise, I don’t 
know whether ‘vorpal’ is an attributive adjective42 or not in ‘He took his vorpal sword in hand’ 
unless I know what ‘vorpal’ means; but that (at least arguably) doesn’t show that the 
attributive/nonattributive distinction is merely lexical either: contrast Evans (1976), who draws 
heavily on the thought, precisely, that this distinction is structural.  It therefore seems possible to 
resist the implication of Koslicki’s analysis that the distinction between “distributive” and “kind-
predicative” (I- and D-) genericity is “lexical”, even while granting the point about ‘frumious’, 
                                                 
42 “attributive” not in the sheerly grammatical sense, but in the “logical” sense of an operator on predicates rather 
than a predicate (the sense at issue e.g. in Evans (1976)). 
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simply by pointing out that structural features aren’t necessarily visible at the surface level.43  At 
a minimum, we might say, whether a generic is “D” or “I” can be a structural rather than a 
lexical feature, even if we agree with Koslicki that, if it’s “D”, then how it’s “D” (so to speak) is 
a lexical matter. 
 
Indeed, even before the ambiguity in the form of plural predication, notice (what Koslicki 
doesn’t seem to notice) that her account actually posits an ambiguity in the predicates appearing 
in I- and D-generic sentences as well.  Consider: her analysis of ‘The tiger is striped’ would 
yield, at the first tier (that is, at the level of logical form), ‘Are-striped((ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-
tiger(y)]).  But then ‘ζ is striped’ as it appears in the example sentence is interpreted as ‘Are-
striped’, which takes as its argument a concept—whereas in ‘Tigger is striped’, the argument of 
the predicate is an individual.  Now, the second tier of Koslicki’s analysis removes this formal 
ambiguity (since, this being an I-generic, the plural predication is reinterpreted as a predication 
distributed generically over individuals); but what are we to make of the fact that, again, this 
second tier is said to be lexical?  At the level of logical form, it seems, a wide range of predicates 
are to be treated as admitting both concepts and individuals as arguments. 
 
Indeed, it begins to seem reasonable to ask what the ground is for taking the detour through the 
second-order tier.  Koslicki argues that, if one cuts straight to the elucidatory analyses of I-
sentences—which tend to wind up as mere quantifications—one obscures what was generic 
about them.  It is the first-stage, second-order analysis that brings out what they have in common 
with D-sentences (and so, one supposes, vice versa: the analysis of D-sentences as plural 
predications, before cashing this out in accordance with the separate demands of the various 
                                                 
43 Compare also ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’ to ‘Scott is the picture of patriotism’: (though Fara might 
disagree,) here too we seem to have a structural difference underlying surface-syntactically parallel constructions. 
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predicates appearing in them, shows what they have in common with I-sentences: namely, 
genericity.)  –But the disjunctive structure of Koslicki’s account of plural predication suggests, 
rather, that, contrary to appearances, I-sentences don’t have anything substantive in common 
with D-sentences.  Another way of bringing this out is to consider that, if the first tier of analysis 
was intended to show what makes the two classes of sentence both generic, then it is rather too 
broad: for there are after all a great deal of obviously nongeneric sentences that share the form 
given at this first tier!  In fact, we can illustrate this point with an example sentence that Koslicki 
herself adduces in the course of her account of plural predication: for ‘The rocks rained down’, 
she gives the analysis Rained-down((ιX)(∀y)[X(y) ↔ Is-a-rock(y)]).  And there is not a trace of 
genericity in this sentence: this is simply a report of a one-time occurrence involving a (mere) 
plurality of objects.  But this shows that the form of plural predication isn’t special to genericity.  
Presumably here, as in the other cases, we are to figure out how to understand this plural 
predication by looking at the predicate ‘Rained-down’—but then, since it’s at this stage where 
we determine whether we have i) an I-generic, ii) a D-generic, or iii) some nongeneric sentence 
like the one about the rocks, that is surely just to say that, on Koslicki’s account, genericity itself 
becomes a lexical matter.  There really is no unifying accomplished by this first tier of analysis. 
 
Furthermore, whatever we make of the two tiers of her analysis, the fact that her account (like 
those of Fara and Cohen above) leaves GEN, as it occurs in the interpretation of I-generics at the 
second tier, unexplained means that it cannot satisfy us in our present enquiry. 
 
Finally and most generally, the very idea (which Koslicki just tosses out casually) that “kinds, 
after all, are just another variety of plural objects” (1999: 453) seems fundamentally misguided.  
‘Tom, Dick and Harry’, and indeed ‘this dissertation, the sun and the number 3’ perhaps denote 
plural objects: but it seems plain that a kind is not “just another plural object” in this sense.  
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What perhaps tempts people into subject-predicate types of analysis (besides surface grammar) is 
that (natural) kinds have a kind of unity that goes beyond anything countenanced by the formal 
treatment of plural objects (not to mention by quantification employing singular predication).  
Boolos himself observes about his account of plural predication, intending this as a selling point, 
that it brings no further ontological commitment besides that already involved in classical first-
order logic.44  So we might express the present objection, somewhat sloganistically, by saying 
that it is precisely this absence of further “ontological commitment” that makes Koslicki’s 
approach “distributive” in our sense, and also that renders it oblivious to the “unity” belonging to 
natural (life form) kinds at which we just gestured.  (But perhaps this would be a misleading 
slogan, since non-nominalistic treatments of plurality, which interpret “plural objects” as sets or 
mereological sums or some such, really do no better at capturing the “unity” I have in mind.) 
 
§2.8.  Cohen’s “probabilistic” theory. 
 
With this article of Cohen’s, unlike the previous one of his we considered (and unlike the 
accounts of Bacon, Fara and Koslicki), we have a substantive attempt at a semantics for a generic 
quantifier.  Unfortunately, it’s flawed. 
 
Cohen begins by proposing to treat his “generic operator” (which he writes as ‘Gn’) as operating 
simply on pairs of predicates, not on open sentences; there are thus no variables ranging over 
individuals in his representations of generic sentences, and this may make his proposal seem not 
quite “distributive” in our sense.  However, he suggests in a footnote that his treatment could be 
broadened to allow the operator to take open sentences as arguments, and in any case the truth 
conditions he settles on for generics involve probability understood in terms of relative 
                                                 
44 Because of this, it is in fact a little puzzling that Koslicki persists in talking of “plural objects”: on the treatment of 
plural predication which she endorses, it involves no new objects. 
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frequency—that is, of course, relative frequency of instances, which brings in explicit reference 
to the satisfaction of the predicates by individuals—so it seems reasonable to treat his proposal 
as a version of the “distributive” approach after all. 
 
Cohen compares generic sentences with sentences involving frequency adverbs, and he proposes 
a unified treatment of both classes of sentence as probability statements.  In essence, the idea is 
to treat a generic as true just in case the probability of an entity’s satisfying the matrix given that 
it satisfies the restrictor is greater than one half.  He recognises that such an account will not do 
without further refinements; as he puts it, in the case of generics, “majority is not enough” (1999: 
228).  So he introduces an account of probability as hypothetical relative frequency, based on 
von Mises’s treatment, but with some refinements.  (We are to consider relative frequency in 
arbitrary “histories” which are extensions of the actual one and for which no temporal 
partitioning of the domain yields differing relative frequencies in different partitions.)  Cohen 
declares, first, that sentences in ‘most’ and ‘usually’ have as truth conditions that the probability, 
in the sense just sketched, of a restrictor-satisfier’s satisfying the matrix of the sentence is greater 
than one half.45  To distinguish generic sentences from such ‘most’ sentences, Cohen simply 
imposes some further conditions on the partitions deemed relevant to the probability calculation: 
a generic sentence is true only if the frequency in such histories of matrix-satisfiers among 
restrictor-satisfiers is homogeneous not only with respect to time but also with respect to any 
other partitions of the domain pragmatically deemed “salient, given the context and the language 
user’s model of the world” (242; Cohen’s emphasis). 
 
                                                 
45 He suggests that such sentences carry an implicature that the probability is substantially greater than one half, but 
insists that such sentences are literally true even when the probability is only minimally greater. 
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Now, Cohen starts out on the wrong foot when he says that “we are only concerned here with the 
descriptive readings of generics, and not with the prescriptive readings” (222; his emphasis).  He 
says this in the context of considering that generics can be true even when they have no 
supporting instances: one of his examples is ‘Mary handles the mail from Antarctica’, when no 
such mail has ever come.  The sentence proves false on the descriptive reading, but remains true 
on the prescriptive reading, if some mail arrives from Antarctica and Mary neglects it, though it 
is her job to handle it.  But it is hard to see how to hold on to the idea that the reading at issue is 
the descriptive one at the same time as imagining that the sentence is true but as yet 
uninstantiated.  I think this is a symptom of Cohen’s predisposition toward a probabilistic 
conception of generics. 
 
The elaborate story Cohen tells about the sense of probability at issue, involving homogeneity 
and “salient partitions” imposed pragmatically, seems to involve telling “just so stories” in order 
to make the probabilities line up with what we already know about the truth conditions of generic 
sentences.  But one is left with the sense that the true account of the semantics of generics ought 
to get directly at whatever it is that grounds this understanding of ours of the truth conditions, 
rather than taking what feels like a detour through the story about probabilities. 
 
In addition, when we consider the aptitude of Cohen’s account for natural-historical judgments in 
particular, it is clear that the conception of “salient partitions” as a pragmatic matter dooms the 
account to an inability to register what (as we’ve seen) Thompson calls the “transparently 
‘factual’ or ‘positive’ character” (1995: 291) of natural-historical judgments.  Cohen emphasises 
the objectivity of one aspect of this notion of partitions: he writes, “While the saliency of 
partitions may vary across individuals and contexts, I take it to be an objective fact whether or 
not a given domain is homogeneous with respect to a particular set of salient partitions and a 
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property” (1999: 242n11).  But this is not enough to save the account from the objection I am 
raising: for it is precisely the varying “across individuals and contexts” that causes the problem.  
For instance, Cohen suggests that the falsity of ‘People are over three years old’ in the face of the 
fact that, statistically, most people are over three years old, is to be explained by the fact that 
hearers of this sentence will evaluate it against the background of a partition according to age.  
However, if there were some context in which, or some speaker for whom, the partition 
according to age were not salient, this sentence would be true in that context or for that speaker, 
according to Cohen’s account of its truth conditions.  But as a natural-historical judgment, this 
sentence is just false: it is simply not part of the natural history of human beings that we are over 
three years old. 
 
In short, Cohen’s account is not of the truth of generic sentences tout court, but of their truth-
relative-to-speaker-and-context (as he makes explicit e.g. at p. 242)—but speaker and context are 
simply not parameters with respect to which the truth of natural-historical judgments varies.  
Even if his account were satisfactory for other classes of generic sentence, in order to 
accommodate the phenomenon of natural-historical judgments, Cohen would need to supplement 
his account with, at a minimum, a theory of “salient partitions” (if “salient” would still be an 
appropriate label) for natural-historical judgments that would make the partitions as objective a 
matter as the homogeneity of a domain with respect to the partitions once given.  But not only 
does Cohen not give us such a theory (a fact for which one might forgive him, since his target is 
the semantics of generic sentences as a whole, not expressions of natural-historical judgments in 
particular—though it is still true that he takes his account to apply also to the latter, and our 
argument shows that, as long as the question of relevant partitions is left as a “pragmatic” matter, 
this is false), there is good reason for despairing of the availability of such a theory.  When, once 
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he has introduced the notion of salient partitions, Cohen talks us through several examples 
showing how he can squeeze the correct truth conditions for the example generic sentences from 
his account, it is hard to avoid the impression, again, that he is telling “just so” stories about how 
to partition the domain so as to yield homogeneity for the true generics and heterogeneity for the 
false.  It is harder still to envision a theory—even one available in principle—which could yield 
the correct partitions in advance, without looking ahead to an independent grasp of the truth 
values of the sentences it provides partitions for. 
 
And in any case, the account in terms of probability doesn’t get things right.46  Cohen 
recognises, as we saw, that “majority is not enough” for a generic sentence to be true; thus, while
frequency statements, for their truth, only require homogeneity across temporal partitions of 
sequences, generic statements require homogeneity across many more partitions—where “the 
suitability of partitions is a pragmatic matter.  A partition is suitable to the extent that it is 
considered salient, given the context and the way we view the world” (1999: 242; emphasis 
removed).  Cohen invokes this mechanism to rule out a range of putative counterexamples to hi
view: sentences for which the hypothetical relative frequency in question is greater than one 
but which plainly do not express true generics.  Thus he gives the example ‘Bees are sexually 
sterile’: this appears to be a false generic sentence, despite the fact that, statistically speaking, 
most bees are sterile.  He suggests that hearers of this sentence will evaluate it against the 
background of a partition of the bees by gender—or, alternatively, by reproductive ability—




                                                 
46 This point is not really separate from that of the previous paragraph: Cohen’s discussion of “salient partitions” 
smacks of adhockery, I think, precisely because what he is doing is looking for a partition on the domain yielding 
homogeneity with respect to the matrix of a given generic, so as to make the probabilities turn out right—where that 
with respect to which they are to “turn out right” is a grasp of their truth conditions which (I claim) is not really 
probabilistically grounded at all. 
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generally not sterile), explaining our taking the sentence to be false.  He walks through sev
other examples, showing how an invocation of “salient partitions” can explain why generic 
sentences can be untrue when their corresponding frequency stat
eral 
ements are true. 
 
Though this mechanism is ingenious, I don’t believe that it yields a true account of generic 
sentences.  We can begin by observing that Cohen’s slogan, that “majority is not enough”, sits 
uneasily with an essential fact about generics that he appears to miss: namely, that on the other 
hand, majority is sometimes not even a necessary condition.  Most scholars of generics advert to 
this feature of them as one of their more puzzling properties near the beginning of their analyses: 
see Krifka et al. (1995) for one example, and consider (for a pithy if somewhat paradoxical 
expression of the same thought), Thompson’s observation that “although ‘the mayfly’ breeds 
shortly before dying, most mayflies die long before breeding” (1995: 284).  Cohen’s partitions 
will not save his account from this flaw: for when P(Φ | Ψ) is less than one half, no amount of 
clever homogeneity-preserving partitioning of the domain will turn P(Φ | Ψ) into something 
greater than one half—for the partitions, again, must be homogeneous!  And yet, as the case of 
the mayflies illustrates, the phenomenon of true generics of the form Gn(Ψ, Φ) where P(Φ | Ψ) < 
0.5 is widespread. 
 
Cohen, perhaps inadvertently, discusses a case of this: he asks why ‘Mammals give birth to live 
young’ is generally taken to be true, while ‘Mammals are female’ is not, even though the 
probability of a mammal’s being female is actually higher than that of its giving birth to live 
young.  (He does not explicitly note that P(Gives birth to live young | Is a mammal) is less than 
one half; he simply notes that it is less than P(Is female | Is a mammal).)  He claims that “[t]he 
requirement of homogeneity explains [this] phenomenon” (1999: 247); but in fact his 
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explanation of how this is supposed to go adverts to domain restriction, which has nothing to do 
with the requirement of homogeneity.  He writes: 
 
… the property give birth to live young induces a set of alternative forms of procreation, e.g. {give birth to 
live young, lay eggs, undergo mitosis}.  The domain of the generic is restricted to only those mammals 
which satisfy one of those alternatives, i.e., procreate in some fashion; this constitutes a subset of female 
mammals.  Since a procreating mammal is highly likely to give birth to live young, [‘Mammals give birth 
to live young’] is true.  (247) 
 
But this, in effect, is to confess that, contrary to his official doctrine, Gn(Is a mammal, Gives 
birth to live young) is not true just in case P(Gives birth to live young | Is a mammal)) is greater 
than one half—even when the explanation of P(Φ | Ψ) in terms of hypothetical relative frequency 
is supplemented with his story about salient partitions.  What his account has to be, even though 
he doesn’t explicitly recognise this, is an account in terms of probability nested inside an account 
of domain restriction.  He doesn’t give us any details about this latter, equally necessary facet of 
his full account (though he cites previous work of his); but in any case, we have already 
discussed the problems associated with the attempt to explicate generic sentences in terms of 
quantifier domain restriction.  (Note that, just as in our discussion of domain restriction in §2.4, 
“Relevant quantification,” Cohen’s example here involves giving birth, so that his story about 
domain restriction is at least plausible-sounding.  But (as we observed in §2.4), many of the true 
generics of the form Gn(Ψ, Φ) where P(Φ | Ψ) < 0.5 are not such as to invite this kind of obvious 
domain restriction.) 
 
§2.9.  Modal approaches. 
 
Krifka et al. suggest that a promising strategy for treating the semantics of generic sentences, 
adopted for instance by Heim, is by adapting and applying to them the modal approach to the 
semantics of conditional sentences (as found e.g. in Lewis, Counterfactuals (1973)).  They make 
this suggestion on the grounds that generic sentences, at least of the sort that seem disposed to be 
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analysed distributively, “resemble conditional sentences” (1995: 49)—indeed, as they put it later, 
“A [generic] sentence such as ‘A lion has a bushy tail’ expresses the same concept as the 
conditional sentence ‘If something is a lion, it has a bushy tail’” (1995: 52, emphasis added). 
 
They therefore begin by describing a standard treatment of possible-worlds semantics for 
modality (whose presentation is due to Kratzer), involving the □/◊ distinction, the accessibility 
relation among possible worlds, and an “ordering source” imposing a similarity ordering on 
worlds.  After reinterpreting ‘A lion has a bushy tail’ as ‘If something is a lion, it has a bushy 
tail’, they propose to treat it as implicitly must-like, “in order to capture the quasi-universal force 
of [generic] sentences” (1995: 52).  Roughly, their truth definition yields that ‘A lion has a bushy 
tail’ will be true in a world w with respect to a given accessibility relation and ordering source 
just in case “everything which is a lion in the worlds [accessible to w] is such that, in every 
world which is most normal according to the ordering source, it will have a bushy tail” (p. 52).  
The point is not that all lions in worlds accessible to w have bushy tails, but that any non-bushy-
tailed lion in such a world must be in a world less normal than one in which it has a bushy tail. 
 
What conception of normality (and for that matter accessibility) underlies this structure?  Krifka 
et al. tell us that, since the accessibility relation and ordering source are often left implicit, 
“hearers construct a modal base and ordering source for the interpretation of a sentence, in order 
to accommodate it” (p. 56; italics in original, with credit to Lewis (1979) for the concept of 
accommodation).  Their remarks on the accessibility and ordering relations appropriate for 
natural-historical judgments are few, and raise problems, as they themselves note: for, by their 
definition, the truth of ‘A turtle is long-lived’ in w seems to require that the “most normal 
worlds” accessible to w be ones in which all turtles survive to an old age—though this would be, 
in fact, a quite abnormal scenario for turtles.  Likewise, ‘A pheasant lays speckled eggs’ seems to 
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require that all pheasants in the most normal worlds lay eggs—but then they must all be female, 
and (as Krifka et al. point out) it is puzzling how, in those worlds, they could have been 
fertilised. 
 
Now, the initial assimilation of generic sentences to conditionals, meant to motivate the proposal, 
is controversial.  Even for genuinely universal generalisations, the equivalence between the 
natural-language ‘All Ss are Ps’ and the (stilted) ‘Anything is such that if it’s an S, it’s a P’ is 
contentious.  (Thus in a sortal logic such as Gupta’s The logic of common nouns (1980), which 
interprets all quantification as restricted quantification, such that we always quantify over things 
of a certain kind—and which eschews a universal sortal ‘thing’—this “Fregean equivalence” 
does not hold fully generally.)  But more gravely, to the extent that the “Fregean equivalence” 
itself is intuitive, the assimilation of generics to conditionals may not be.  For after all, the (false) 
universal ‘All lions have bushy tails’ is, according to the Fregean equivalence, also equivalent to 
‘If something is a lion, it has a bushy tail’.  Since the generic is certainly not equivalent to the 
universal, it doesn’t seem as though it can be equivalent to ‘If something is a lion, it has a bushy 
tail’ either.  –Now, of course, in response to this, we’ll be urged to “hear the conditional 
generically”, meaning (on this approach) to hear it as a conditional understood modally, and in 
particular against the background of the appropriate modal apparatus.  (Indeed advocates of 
modal approaches to conditionals will surely insist that this is appropriate quite generally, and 
that if conditionals are ever equivalent to straightforward universal generalisations as Frege held, 
this is to be modeled by suitably tweaking the modal apparatus.)  But arguably, the assimilation 
to conditionals is nevertheless more contentious in the case of generics than in that of universal 
generalisations, for the sort of reason discussed at the end of §2.1 on Bacon: a (however 
modally) quantified conditional quantifies over individuals, and I suggested there that any 
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attempt to understand natural-historical judgments in terms of the properties of a selection of 
(now perhaps merely possible) individuals will do injustice to them.  But let us turn to the details 
of the proposal. 
 
As for what the appropriate modal apparatus is:  Krifka et al.’s remarks on the pragmatic 
accommodation of generic sentences may make us nervous, in the light of the “transparently 
‘factual’ or ‘positive’ character” Thompson attributes to natural-historical judgments (1995: 291) 
that we have now seen several times.  On the other hand, the very exercise Krifka et al. go 
through, of working through various examples of generic sentences and cataloguing the different 
accessibility and ordering relations that would explain their truth conditions, suggests an 
interesting response to Thompson’s complaint, with which we began this chapter, according to 
which, since generics constitute a “rag-bag” of logically distinct types of sentence, no formal 
treatment of their semantics can shed light on the logical form of the natural-historical judgment.  
In addition to the response we already gave to this objection at the beginning of this chapter—
viz., that genericists do not treat “the class of generics” homogeneously if by that class is meant, 
as Thompson implied was meant, something so large as also to include statistical 
generalisations—an advocate of the present, modal approach can respond further: even genuine 
generics are in one sense a “rag-bag”: viz., they rest on different accessibility and ordering 
relations.  But in another perfectly intelligible sense, they share a logical form: namely, the one 
revealed when we give their truth conditions “relative to world, accessibility relation and 
ordering source”, without specifying what the particular accessibility relation and ordering 
source for a given sentence are.  (Something like this approach is taken by Papafragou (1996), 
and indeed also Heim, whose treatment Krifka et al. are for the most part following.)  Thus, 
when Thompson argues that natural-historical judgments are logically distinctive even from the 
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(in some respects similar) class of judgments about artefacts and techniques, a modalist can 
perhaps attempt to reply: what distinguishes them is the difference in the content of the modal 
apparatus needed to evaluate their truth: they share the logical form of modalised conditionals.  
(Thus Thompson points out that the teleological order of technical judgments exhibits a “partial 
idealism” (in Anscombe’s sense (1976)), in that the truth of an articulation of that order in the 
case of a given technique “presupposes that someone makes or has made the corresponding 
judgment, or at least some others belonging to the same system of judgments….  An 
unrecognized technique is after all a merely possible one” (Thompson 1995: 294), whereas the 
truth of an analogous natural-historical judgment stands in no such need of having been 
recognised.  But the modal order, it might seem, could be selected to accommodate this 
distinction: at a minimum, perhaps, by (for technical judgments) allowing as accessible to w only 
worlds in which no techniques exist that have not been developed in w.) 
 
But can we find an appropriate modal base and ordering source for natural-historical judgments?  
Krifka et al. themselves, as we saw, raise what appear to be quite damning objections to the idea 
that a coherent account can be devised, illustrated by ‘A turtle is long-lived’ and ‘A pheasant 
lays speckled eggs’.  Again, the truth conditions they give for generics are such as to make ‘A 
pheasant lays speckled eggs’ true in w just in case any pheasant in any world accessible to w is 
such that it lays speckled eggs in any most normal world.  But then it is implied that, in any 
“most normal world”, every pheasant lays speckled eggs—hardly a biologically realistic 
conception of normality!  In fact we face here many of the same problems that arose with respect 
to the ducks we considered in connection with the “prototype” approach to generic sentences.  
Thus (analogous to a problem I raised there) consider the sentence ‘Ring-necked pheasants have 
colourful plumage and lay olive-buff eggs’: the proposal requires that its truth condition be that, 
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in every “most normal world”, every pheasant47 have colourful plumage and lay olive-buff 
eggs—although what is in fact normal for ring-necked pheasants is that the males be colourful 
and the females—when fertilised and so on—lay olive-buff eggs, not that a single bird instantiate 
both of these properties. 
 
It may even be that these problems are more acute for the modal approach than for the prototype 
approach, because whereas there we envisioned (going beyond anything actually said by the 
discussants of the prototype approach, actually) generating a set of prototypical creatures for a 
given life form and taking a generic sentence to quantify only over those, here we are still 
quantifying over every member of a kind (at least, every member present in any world accessible 
to the world of evaluation).  This very pheasant—the one standing next to the water cooler in 
world w'—has got to be both colourful and egg-laying in every most normal world (as does 
every other pheasant in every world accessible to this one). 
 
§2.10.  Situations. 
 
Krifka et al. then consider, without too much detail or any criticism, the possibility of explicating 
generic sentences within the framework of situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983).  The 
advantage to shifting from quantification over possible worlds to quantification over situations is 
that, since situations needn’t be total in the sense in which possible worlds are, we can avoid 
some of the problems arising for attempts to treat generics in possible-worlds frameworks: for 
example, we can consider a situation in which a pheasant is laying eggs, without supposing that 
the situation exhausts the world (and hence that there are no males to have fertilised her).  More 
formally, the situation-semantic approach to generic sentences follows the situation-semantic 
                                                 
47 strictly, again, every pheasant also present in a world accessible to the one at which the truth of the sentence is 
being evaluated 
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approach to conditional sentences, which is to say that it models them as constraints on situations.  
The basic idea of a constraint in this context is as a relation between situation types Σ ⇒ Σ', to 
the effect that whenever a situation of type Σ obtains, so does one of type Σ'.  The effect of 
quantificational variables is captured by the idea of anchoring situation types in parameters, such 
that constraints persist through the anchoring of the situation types involved in them: so that if 
we have Σ ⇒ Σ', we also have Σ(f) ⇒ Σ'(f), where Σ(f) is just like Σ but anchored in some range 
of parameters.  In addition, situation semantics expresses the idea that such a constraint only 
obtains against some background by expanding the two-place relation between situation types to 
a three-place relation among situation types and a background: we may write (Σ ⇒ Σ')|B or Σ 
⇒B Σ'.48  Now we can express the situation-semantic model of generic sentences.  As Krifka et 
al. put it, a generic sentence with its Restrictor and Matrix 
                                                
 
is true relative to a background B in which [the variables bound by GEN], and possibly others, occur as 
parameters… iff: 
There is an anchor f for the parameters in B such that for every situation σ which is of type B(f) it holds that 
if Restrictor(f) is true, then f can be extended to f' such that Matrix(f') is true.  (58) 
 
And they illustrate with ‘A pheasant lays speckled eggs’: 
 
GEN[x,s;y](x is a pheasant in s; x lays y & y are speckled eggs in s) is true with respect to the 
background ‘s is a situation of giving birth’ iff: 
For every situation σ which is a situation of giving birth it holds that for any x which is a pheasant in σ, 
there is a y which are speckled eggs, and x lays y in σ.  (58) 
 
However, though this does appear to sidestep some of the objections to modal approaches we 
saw above, the formalism presumes that the background (that which is represented by ‘B’) 
against which we are to evaluate the truth of a given generic sentence is fixed for that sentence.  
My complaint is not that the formalism doesn’t provide the (content of) B—that would be an 
 
48 The original presentation of situation semantics, Barwise and Perry (1983), accommodated the idea of a 
background to a constraint by building it into the first place of the two-place relation: (Σ ∪ B) ⇒ Σ'.  However, later 
works in the tradition, I gather, have tended to prefer the approach described in the text. 
94 
unreasonable complaint, since the generic doesn’t explicitly provide it either—but that the 
formalism, again, presumes that it is fixed.  To see what I mean, first consider Krifka et al.’s 
example treatment of ‘A pheasant lays speckled eggs’ quoted above.  (I’ll pretend that this 
sentence expresses a true natural-historical judgment.)  It may be granted that if a pheasant is 
“giving birth” (as they put it) in a given situation, it will be laying eggs.  (Indeed, even this is 
granting too much: we can imagine a DDT-like substance in the environment preventing 
pheasants’ eggshells from forming, so that pheasants in situations of “giving birth” might 
actually give birth!)  But will they be speckled?  Surely it sometimes happens that a pheasant 
lays eggs of an anomalous colour (perhaps due to dietary oddities or some such).  The analysed 
truth condition they give for the sentence is, as we see, “For every situation σ which is a situation 
of giving birth it holds that for any x which is a pheasant in σ, there is a y which are speckled 
eggs, and x lays y in σ.”  But the considerations just adduced show that this is false as it stands.  
Now, presumably (though Krifka et al. do not appear to have registered this fully) the 
background parameter B is meant to take care of this sort of thing—but it should be clear that 
this will only work if B can rule out all possible anomalies.  However, it’s not just that it’s “hard 
to spell out” the background conditions the obtaining of which would guarantee the universality 
of the connection between restrictor and matrix (here, between situation types): it’s that there is 
no fixed set of such.  ‘A pheasant lays speckled eggs’, but an indefinite number of things could 
intervene: something in its diet could alter the eggs’ colour, or the pheasant could be shot just 
before the eggs emerge, or some industrial pollutant preventing calcium absorption could have 
entered the pheasant’s system, or a meteorite could strike the area, or….  There is no reason to 
suppose that there is a fixed list of such possible grounds for exception, even in principle.  Hence 
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to model generics as though there were—as though the value of B is fixed once Σ and Σ' are 
given—is to be false to their semantics.49 
 
Additionally and more generally, the situation-semantic approach to generic sentences attracts 
the same objection I outlined at the end of §2.1 on Bacon.  Namely, by isolating, however 
cleverly, the pheasants (to continue with Krifka et al.’s example) that are “giving birth”, and 
restricting the generalisation about speckled eggs to them, this approach obscures the “unity” 
attaching to the system of natural-historical judgments collectively describing a life form (say, 
the ring-necked pheasant), through which each individual judgment in some sense has 
application to all those exhibiting the form in question, even when they do not instantiate the 
particular judgment’s matrix. 
 
§2.11.  Nonmonotonic inference. 
 
The basic idea of nonmonotonic inference is that, in certain domains, it is useful to systematise a 
notion of inference for which the structural rule of Weakening is inadmissible: that is, a notion 
according to which it does not hold in general that when a conclusion A follows from a set of 
premises Γ, A follows from any superset of Γ.  Though most scholars of nonmonotonic inference 
develop such systems with applications in artificial intelligence in mind, Krifka et al. point out 
                                                 
49 In a similar context, Thompson considers the idea that generic sentences can be understood as universal 
generalisations qualified by tacit “ceteris paribus” clauses.  He argues that to spell out these clauses for a given 
natural-historical judgment would itself require an appeal to the life form that is the subject of the judgment, and 
would thus not allow us to “escape the circle” that judgments involving life constitute.  (Thus if the tacit condition 
behind ‘The Serbian mayfly breeds in mid-June’ is “barring outside intervention” or “supposing conditions are 
normal”, then ‘intervention’ and ‘normal’ must themselves be understood in terms of the natural history of the 
mayfly.)  But this objection is not quite enough for us; for the formal semanticist wants merely to model natural-
historical judgments, and as long as there is some background condition B—even if it is (quite explicitly recognised 
as) a function of the life form and predicate (the restrictor and matrix) in question, rather than something specifiable 
without reference to that life form—we do not have an objection to modeling such judgments as, say, (Σ ⇒ Σ')|B.  
My point is, rather, that there is no such B to be denoted, even by explicit reference to the life form in a locution 
such as “conditions being normal for the mayfly”.  The problem is not simply that we cannot say what those 
conditions are except by reference to the mayfly, and hence that we cannot “break into the circle”, that is, reduce it 
to something outside the circle; it is that there is nothing for such locutions, circular or not, to denote. 
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that the application of the notion to generic sentences ought to seem promising, since the sorts of 
example that arise in the literature on nonmonotonic inference often involve generics.  The 
standard example runs as follows: from ‘Tweety is a bird’, it is a good inference to infer ‘Tweety 
flies’; but from ‘Tweety is a bird’ together with ‘Tweety is a penguin’, it is no longer a good 
inference to draw that same conclusion. 
 
There are, of course, treatments in the literature of nonmonotonic logic in abstraction from its 
context (Restall (2000) gives a nice introduction to substructural logics generally); there are also, 
as I have said, treatments of nonmonotonic logic with one eye on applications in artificial 
intelligence (Moore (1995) is an example, though his (1984, 1985, 1993) are not especially 
focused on AI).  For the purposes of this chapter, I shall focus my attention on Asher and 
Morreau (1995), who explicitly develop an application of nonmonotonic logic to generic 
sentences. 
 
Some treatments of nonmonotonic logic understand the sentences from which nonmonotonic 
reasoning is appropriate as inference rules: that is, rather than treating them as sentences on a par 
with other sentences of the object language, they give them a metalinguistic interpretation.  Thus 
“default reasoning” approaches treat ‘The S is P’ as, roughly, “If ‘a is an S’ is true, and if ‘a is a 
P’ can be consistently assumed, then conclude that ‘a is a P’ is true”.  But Asher and Morreau 
point out that this makes it very difficult to understand how such sentences can embed in larger 
sentential contexts; and Krifka et al. argue that this metalinguistic approach seems to run 
contrary to the thought (to which we have already made much reference in this chapter) that 
natural-historical judgments have a “transparently ‘factual’ or ‘positive’ character” (in 
Thompson’s words).  Likewise, many treatments of nonmonotonic logic—which is after all an 
active research area in artificial intelligence—interpret generics epistemically, in terms of how 
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new information should be used to revise information states (cf. Engelfriet and Treur (1998) for 
one example).  The attempt to apply this sort of approach to nonmonotonic logic to generics 
seems to fall to the same two objections. 
 
Asher and Morreau devise an interesting treatment of generic sentences, in so far as they begin 
by acknowledging that such sentences enter into few patterns of deductive reasoning, but then 
suggest that, rather than therefore despairing of giving them a formal treatment, we ought to 
canvass as well the patterns of nondeductive—defeasible—reasoning, to see if we can come up 
with a semantics that can explain their inferential behaviour thus broadly construed.  They 
produce a truth-conditional account of the semantics of generics (and hence sidestep the 
objections discussed in the previous paragraph), a variety of modal approach, and then they 
define a notion of defeasible consequence and show how their semantics for generics explains 
not only how generics figure in deductive reasoning but also why they behave the way they do in 
defeasible reasoning. 
 
(By the way, Moore (1985) complains about McDermott and Doyle’s treatment of nonmonotonic 
logic that their semantics would render the nonmonotonic reasoning they attempt to formalise 
deductively valid, even though they remark informally (in Moore’s words): 
 
… that their notion of nonmonotonic inference is not to be taken as a form of valid inference.  If this 
is the case, their formal semantics cannot be regarded as the “real” semantics of their nonmonotonic 
logic.  At best, it would provide the conditions that would have to hold for the inferences to be valid, 
but this leaves unanswered the question of what formulas of nonmonotonic logic actually mean.  
(126n1; Moore’s emphasis) 
 
Plainly, Asher and Morreau’s account is not susceptible to this objection.) 
 
To explain why I am nevertheless dissatisfied with Asher and Morreau’s account as applied to 
natural-historical judgments, I shall spare the reader a lengthy exegesis of their apparatus and cut 
98 
directly to the truth definition their system yields for its representation of sentences of the form 
‘φs are normally ψs’: 
 
 [I]t is true [at w] just in case for every individual δ, if we look at the worlds where φδ holds along 
with everything else which, in w, is normally the case where φδ holds, we find that ψδ holds.  (313) 
 
One oddity of this account is that it indexes “normality” to the individual.  If I’m not mistaken, 
we seem to be saying: ‘Birds fly’ is true at w iff, for any bird you like—say, Big Bird, an ostrich 
at the local zoo—the worlds where ‘Big Bird is a bird’ holds as well as everything that, in w, 
normally goes along with ‘Big Bird is a bird’ are all worlds where ‘Big Bird flies’ holds.  In 
other words: “everything that normally goes along with” is inside the scope of the quantifier: it 
attaches to each individual predication, rather than to the quantification as a whole.  So we have 
to consider what (in w) “normally goes along with” Big Bird’s being a bird (and ditto for all 
other birds).  But what prevents us, then, from thinking—especially when w is the actual 
world—“Well, what (here in w) normally goes along with Big Bird’s being a bird is his being 
2.5 metres tall, weighing 120 kg, being somewhat depressive, etc. etc.—and his not flying”? 
 
Also, Asher and Morreau concede a criticism of Carlson’s, to the effect that their system doesn’t 
capture the inference (even as a defeasible one) from {‘Dogs are hairy’, ‘Dogs have four legs’, 
‘Fido has three legs’} to ‘Fido is hairy’.  (Since the second and third premises together vitiate the 
thought that Fido is “normal”, their system no longer countenances any of the defeasible 
inferences that presuppose that we do not know that Fido is not normal.)  They gesture at a 
modification of their account, which they have not yet succeeded in seeing how to make, 
involving the introduction of a notion of “degrees of normalcy”, allowing one to consider worlds 
where Fido (e.g.) is anyway no less normal than one already knows.  They propose (again, so far 
only in briefest outline) doing this in terms of the number of predicates normally associated (in 
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w) with doghood that Fido lacks.  But it is hard to find promise in this attempt to save the 
account from Carlson’s criticism.  Surely in the example argument, what matters isn’t that Fido 
is (so far as we know) only one predicate away from normality (!), but rather that number of legs 
just has nothing to do with hairiness.  (If the third premise in the sample argument had been 
‘Fido’s follicles are defective’, it would seem as though their envisioned cardinality-driven 
system would have to treat it just as it would the sample argument itself: but clearly the 
conclusion in this case isn’t equally well justified by the premises.  (And it is in any case already 
a puzzle how to quantify the “number of predicates” at issue: Fido instantiates ‘has three legs’, 
but also (as we can infer without further information) ‘has less than four legs’, ‘has an odd 
number of legs’, ‘has a prime number of legs’, and so on.  How many predicates away from 
normality is he?) 
 
Finally, in so far as the semantic core of their proposal is a species of modal approach (albeit an 
ingenious one, especially in the way it is supplemented with a theory of defeasible reasoning), 
Asher and Morreau’s treatment of generic sentences is threatened by the objections we’ve 
already canvassed to modal approaches.  Thus, for instance, another criticism of Carlson’s they 
attempt to address is a form of one we’ve seen already: because of the way in which their 
semantics for generic sentences involves universal quantification, it would seem to have the 
implication that, if ‘Chickens lay eggs’ is true, then so is ‘Chickens are hens’.  They respond that 
the cause of the difficulty here is a matter of determining the restrictor implicit in a given 
natural-language quantificational statement—a matter which is as pressing for standard universal 
quantifications as for any other types of quantification.  (Thus—their examples—the chair of a 
committee meeting remarking ‘Everyone is here’ is not quantifying over the whole human 
population, and ‘John always feeds the cat’ is not quantifying over all moments of time; but 
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these two sentences are nevertheless correctly understood as involving universal quantification.)  
Determining the restrictor of a quantification, they go on, can be difficult (and they recommend 
drawing on Lewis’s notion of accommodation (in his 1979) for help), but it is no special 
difficulty for generic sentences in particular.  However, I’m not sure that specifying the restrictor 
as narrower than the natural-language sentence seems to present it will actually solve the 
problem; and I’m not sure that it really is precisely the same problem as in the nongeneric 
examples they give: I’m not sure it’s not after all a special problem for generics.  The implication 
is that an utterance of ‘Chickens lay eggs’ could quite naturally be followed with ‘I mean the 
female ones, of course’ (just as ‘Everyone is here’ could be followed with ‘I mean, everyone on 
the committee’).  But (again) consider an utterance of ‘Ring-necked pheasants have colourful 
plumage and lay olive-buff eggs’: with what could we follow this so as to specify a restriction on 
the antecedent concept to yield a truth?  Neither ‘I mean the female ones’ nor ‘I mean the male 
ones’ would do.  Should we understand the sentence as short for ‘Ring-necked pheasants have 
colourful plumage and ring-necked pheasants lay olive-buff eggs’, and then imagine it 
supplemented as ‘Ring-necked pheasants have colourful plumage—I mean the male ones—and 
ring-necked pheasants lay olive-buff eggs—I mean the female ones’?  (That is, should each 
conjunct be run through Asher and Morreau’s semantic machinery separately, each time 
presuming a (separate) antecedent accommodation of the restrictor of the quantification?)  But 
this seems false to the information an utterance of the original sentence would convey.  It may 
well be that anyone with the most rudimentary knowledge of biology could supply for herself the 
qualification on ‘Ring-necked pheasants lay olive-buff eggs’; but it is less widely known that it is 
only the males that are colourfully feathered, and in any case it is clearly implausible that this 
fact is communicated by the sentence ‘Ring-necked pheasants have colourful plumage and lay 
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olive-buff eggs’.  One can learn from this sentence that the two properties in question are 
characteristic of pheasants, without learning or even assuming anything about their respective 
distributions among the individual pheasants. 
 
 
§2.12.  “Distributive” approaches: summary of results. 
 
I have canvassed a wide range of broadly “distributive” approaches to the semantics of generic 
sentences, and found them all wanting.  I suggest that this is no coincidence: for, firstly, as Gupta 
and Savion pointed out (and as we quoted earlier), this sort of approach, namely “of taking 
generic sentences to be implicitly quantificational, can survive refutation only by being evasive 
on the nature of quantification involved” (1985: 859).  The purpose of the preceding section was 
to press this objection in the face of the existence of some less evasive proposals; the result has 
been, as expected, that, when less evasive, they cannot survive refutation: no quantificational 
approach satisfactorily captures the force of generic sentences. 
 
“Distributive” approaches have in common that they interpret the restrictor and the matrix of a 
generic sentence—in our particular case, the “life form word” and the predicate ascribed to it in 
an Aristotelian categorical or other expression of a natural-historical judgment—both as (perhaps 
complex) predicates, true or false of individuals (and in our particular case, of individual 
organisms).  In the simplest case, they interpret generics as giving the quantity of restrictor-
satisfiers satisfying the matrix; but Thompson points out (as do many scholars of generics) that 
there is no such quantity either necessary or sufficient to guarantee the truth of the judgments in 
question.  Slightly more sophisticated approaches attempt to understand generics as restricting 
the domain of restrictor-satisfiers before making the quantificational (now usually universal) 
claim; but we have seen that no subset of restrictor-satisfiers need be guaranteed to satisfy the 
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matrices of all true generic sentences with the same restrictor.  (And it doesn’t help to recognise 
that the function from the restrictor to the subset in question must be intensional.)  A further 
refinement is the proposal, in the face of this, that we understand a generic as involving a two-
place (perhaps intensional) function of restrictor and matrix, yielding as value a subset of the 
restrictor-satisfiers, and then an (again usually universal) quantification attributing to the 
members of this subset satisfaction of the matrix.  But we found even in this case that no such 
function applied consistently to the whole range of natural-historical judgments would yield 
truths in all and only the right cases.  Other approaches, perhaps a bit further from the 
“distributive” paradigm, take generics to predicate the matrix not of the members of any subset 
of actual restrictor-satisfiers, but rather of some ideally constructed restrictor-satisfiers—
prototypes, stereotypes50, and so on.  But we saw fatal problems with the idea of this 
construction—whether, again, the construction of such ideal entities is conceived as a function 
taking the restrictor alone as argument or as a function of the restrictor and matrix together.  We 
also considered proposals, still within the generally “distributive” framework, that attempt to 
capture what one might want to call the “normative force” of natural-historical judgments using 
modal apparatus, quantifying over possible worlds or situations (and perhaps erecting a system 
of nonmonotonic inference on this modal foundation).  Although the modal apparatus may do a 
better job of homing in on the individuals witnessing the truth (as it were) of a given natural-
historical judgment, however, we saw that it raises problems of its own; and in any case, such 
approaches persist in what I have been urging to be the fundamental error of distributive 
approaches, namely, the attempt to construct natural-historical judgments out of such a collection 
of predications of (now actual or possible) individuals.  My claim is that the fundamental reason 
                                                 
50 Actually the “stereotype” approach didn’t take quite this specific a form; but, for lack of formal-semantic details, 
we can say roughly that the idea was that a generic sentence is true iff its matrix is true of “our stereotype of” its 
restrictor.  The remarks in the text are meant to cover this (admittedly vague) conception. 
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for which all of these proposals fail is that the truth of a natural-historical judgment is simply not 
correctly conceived of as a matter of the satisfaction of the predicate of the judgment by any set 
of actual or possible individuals of the life form of which it is predicated: it is not a functional 
combination, of that sort, of the restrictor and the matrix. 
 
There can be no doubt that, at the linguistic level, it must be harmless to view a generic sentence 
as the value of a certain function taking the restrictor and the matrix as arguments.  (‘The 
domestic cat has four legs’ is just that sentence which combines ‘__ is a domestic cat’ and ‘__ 
has four legs’ (taken in that order) generically, if you like.)  But what appears to emerge from our 
enquiry is that, at least as far as natural-historical judgments are concerned, any attempt to 
specify the Bedeutung of this linguistic function as a function from pairs of first-level functions 
into {T, F}, or indeed on any other function-argument model of the combination of predicates, 
comes to grief. 
 
§3:  Subject-predicate approaches. 
 
In view of the problems associated with trying to unpack generic sentences in terms of 
quantification (however refinedly), some theorists argue that generics—or at any rate some of 
them—are best understood simply as singular predications of kinds.  By a “subject-predicate 
approach” I shall mean one like this: one which treats (at least some subclass of) generics as 
singular predications, rather than analysing the noun phrase in subject position into a quantifier 
phrase or in some other way.  Thus Carlson’s early work (1977, 1982) contains an argument for 
treating generics this way, motivated in the first instance syntactically, and supplemented by the 
claim that “generic terms” cannot be understood as sets, or as power sets or as intensions of sets, 
but must simply be treated as basic entities of the model, in the domain together with individuals.  
Krifka et al. (1995) (though we have seen them discuss “distributive” approaches at length) end 
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up advocating a subject-predicate interpretation of a wide range of generic sentences.  E.J. Lowe 
(1991) practically takes for granted that generics can’t be understood quantificationally (even in 
terms of restricted quantification or plural quantification); he gives a quick Quine-inspired 
argument for the claim that the noun phrases in question refer, on the grounds that we can treat 
them syntactically as follows: “What does Fido chase?  —Cats.”  (To be is to be the value of a 
variable.)  (He also adduces some additional syntactic arguments.)  Lowe calls such phrases 
singular sortal referring expressions, and distinguishes them from names of species, arguing that, 
for example, ‘Fido chases cats’ doesn’t mean that Fido chases the species (where by ‘the cat 
species’ Lowe understands the mereological sum of cats). 
 
However, there are some major obstacles facing “subject-predicate” approaches as well.  Let us 
start with Gupta and Savion again, who raise serious questions for Carlson’s interpretation of 
“generic terms” as making singular reference to kinds, which he understands as “basic entities” 
on a par with individuals.  For one thing, Gupta and Savion observe, {Dogs live in the northern 
hemisphere, No dog ever has lived or ever will live in the northern hemisphere} seems like an 
inconsistent set, but Carlson cannot account for its inconsistency.  Further, without “an unusual 
Meinongian account of kinds, his theory will turn contraries into contradictories”: for instance, to 
adapt an example of Gupta and Savion’s to a natural-historical case, it could be that ‘Mayflies 
breed in the afternoon’ and ‘Mayflies do not breed in the afternoon’ could (construed as natural-
historical judgments) both be false—if, say, they breed indifferently throughout the day; but if 
‘Mayflies’ denotes an entity, these become contradictories.  In short, Gupta and Savion insist, we 
need an account of kinds before we can judge the theory. 
 
We can also point out (what in fact moved Cohen to his “type-shifting” interpretation of 
“inductivist” bare plural generic sentences) that interpreting generics in this subject-predicate 
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fashion often yields puzzling results.  For instance, Carlson hears ‘The tiger is striped’ as a 
singular predication of the kind tiger, but (as we saw in our discussion of Fara) it seems quite 
odd to understand the sentence as expressing the thought that the tiger kind is striped.  It is not 
even clear what that would mean.  One’s prima facie inclination is to find ‘is striped’, and indeed 
also ‘tiger’, appearing univocally in ‘Tigers are striped’ and ‘Tigger is a tiger and he is striped’.  
But combining this inclination with the subject-predicate approach yields the result that ‘striped’ 
must be something predicable at once of material objects such as individual tigers and of kinds. 
 
Several critics also point out that, despite the claims for syntactic parallels between “generic 
terms” and singular terms, there are phenomena such as scope ambiguity that attach to “generic 
terms” but not to genuine singular terms, as we saw in several of the discussions of “distributive” 
approaches in §2, and indeed as is at work in Gupta and Savion’s point about contraries and 
contradictories. 
 
I hope to treat Lowe’s account at some length in another work, since his treatment of generic 
sentences in Kinds of being at once is sympathetic to some of our concerns and threatens a 
possible serious counterexample to our claim.  For Lowe gives a kind of proof theory for a 
formalism in which he represents kinds and individuals distinctly, and also dispositional and 
occurrent predication distinctly—indeed his system purports to capture, what I am concerned to 
argue against the possibility of capturing in a formal system, two modes of predication involving 
the very same elements (that is, the same predicate and the same object of predication).  (Further, 
he is sensitive to the problems with “distributive” approaches, and also to the difficulties for 
“subject-predicate” approaches such as those involving scope ambiguity.)  I believe, though, that 
the absence of a formal semantics for this system is revealing, and indeed that his informal 
“consistency proof”, which reinterprets his system as a standard presentation of predicate logic 
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(thereby showing that it is consistent if the latter is), actually shows his two forms of predication 
to be a kind of sham, coming to nothing more than a partition on the set of predicates in the 
language. 
 
§4.  Conclusion:  The structure of “natural-historical judgments” as nonfunctional. 
 
I said already in §2.1 above that any “distributive” approach risked falling to the objection that, 
by attempting to interpret natural-historical judgments as distributions of the property expressed 
in the matrix to some subset of instances of the restrictor (in order to accommodate the 
phenomenon of exceptions), it fails to recognise the unity of the life form: that is, it fails to 
recognise the sense in which (to put the point a little metaphorically) a natural-historical 
judgment “speaks of” all instances of the kind of organism that is its topic.  I also alluded above 
(in footnote 23 to §2.3, on Cohen’s adaptation of Carlson’s distinction between “inductivist” and 
“rules-and-regulations” approaches to generic sentences) to the inclination some scholars find, 
surely upon contemplating the same phenomenon of exceptions, to ascribe to natural-historical 
judgments (if not to generic sentences generally) some sort of normative or regulative character.  
Both of these considerations fuel the attraction of “subject-predicate” approaches.  For, first, to 
understand a natural-historical judgment as a singular predication of a kind is, palpably, to 
remain true to the “unity” of that kind; and second, if after all “the tiger” (say) is striped, then 
surely—one wants to say—any particular tiger that isn’t striped “falls short of” the standard set 
for it by its kind in that respect. 
 
But the considerations we just (briefly) canvassed in opposition to “subject-predicate” 
approaches suggest that to succumb to this attraction is to let the pendulum swing too far back.  
To put the point in the form of a slogan, it is to ascribe too much unity to the life form.  Natural-
historical judgments turn out to constitute a battery of descriptions of some particular “basic 
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entity”, whose connection to individual instances of the form becomes obscure.  If we posit (as 
proponents of this sort of approach inevitably do) a relation of “instantiation” holding between 
individuals and kinds, we will nevertheless have nothing to say about the predicates which can 
be employed both in natural-historical judgments and in their instances, such as ξ is striped.51  
What it is for such a predicate to hold of an individual is surely different from what it is for it to 
“hold of a kind”; but such systems do not illuminate this distinction. 
 
But the function-argument analysis of discourse presses us to make a choice between these two 
types of approach.  If we parse the “subject term” of a natural-historical judgment as, indeed, 
having the semantic value of a singular term, we will not at once be able to understand it as 
having the semantic value of a predicate; and conversely.  (The point will hold whatever 
functional account we choose to give for predicates and for singular terms, for they will surely, at 
any rate, be different.) 
 
In short, the general moral to extract from our discussion is that function-argument analysis, 
which is intimately related at once (and not coincidentally) both to the Fregean conception of a 
begriffsschrift and to the sort of formal-semantic endeavour we have been examining, cannot 
cast light on the natural-historical judgment.  If we understand “life form words”, and the 
predicates ascribed to them, simply as elements which combine with individual terms to yield 
                                                 
51 By “have nothing to say” I do not mean that no advocate of a “subject-predicate” approach has so much as noticed 
the matter.  On the contrary, Carlson (1977) proposed (as have others) introducing an operator on predicates which 
turns a predicate suited to apply into an individual into one suited to apply to a kind: thus ‘Tigger is striped’ might 
be represented as Striped(Tigger) and ‘The tiger is striped’ as G'(Striped)(the tiger) (I am abstracting from the 
details of his treatment of the noun phrase ‘the tiger’).  But Carlson gives us very few details about the interpretation 
of the operator G' in turn: only a couple of minimum constraints on how it must behave, rather than a substantive 
proposal.  –In fact, if we had a coherent account of G', we might well have a response to Gupta and Savion’s 
complaint about turning contraries into contradictories: for (in our earlier example) ‘Mayflies breed in the afternoon’ 
and ‘Mayflies do not breed in the afternoon’ would be represented respectively as G'(breed-in-the-afternoon)(the 
mayfly) and G'(~breed-in-the-afternoon)(the mayfly), and these are not contradictories.  But absent an account, G' 
merely labels the problem rather than solving it.  (Indeed, absent an account, we have no reason to understand, say, 
G'(Striped) as having anything to do with being striped.) 
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predications, we shall not be able to cobble together (“distributively”) a natural-historical 
judgment from such materials; but if we think of “life form words” simply as denoting basic 
entities, the life forms, we shall not at once be able to respect the univocality of their uses in 
generics and the predicative use to which they can also be put. 
 
But we learned in the previous chapter that the idea of a begriffsschrift (with its eminent 
suitability for function-argument analysis) is essential to Frege’s very conception of the logical.  
If natural-historical judgments cannot be captured in such a system, then the claim that they 
exhibit a unique logical form is at once a claim that Frege’s conception of logical form is 
unsatisfactory.  Thompson casually refers to a “properly begriffsschriftliche formulation” in 
which it would be revealed that sentences such as ‘Some animals are viviparous’ involve 
quantification over life forms (1995: 283).  This betrays his insufficient recognition of the degree 
to which he is departing from Frege.  To portray the difference between Thompson’s 
Wittgensteinian conception and Frege’s as simply a matter of the number of distinctions in 
logical category drawn (cf. Thompson, 1995: 249n4), and to suggest that an updated 
begriffsschrift could accommodate this wider range of distinctions, misses the fact that with 
Frege’s commitment to formalisability comes a principled limitation on the range of logical 
categories. 
 
But if natural-historical judgments cannot be construed as functional combinations of elements, 
how are we to understand their composition?  And what are we to make of the status of the post-
Fregean conception of the study of logic as having at its centre the construction of 
begriffsschriften of Frege’s sort?  Specifically, do we have any reason for understanding the 
mode of combination of elements in natural-historical judgments, which I have argued is not 
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functional, as a matter of their logical form, rather than, say, a matter of the peculiarity of their 
content? 
 
I shall approach this question historically, by spelling out a hint in a footnote of Thompson’s, 
who (as we saw at the beginning of this chapter) suggests that we ought to understand his claim 
about the logical uniqueness of natural-historical judgments in terms of Wittgenstein’s 
broadening of Frege’s conception of logical categories.  In Chapter V, I will attempt to show 
how Wittgenstein’s engagement with Frege’s and Russell’s views of logic that led to the 
Tractatus then paved the way for a shift in the conception of propositional articulation away 
from the functional structure necessary for formalisability and toward a richer conception, that 
can be perceived to be at work in the Investigations, outstripping the limits of formalisation.  But 
before that, in Chapter IV, I will explain why I am not ready to accept Sebastian Rödl’s claim 
that the conception of logical form at issue in Thompson’s work and indeed in the Investigations 
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1. Is the Investigations in need of a transcendental vindication? 
 
Sebastian Rödl, in his Kategorien des Zeitlichen (2005), claims that the later Wittgenstein in his 
“grammatical” investigations, and scholars such as Gilbert Ryle, Elizabeth Anscombe, John 
McDowell and Michael Thompson in their employment, in one context or another, of a notion of 
form influenced by Wittgenstein, are engaging—unawares—in investigations into transcendental 
logic in Kant’s sense.  He claims that, on the one hand, “‘logic’ in the analytic tradition now only 
designates the science of formal calculi” (2005: 8); an implication of this is that, if a notion of 
“logical form” is operative in that tradition, it will depend on the location of judgments in a 
deductive order of the sort limned by such a calculus.  This notion of logical form (which Rödl 
also allies with what Kant called “general logic”: ibid., pp. 13-14) has roots in Frege’s work: 
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indeed, “Frege’s central thought was that a certain deductive order characterizes thought as such” 
(ibid., p. 8)—though Rödl holds that the analytic tradition has retained Frege’s emphasis on 
deductive order while dropping the notion of the characterisation of “thought as such,” with the 
result that the application of a formal calculus to discourse “can only be pragmatically justified” 
(ibid., p. 9).  Meanwhile, however, the notion of form operative in the investigations of 
Wittgenstein and his intellectual heirs cannot be the Fregean one, since these authors simply do 
not deal with questions of the systematisation of inference.  Rather, their notion of form can only 
be understood as “logical” in the transcendental sense.  Rödl claims that the corpus of work in 
the Wittgensteinian tradition thus stands on shaky foundations as long as the principle from 
which its formal categories spring has not been recognised and vindicated, in something like the 
manner in which Kant provided a “transcendental deduction” of the objective validity of his 
categories.  Without such a grounding, “an obscurity is cast over that strand of the analytic 
tradition which arises from the Philosophical investigations, an obscurity over the nature and 
possibility of ‘grammar’ and thus over the object of philosophical investigation” (ibid., p. 10). 
 
Now, Rödl’s is not a work on Wittgenstein: his project is to fill out and defend the 
transcendental-logical conception of form as contrasted with the Fregean conception, and in 
particular to bring out the centrality of temporality for the former; the remarks on Wittgenstein to 
which I’ve just alluded are relatively brief and programmatic.  But these remarks nevertheless 
implicate Wittgenstein deeply in the story Rödl tells: he writes that “Frege’s central thought” 
about the connection between deduction and thought “has an overpowering effect on… 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, which work however “at the same time leads the Fregean thought… 
to the point of its dissolution” (ibid., pp. 8-9).  Rödl’s idea is that, with the failure of the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein alters his own conception of logic radically, in effect to the 
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transcendental-logical conception, in his later work.  And the exemplars of the transcendental-
logical conception of form in contemporary analytic philosophy Rödl holds up are, in one way or 
another, influenced by (the later) Wittgenstein.  If this is so, then surely a closer examination of 
Wittgenstein’s rôle in this story, and of the aptitude of Rödl’s attributions to the earlier and later 
Wittgenstein of these distinct conceptions of form, is worth pursuing. 
 
And further, this story obviously bears a close relation to the one in whose telling the present 
work consists.  I have argued in Chapter II that central to Frege’s conception of a begriffsschrift 
is interpretability in function-argument terms; and I have been taking it for granted that the idea 
of a begriffsschrift in turn is central to Frege’s conception of logic.  Following Thompson—one 
of the exemplars of the tradition Rödl holds up in contrast with Frege’s approach to logic—I 
have argued in Chapter III that natural-historical judgments are not amenable to function-
argument analysis, and hence are not susceptible of regimentation in a Fregean begriffsschrift.  I 
suggested at the end of that chapter that an implication of these results was that Thompson’s 
conception of logical form must be further from Frege’s than Thompson recognises, given his 
references to the “properly begriffsschriftliche formulation” of certain judgments involving life 
form words, as well as his emphasis on the claim that his distinction between life form and vital 
operation is a distinction “of the sort Frege introduced” (1995: 283, 249n4; emphasis removed).  
(Thompson’s meaning, of course, is that the distinction between life form and vital operation is a 
distinction in the categorial structure of thought on the same order as Frege’s between object and 
concept; and nothing I have said casts any doubt on this.  What I have been emphasising is the 
relation Frege sees between such categorial distinctions and the regimentation of inference—as 
we saw Rödl put it, “Frege’s central thought was that a certain deductive order characterizes 
thought as such”—and so, since Thompson’s method, in demonstrating the categorial status of 
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his favoured concepts, is not the regimentation of inference, his conception of the nature of these 
categories must be in this respect (and that is to say, essentially) different from Frege’s.) 
 
This is all to bring out the close affinity Rödl’s account has to what I have been doing.  But I am 
not convinced that his positive account of the conception of logic at issue in Thompson’s work is 
quite right.  I am not convinced, in particular, by the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s conception of 
grammar (which Thompson indeed appears to consider akin to his own investigations: cf. again 
his p. 249n4) is in effect one of transcendental logic, and hence in need of foundation in a 
principle.  In this chapter, then, I shall try to show why I think Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
investigations do not stand in need of a foundational justification.  In the following chapter, I will 
describe how the Investigations’s conception of grammar arose out of reflective engagement 
with, rather than utter repudiation of, conceptions of logic at issue in Frege’s and Russell’s work; 
in this way I will attempt to attempt to show that there is another option beyond Rödl’s stark 
dichotomy between the “Fregean” and the transcendental conceptions of logic and logical form. 
 
Let me begin, then with an examination of Wittgenstein’s rôle in Rödl’s story. 
 
2. Two readings of the Investigations 
 
Even before embarking on this examination, however, Rödl’s particular claims about the place of 
the later work of Wittgenstein and of his intellectual heirs seem open to grave prima facie doubts.  
For the idea that a thorough understanding of the significance of that work “requires developing 
a system of grammar from a principle”1 seems manifestly to run counter to Wittgenstein’s own 
developed views of the scope and proper ambitions of philosophy.  At the very least, it seems 
clear that Wittgenstein does not think of his grammatical investigations as awaiting a foundation, 
                                                          
1 The phrasing is Rödl’s, from personal communication. 
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of the sort provided by a “principle”, not itself expressed in the Investigations: the “grammatical 
remarks” made there seem to be presented as self-contained.  This might incline us to think that 
whatever foundation or principle is needed is already there in the book.  But further, it seems 
equally clear that Wittgenstein thinks of the search for foundations of this sort as entirely 
misguided: that it is not that his grammatical remarks sit on a firm foundation, nor much less that 
they are awaiting a foundation still to be provided, but that there is simply no such foundation to 
be had.  There is no “principle” from which to develop a “system” of grammar: there is simply 
grammar. 
 
To cast these prima facie impressions in terms closer to those which Rödl uses, we might say: if, 
on the one hand, it is right to think of Wittgenstein as giving something like a “transcendental 
logic”, he at any rate does not think of his work as standing in need of a further vindication of the 
objective validity of grammatical categories, but rather as providing already whatever 
vindication is to be given; but on the other hand, it may on the whole be better to think of his 
work—or of his own understanding of it at any rate—not as providing a “transcendental logic” 
(or grammar) whose categories have been or are to be vindicated at all, but as doing something 
else entirely. 
 
Now, none of this will come as news to Rödl, who himself observes that Wittgenstein “appears 
to want to reject the very idea of a general form of thought,” not to mention the project of 
vindicating such an idea, but who is in any case claiming that the absence of such a vindicating 
account yields an “obscurity”, a lack which must be repaired (ibid., pp. 10, 13).  So merely 
appealing to Wittgenstein’s self-understanding will obviously not suffice to dislodge his work 
from the place in his story Rödl wishes to assign it.  These prima facie observations put some 
pressure on Rödl’s view of the significance of the work, by showing the extent to which it rests 
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on that attribution to it of a (not merely insufficient but) false self-understanding.  Ceteris 
paribus, a more charitable reading would make sense of the rest of the work in a way that 
preserves its self-understanding.  But perhaps, in the end, Rödl’s will prove to be the most 
charitable reading available.  The only way to settle the issue is to dive into the details: to 
examine the grounds on which Wittgenstein rejects the project of vindication, and to determine 
whether these really can be reconciled with the pretensions behind the “grammatical remarks”. 
 
I suggested above that there are two different ways in which we might understand Wittgenstein’s 
“rejection” of the project of vindication: he might hold that his work in fact already contains 
whatever kind of vindication could be hoped for, or (giving what is perhaps a more literal 
reading to some of Wittgenstein’s methodological remarks) we might suppose that he really 
means that no “vindication” is necessary at all (nor is it possible).  I will begin by addressing this 
first, preliminary question, which of these two readings of Wittgenstein’s work—of the 
significance that Wittgenstein himself sees in it—is more plausible; indeed this will occupy us 
for most of the chapter.  This will put me in a better position to make some remarks concerning 
the further issue, whether Rödl is right to find fault with Wittgenstein’s own understanding of his 
work (whichever way we end up making that out), at the end of the chapter.2 
 
3. An ill-posed question? 
 
But before I launch into this, I need to allay one more worry which may have arisen in 
connection with how I’ve been setting out the dialectic.  For it was implicit in Rödl’s remarks 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter that when one purports to describe the structure of 
thought and talk, one must be doing either general or transcendental logic—but one might object 
                                                          
2 After all, again, these two questions aren’t quite as neatly separable as the text suggests: for the question how best 
to understand Wittgenstein’s own conception of the import of his work is of course controlled to some degree by the 
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that the later Wittgenstein makes no claim to be interested in describing “the structure of thought 
and talk” at all.  Thus Jonathan Lear claims that: 
 
… whereas in the Tractatus it is hoped that we will… recover the structure of thought, by the time the 
Investigations was written, Wittgenstein realized that there is no interesting structure worthy of recovery.  
(1982: 385) 
 
Now, there is no doubt that Lear is onto something here.  But the point needs some care; for 
contrast some of Wittgenstein’s words from the very work to which Lear is referring: 
 
This [sc. the idea that our “analysis” of language aims at an ideal of complete exactness, complete analysis] 
finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought.—For if we too in 
these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language—its function, its structure,—yet this is 
not what those questions have in view.  For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to 
view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath the surface.  
Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and which an analysis digs out.  
(Investigations, §92) 
 
Here, Wittgenstein himself, like Lear, draws a contrast between the approach of the 
Investigations and one plausibly attributed to the Tractatus.  But Wittgenstein shows himself 
willing to associate the idea of structure with what he is after in the Investigations: only, a 
structure “that already lies open to view”.  —Still, is this too thin to sustain the sort of question 
with which we began—namely, whether the sort of structure Wittgenstein is describing requires 
a transcendental foundation?3 
 
Plausibly not.  The context of the passage quoted (especially §90) makes clear that what 
Wittgenstein has in mind is grammar.  This “lies open to view” in the sense that grammatical 
propositions are obvious to us (though the need for the grammatical investigation arises from our 
tendency to allow, for instance, “certain analogies between the forms of expression in different 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
question what such conception strikes us as correct.  To that degree, we’ll be addressing the second question, as well 
as the first, from the beginning. 
3 I do not mean to suggest that Lear himself takes his observation about a difference between the Tractatus and the 
Investigations to imply that the latter’s conception of structure is too thin to sustain such questions.  Indeed, Lear’s 
articles will provide a paradigm of the sort of reading of Wittgenstein’s later work that has him not only engaged in 
transcendental philosophy (as Rödl suggests) but carrying it to completion (as Rödl denies). 
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regions of language” (§90) to lead us into confusion, to lead us to forget what we know about our 
grammar).  But this already seems to be enough to sustain those questions: for we may well find 
ourselves asking what warrants our finding those grammatical propositions obvious (whether, 
say, they “correspond to anything in fact”).  And this was just Rödl’s complaint: that if one is to 
appeal as Wittgenstein does to grammatical knowledge at all, one must show how synthetic 
knowledge a priori is possible (for Rödl holds that that is what Wittgensteinian “grammatical 
knowledge” is: ibid., p. 9) by developing a system of grammar from a principle.4 
 
I hope this is enough to justify setting aside, at least for now, the worry that the later 
Wittgenstein is simply not interested in “describing the structure of thought and talk” in any 
sense thick enough to make it look even worth asking whether such description requires some 
sort of transcendental grounding which Wittgenstein does or does not provide.  In any case, the 
second proposed reading of Wittgenstein’s own intentions—namely, that he means not so much 
already to have given a sort of transcendental grounding to his grammatical reflections, as rather 
to have rejected the demand for such grounding altogether (a reading which, in any case, I shall 
recommend)—may come close to accommodating the worry.  For one way of maintaining that 
his grammatical reflections stand in no need of vindication could be to insist that they simply 
don’t constitute the sort of system for which vindication (transcendental or otherwise) is in order. 
 
4. The Investigations as transcendental logic: Williams and Lear 
 
Let me therefore begin by setting out the case for the idea that the Investigations does provide a 
transcendental philosophy, and what’s more, contains its own version of a transcendental 
deduction of objective validity.  In §5, I shall consider the reading according to which the nature 
                                                          
4 Note that I do not mean here to endorse Rödl’s characterisation of the content of Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
remarks as “synthetic knowledge a priori”; the question how best to conceive of their content is of course 
inseparable from the question what sort of grounding, if any, they require. 
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of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations is far enough from transcendental philosophy not to 
require anything like such a deduction. 
 
Bernard Williams suggests that there is room for a view according to which: 
 
… our language, in [the] sense in which its being as it is has no empirical explanation, shows us everything 
as it appears to our interests, our concerns, our activities, though in the only sense in which we could 
meaningfully say that they determined everything, that statement would be false….  [T]hat provides 
grounds, I suggest, for calling such a view a kind of idealism….  (1974: 153; Williams’s emphasis) 
 
And he suggests—tentatively and with qualifications—that the work of the later Wittgenstein is 
pointing toward such a view, as his earlier work pointed to a first-person-singular predecessor of 
it: 
 
[W]hile much is said by Wittgenstein about the meanings we understand being related to our practice, and 
so forth, that we turns out only superficially and sometimes to be one we as against others in the world, and 
thus the sort of we which has one practice as against others which are possible in the world….  [O]ne finds 
oneself with a we which is not one group rather than another in the world at all, but rather the plural 
descendant of that idealist I [of the Tractatus] who also was not one item rather than another in the world.  
(1974: 160; Williams’s emphasis) 
 
That is:  On Williams’s reading of the Tractatus, the shrinking of the ‘I’ which results in the 
coincidence of solipsism with pure realism, and which implies that, if there is any way in which 
“in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I” (§5.641), it must be “not with sense” 
(Williams 1974: 146), nevertheless leaves something “transcendental” to be gestured at: the ‘I’ is 
certainly not an empirical object in the world, nor can it even be spoken of sensibly as a 
nonempirical object (since nothing not in the world can be spoken of sensibly), but it (as “a limit 
of the world”, §5.632) is still that which anchors the insight that “what solipsism means, is quite 
correct” (§5.62). 
 
Wittgenstein’s later work on privacy, continues Williams, serves to undermine solipsism and 
phenomenalism, but leaves room for a gesture at an updated idealism.  Just as, in the Tractatus, 
for an ‘I’ not a part of the world, there is something right about the thought that “the limits of my 
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language mean the limits of my world” (§5.6), so a kind of plural form of idealism—one whose 
plurality insulates it from the privacy considerations—can gesture at the truth that “the limits of 
our language mean the limits of our world.”  The ‘we’ in question must, like the ‘I’ of the 
Tractatus, not be one among many in the world (and likewise for the sense of ‘language’ at 
issue); but this is not untrue to the method of the Investigations.  Though we are frequently 
invited to contemplate putative alternatives to our practices, we are meant not to take them 
seriously as genuine alternatives, but to use them as matter for deeper reflection on our own 
practices—the only ones we can genuinely understand. 
 
Jonathan Lear picks up Williams’s suggestion of a gesture at transcendental idealism in 
Wittgenstein’s later work and runs with it.  In “Leaving the world alone” (op. cit.), he uses the 
expression “being minded in a certain way” to speak about the sort of reflective exploration of 
our practices that Williams finds in the later Wittgenstein’s work: the nature of our mindedness 
is what that exploration facilitates our coming to grips with.  But Lear, like Williams, insists that, 
for Wittgenstein, our mindedness is not one among many: “The possibility of there being persons 
who are minded in any way at all is the possibility of their being minded as we are” (1982: 386).  
To emphasise our mindedness is precisely not to imply that “we could have been minded 
otherwise”: we cannot make sense of this putative possibility.  And (echoing Williams again: cf. 
his 1974: 154ff.) there can be no real explanation of our being minded as we are: for, again, this 
isn’t one empirical possibility among others.  Still, Lear suggests that, even by Wittgenstein’s 
lights, there is some sort of insight to be captured along the lines of “Only because we are 
minded as we are do we see the world the way we do” (1982: 392) (though this does not support 
the inference to the counterfactual “If we were other-minded, we would see the world 
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differently”): and this is the sense in which, Lear claims, (the later) Wittgenstein is a 
transcendental idealist. 
 
And in his contribution to the symposium on “The disappearing ‘we’”, Lear takes the attribution 
of transcendental idealism to the later Wittgenstein’s work, and the analogy that that attribution 
implies between it and Kant’s version of idealism, literally enough to find in the Investigations a 
“transcendental deduction” of the legitimacy of our ways of understanding.  Kant, on Lear’s 
account, was concerned with the question how it is that thought and intuitive experience are in 
harmony; his response was to argue that we constitute this harmony—we constitute experience, 
as experience of objects—by uniting the manifold of intuition (in accordance with the categories).  
An object just is that which is represented when you unite the manifold of intuition so as to yield 
something thinkable: something you can preface with ‘I think’.  Exactly parallel, says Lear, is 
Wittgenstein’s response to the question how it is that the subjective and the objective points of 
view are in harmony.  Meaning seems to be at once a subjective and an objective phenomenon: 
but for me to mean something by something—to be able to prefix it with an ‘I understand’—it 
must be part of a—public—language.  And to share in a language is to share a “mindedness”: the 
‘I understand’ can be replaced by a ‘We are so minded’.  Again, however, the ‘we’ disappears: 
for there is no possibility of being minded otherwise than as we are. 
 
In short, on Lear’s reading, the Investigations contains materials for a “transcendental deduction” 
uncannily parallel to Kant’s own.  —Now, Lear does not make especially clear what exactly it is 
a deduction of—what corresponds in Wittgenstein’s investigation to Kant’s categories—but he 
speaks of “establish[ing] the objective validity of our representations” (1984: 233), and it would 
presumably not do violence to Lear’s account to say, a little more generally, that the deduction is 
of the objective validity of our “mindedness”.  If Wittgenstein’s “grammatical propositions” can 
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be considered something like the core of his reflective exploration of our mindedness (taking 
care, of course, not to fantasise this into the kind of “super-order” discussed at Investigations 
§97), then it looks as though Lear is telling us that Wittgenstein is not merely engaged in 
transcendental philosophy, he has carried it out to something like completion.  His transcendental 
argument establishes the objective validity of our grammatical knowledge: there is nothing for 
Rödl to bemoan the absence of. 
 
5. Wittgenstein as no idealist 
a) Stroud versus Lear 
 
Lear’s reading of the later work of Wittgenstein adds a fascinating determinacy to Williams’s 
earlier, more guarded attribution of a gesture “in the direction of a transcendental idealism” to 
that work. However, a reader of Lear’s article familiar with the Investigations is likely to find 
amazing the suggestion that such heavy philosophising is to be found there (as that the subjective 
experience of understanding stands in need of legitimation, which it then receives from the 
insight that the ‘I understand’ which must be able to accompany all my representations is empty 
until those representations are united into a language, etc.).  And I think this sense of amazement 
is well-founded.  Thus Barry Stroud’s symposium contribution, after questioning the details of 
the “transcendental deduction” Lear claims to find in Wittgenstein, ends with an insistence that 
an ascription of idealism to Wittgenstein must be wrong.  I think some of Stroud’s particular 
complaints are less than compelling, but I find his conclusion hard to resist.  Let’s work through 
some of the details before considering Stroud’s conclusion. 
 
Stroud first questions whether the ‘I understand’, and likewise the ‘We are so minded’, must by 
Wittgenstein’s lights be able to accompany all my experiences of understanding, just as the ‘I 
think’ must, as Kant’s deduction has it, be able to accompany all my representations.  Stroud 
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cites the case of the slab language of §§2ff. of the Investigations as a counterexample: for 
Wittgenstein there—as early as §2, when the language only contains four moves—bids us to 
“[c]onceive this as a complete primitive language.”  The builders cannot preface any of their 
linguistic acts with ‘I understand:’, or ‘We are so minded:’: for they have no such expressions in 
their language (not even as it is enriched in the following sections).  But then, suggests Stroud, 
Lear’s transcendental deduction cannot get started. 
 
The slab language is certainly puzzling, and not only because it presents a problem for Lear’s 
reading.  But let’s start with that.  A first response to Stroud’s worry might run along these lines: 
“Surely what’s important isn’t that a certain form of words be available to preface any given act 
of understanding; what matters is that I understand it.  And the builders surely understand each 
other, and themselves: for ex hypothesi, B acts on A’s commands.”  But perhaps it isn’t quite 
enough just that they understand in this way5: for Lear seems to insist, in his explication of the 
thought that the ‘I understand’ must be capable of accompanying a meaningful linguistic act of 
mine, that what this signifies is that “I must be able to take conscious possession of it for it to be 
an act of mine” (1984: 228; emphasis added).6  Can the builders “take conscious possession” of 
their linguistic acts?  Perhaps the poverty of their language shows, after all, that they cannot, and 
Stroud’s point is vindicated.7 
                                                          
5 And we shall question below whether this really does constitute understanding: cf. the sentence below from which 
note 8 hangs, and the note itself. 
6 In the (allegedly parallel) Kantian case, it is manifestly important that I am in fact self-conscious: that I do 
“generat[e] the representation ‘I think’ (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all of my 
representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same” (B132), even if it is not so important—though 
Kant doesn’t flag this unimportance—that I use the words ‘I think’ (or ‘Ich denke’!) to stand for this representation. 
7 Goldfarb (1983), crediting Stanley Cavell, suggests that the case of the slab language can be taken in two ways: as 
the “entire linguistic behavior” of the builders, or as a practice that has a home in a linguistically much richer way of 
life such as ours.  In what follows I presume that we are to take it in the first of these ways.  The bulk of what 
Goldfarb himself takes the case of the slab language to be doing in the Investigations is derived from this way of 
understanding it.  But I think nothing essential to my discussion would be threatened by my conceding that 
Wittgenstein might have in mind that we also consider hearing the example in the second way. 
123 
But now we should find ourselves becoming puzzled as to whether we can make sense of this 
idea of a language whose speakers lack the ability to recognise themselves as using expressions 
with understanding.  How seriously, or anyway literally, are we to take Wittgenstein’s enjoinder 
to “conceive [their practice] as a complete primitive language”?  Wittgenstein introduces the slab 
language as an illustration of “the idea of a language more primitive than ours”, an idea which he 
has in turn introduced as something like the practical correlate of the “primitive idea of the way 
language functions” which is the home of a certain “philosophical concept of meaning” (§2)—
namely, of the conception of meaning which has its roots in the picture of language painted in 
the words of Augustine quoted at the beginning of the Investigations.  But after all, we are 
working our way up to the realisation of the inadequacy of this conception of meaning and of the 
“primitive idea of the way language functions” in which it has its place.  (One of the milestones 
on this particular road is §32.)  Can it be that Wittgenstein is inviting us to try to conceive of the 
builders’ practice as a complete language, so as to see more clearly how it is similar to and 
different from our own practices (cf. §130)—leaving it open that we may in the end find that we 
cannot make sense of the idea of a “form of life” to which the language of §2 (or even that of §8) 
stands in the same relation that our whole language does to ours?  (This is, indeed, the sort of 
structure that Williams and Lear claim to find in much of Wittgenstein’s practice in his later 
work.)  If so, perhaps we needn’t take too seriously the idea that §2 illustrates a genuinely 
possible “complete language”—and Stroud’s point is once again cast into doubt. 
 
Now, the connection with the idea of a form of life to which I just alluded is made at §19, just 
after Wittgenstein has urged us, precisely, not to balk at the thought that the languages of §2 and 
§8 might be complete, on the grounds that it is not clear when we can say of any language—even 
our own—that it is complete.  This would seem to pose a problem for the suggestion I just made.  
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But it might be that what Wittgenstein is especially concerned to discourage in §18 is, as I might 
put it, a narrowly surface-grammatical conception of completeness: thus, it is the fact that the 
languages of §2 and §8 “consist only of orders” that inspires Wittgenstein to see that we may 
need reassurance.  (Thus, also, in the vicinity we are told that “We could imagine a language in 
which all statements had the form and tone of rhetorical questions; or every command the form 
of the question ‘Would you like to…?’” (§21).)  Perhaps, that is, the emphasis in §18’s 
reassurance is not on what could or could not make a “complete form of life”, so much as just on 
whether an apparent poverty of surface grammar should be taken to imply incompleteness.  
Wittgenstein tells us: “It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in 
battle….  And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (§19).  Yes: it is easy to 
close one’s eyes and imagine a battle scene, and think about how language is used there, and not 
to imagine anything else in connection with the people involved.  The use of language in battle is 
perhaps distinctive enough that, for certain purposes, we can treat it as an autonomous practice.  
But must we take Wittgenstein to be committing himself to the genuine possibility of a people 
who, from birth to death, use language only in the course of doing battle? 
 
In sum:  Though it might indeed be rash to attribute to Wittgenstein such a weighty thesis as, say, 
that “true language use must be accompanied by self-conscious appreciation of one’s 
understanding of that use”, I think it is also rash to take Wittgenstein’s suggestion to “[c]onceive 
[the practice of §2] as a complete primitive language” as implying an almost equally weighty 
thesis to the effect that the idea of a people whose only putatively linguistic practice consisted of 
what is described at §2 is a fully intelligible one, and that such people could genuinely be 
understood to be language users.  Stroud’s reliance on this case to undercut Lear’s suggestion 
that, by Wittgenstein’s lights, we must be able to accompany our “representations” with ‘I 
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understand’ and with ‘We are so minded’ thus strikes me as weak.  At any rate, what Lear is 
interested in is “act[s] of speaking or using a language with understanding” (227; emphasis 
added); on balance it doesn’t seem unreasonable to say, after all, that, whatever the builders are 
doing (communicating, perhaps), they’re not doing it with understanding.8 
 
Stroud also has doubts about the last step in Lear’s Wittgensteinian “transcendental deduction”: 
about the claim that ours is the only mindedness whose possibility we can grasp.  Stroud quotes 
from the Investigations to show that Wittgenstein does not hold this: 
 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in 
the sense of a hypothesis).  But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and 
that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine 
certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts 
different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.  (Investigations, p. 230) 
 
Stroud emphasises that he is not implying, and indeed does not claim, that Wittgenstein believes 
we have genuine access to these other “mindednesses”.9  But the very idea of an alternative 
mindedness doesn’t disappear: 
 
                                                          
8 I may appear to risk sounding as though I am disregarding Wittgenstein’s plea in §154 to “[t]ry not to think of 
understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all.”  (Or anyway, more generally, to risk mystifying “understanding” in the 
face of Wittgenstein’s attempts to demystify it.)  If the builders’ language “is meant to serve for communication” 
(§2)—and after all does so serve (or anyway is so stipulated)—what should prevent us from granting them 
understanding?  But I hope the point I am making is in fact compatible with this.  Though dogs can be trained to 
understand commands, no one takes Wittgenstein’s considerations (much less Kant’s transcendental deduction!) to 
be vitiated if they don’t apply fully to what dogs do.  There are differences between what goes on when a dog 
understands something, and what goes on when we understand something—differences which can be specified 
without appeal to “mental processes”.  Thus: we can get confused, and then see our way out of the muddle; we can 
find something ambiguous, and then see which way to take it; we can ask an interlocutor to explain herself; and so 
on.  (And of course we often understand things straight off, without needing to resort to such helps.)  The activity of 
the builders of §2 resembles that of dumb animals more closely than it does this sort of phenomenon.  (Is it the 
building, the structured practice in which their communicative activity is lodged, that distinguishes them from dumb 
animals?  —But animals build as well, even “coöperatively”.  If you describe the case in enough detail, in such a 
way as to reveal an essential difference between what the builders do and what dumb animals do, you will surely 
make it impossible to hold onto the thought that the language of §2 is their only linguistic activity.)  (On this point 
cf. Rhees (1959-60) on the way in which language games can be parts of a language, in apparent disanalogy with 
games tout court.) 
9 I borrow the wording from the title of Chapter 7 (“Alternative grammars? The problem of access”) of Forster 
(2004), where he explores this issue at length (though I don’t suppose he is the first to use this phrase).  I will return 
to Forster’s work below. 
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This [quotation from the Investigations] seems to me to acknowledge the intelligibility of there being forms 
of thinking different from ours.  Even if we founder when we try to understand in some detail what it would 
be like to think in one or another of those ways, so that we do not find fully intelligible any particular way 
of thinking different from ours, Wittgenstein does seem to be suggesting that we can nevertheless be 
brought to see the contingency of our thinking in the ways we do, or the contingency of anyone’s being 
‘minded’ as we are rather than in some other way.  It goes too far, then, to say that for Wittgenstein we 
cannot even make sense of the possibility of there being other ways of being ‘minded’—that ‘the concept 
of being minded in any way at all is the concept of being minded as we are’….  (1984: 255)10 
 
But what would be wrong with a response, on Lear’s behalf, such as this?:  In grasping the fact 
of our mindedness, we are indeed inclined to think of it as standing in contrast to other 
“mindednesses”.  But as we work through cases and find them all unintelligible, we find that the 
contrast collapses: the idea of an alternative mindedness, as we might put it, “shrinks to an 
extensionless point.”  So long as the idea remains purely negative—the idea of a mindedness 
unlike ours—and as it becomes apparent that we cannot give it any positive sense, we see that it 
poses no threat to the sort of argument Lear is trying to construct.  –And note the parallel with 
Kant: though he frequently refers to modes of sensible intuition different from ours, as well as to 
the idea of an intuitive intellect, in order to render vivid his claims about the nature of our 
sensibility and understanding, he nevertheless emphasises: 
 
[The act of synthesis of the manifold] is indeed the first principle of the human understanding, and is so 
indispensable to it that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding, either of 
such as is itself intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is 
different in kind from that in space and time.  (B139) 
 
(I do not pretend that this is unmysterious, but only observe the parallel with the line I am 
suggesting is open to Lear.)11 
                                                          
10 Stroud argues at greater length for the same point in his (1965). 
11 Lear himself finds a disanalogy here:  “Diagnosing our consciousness as a discursive intelligence whose sensible 
intuitions are spatio-temporal, [Kant] is able to contrast us both with discursive intelligences with alternative forms 
of sensible intuition and with a non-discursive intelligence, an intellectual intuition.  Wittgenstein, however, is able 
to awaken us to the possibility that our form of life is partially constituted by our being so minded without making 
contrasts with ‘other perspectives’” (1984: 232).  But I find this puzzling: for by Williams’s and Lear’s own lights, 
Wittgenstein gets us started on the reflective exploration of our mindedness by describing (putative, to-be-discarded) 
alternatives; and by Kant’s own lights (as we see in the B139 passage, which, though not quoted by Lear, is among 
the many he lists as references in the footnote attaching to the text I have just quoted) the “alternatives” he uses to 




Stroud’s specific reasons for rejecting Lear’s claim to find the materials for a “transcendental 
deduction” in Wittgenstein’s later work are, I thus suggest, less than persuasive.  But I 
nevertheless find irresistible the note Stroud sounds in the last pages of his contribution.  Stroud 
points out that, for Kant, someone looking for a deduction of the objective validity of the 
categories could not rest content with the result that any thinker must work with them: there 
appears to be a gap between showing that and showing that the categories are true to how things 
are.  And Stroud suggests—and of course this is Kant’s claim—that only (transcendental) 
idealism can satisfy the demand to demonstrate the latter, once the demand is granted force.  
Again, Kant’s claim is that we constitute objects, we constitute experience, in accordance with 
the categories.  Stroud argues that one who takes Wittgenstein’s work to provide a response to 
this same demand—a response that grants the demand its force and attempts to satisfy it—is 
bound to find in that work a version of idealism (as indeed Lear does, as we saw (1982: 392)).  
But Stroud adds, “[t]hat seems to me reason enough to seek some other account of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy” (1984: 258): for however subtly it is developed, idealism constitutes 
a conflation of the subjective and the objective in violation of undeniable commonplaces (cf. 
1984: 243-244).  –And Stroud gives a quick argument for the hermeneutic conclusion: by Lear’s 
own lights, Wittgenstein eschews the kind of detached perspective on our thinking that Kant’s 
idea of a “noumenal world” appeals to: but (pace Lear) idealism requires just such a perspective.  
On Stroud’s account, Lear is right that Wittgenstein eschews such a perspective; and Kant is 
right that the only way to satisfy the demand for a deduction of objective validity is idealism—
but put together, these two facts requires us to understand Wittgenstein not as trying to satisfy 




b) Idealism in Wittgenstein’s early work 
 
Williams motivated his (guarded) attribution of idealism to the Investigations by bringing out 
some of the continuities between that work and the earlier Tractatus, and arguing that whatever 
idealism attached to the elements of continuity as they figured in the Tractatus can still be 
construed to attach, in modified form, to those elements as they figure in the Investigations.  
(Again, the attribution of idealism was in both cases guarded: the “need… to try to point, 
hopelessly, in a solipsistic direction” of the Tractatus takes the form, in the Investigations, of a 
“point[ing] in the direction of a transcendental idealism” (Williams 1974: 147, 163).)  One way 
of undermining the ascription, guarded or not, of idealism to the later work would therefore be to 
undercut the claim (guarded or not) that it is to be found in the earlier.  It would take us a little 
too far out of our way to delve deeply into Tractatus interpretation here; let me therefore simply 
gesture at the existence of a coherent and satisfying reading of the Tractatus that finds in it an 
unequivocal resistance to idealism. 
 
Peter Sullivan has argued that part of the achievement of the Tractatus is the “demonstrati[on] in 
practice… that transcendental idealism is untenable.”12  We come to see, as we work though the 
Tractatus, that: 
 
the notions of world and thought are… intrinsically tied, that the world is not something other, so that it 
would need the kind of positive philosophy aimed at establishing an a priori order to ensure thought’s 
engagement with it.  (1996: 204) 
 
But if this is right—if the engagement with transcendental idealism in the Tractatus issues in its 
dissolution rather than its (silent) advocacy—then the story of Wittgenstein’s development that 
Williams tries to tell gets it wrong from the beginning.  Williams writes that a consequence of an 
                                                          
12 See e.g. Sullivan (2004); the quotation is from p. 43. 
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idea to be recovered from the Tractatus is that, in the senses of ‘world’, ‘language’ and ‘my’ at 
issue in the context of the discussion of solipsism: 
 
we cannot conceive of it as a matter of empirical investigation… to determine why my world is this way 
rather than that way, why my language has some features rather than others, etc.  (1974: 146) 
 
Williams appears, however, to be implicitly assuming that those questions nevertheless have, in 
the Tractatus, some go: only, not as “a matter of empirical investigation,” but rather, one 
supposes, as a matter of transcendental investigation.13  (This grounds Williams’s inclination to 
find in the Tractatus a “need… to try to point, hopelessly, in a solipsistic direction.”)  But if 
Sullivan’s work is on the right track, it looks as though the Tractatus is showing us how to stop 
supposing that there is an a priori order of things (cf. §5.634): showing us that, once empirical 
matters are set aside, there is simply nothing left of the questions Williams mentions. 
 
c) Idealism in Wittgenstein’s later work 
 
i. No justification… 
 
Of course, if Williams has misunderstood the thrust of the Tractatus, that does not in itself 
demonstrate that he is wrong to find a gesture toward idealism in Wittgenstein’s later work; so 
we ought to direct our attention to the latter, to see if we can satisfy ourselves that we aren’t 
forced into the understanding of it that Williams and Lear recommend.  –Stroud essentially tells 
us that it must be wrong to find idealism there—more on the grounds that idealism is a 
philosophical dead end than on the strength of a positive exegetical effort14 (but note the 
similarity between, on the one hand, the sort of response Stroud suggests we ought to look for in 
                                                          
13 I owe this thought, and indeed the connection to Sullivan’s work, to John McDowell. 
14 but we also mentioned above his quick argument that Wittgenstein’s later work is not idealist, grounded on Lear’s 
own observation that Wittgenstein does not recognise the intelligibility in any sense of a vantage point external to 
our mindedness 
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Wittgenstein’s later work to the demand for a deduction of objective validity, and on the other, 
Sullivan’s reading of the relation of the Tractatus to idealism); but we need to think this through. 
 
Perhaps a way to start is by recording the emphasis Wittgenstein places on the unavailability of 
justification for our mindedness.  (I will continue to use Lear’s term, for convenience.)  Indeed, 
Williams, and Lear in turn, themselves allude to this feature of Wittgenstein’s thought: thus 
Williams finds in Wittgenstein’s refusal to explain our mindedness, or compare it evaluatively 
with others, materials for the claim that Wittgenstein does not really mean his discussions of 
alternative practices to be taken to present genuine alternatives, and that his view is thus 
importantly distinct from relativism.  But, though Williams recognises that empirical explanation 
and justification are not at issue, it looks as though he is thinking that there is some sort of—
nonempirical—explanation or justification still to be intelligibly hoped for.  This is parallel to the 
point about Williams’s reading of the Tractatus.15  Williams calls “the fact that our language is 
such and such, and… that the world we live in is as it is” “transcendental facts”, and remarks that 
they thus “have no empirical explanation”; but he goes on to suggest that the rôle played by our 
reflective exploration of our world view stands to these “transcendental facts” as empirical 
explanation would to corresponding empirical facts (about particular languages, say), and indeed 
to claim that it is precisely this that justifies calling Wittgenstein’s later views “a kind of 
idealism” (Williams 1974:152-153). 
 
But some of the features that Williams himself emphasises, in his excursus on relativism, seem 
to tell against this suggestion that, by Wittgenstein’s lights, any (even inarticulable and 
transcendental) explanation is available.  Williams highlights Wittgenstein’s insistence that any 
putative explanation of our world view, or evaluation of it in comparison with an (alleged) 
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alternative, would itself have to be made from within our world view.  He collects several 
passages from Wittgenstein’s writings; let me reproduce part of Williams’s result: 
 
There are many remarks, again, which claim such things as that reasons can be given only within a game, 
and come to an end at the limits of the game (Philosophische Grammatik, p. 55), that our mode of 
representation is a language-game (Philosophical Investigations, p. 50), that ‘grammar’ cannot be justified 
(Philosophische Bemerkungen, p. 7), and that the language-game is not reasonable or unreasonable, but is 
there, like our life (On Certainty, 559).  (1974: 156) 
 
No doubt Williams supposes that the reflective exploration of our world view that Wittgenstein’s 
investigation of our practices constitutes and encourages us to carry on—or, rather, the reflective 
clarity that such exploration results in—is in some way exempt from the limits he canvasses: 
perhaps the difference is thought to lie in the peculiarly reflective, consciousness-raising quality 
of this clarity, with the implication that it transcends any particular aspect of our practices 
(maybe by grasping them all together in a Gestalt).  But this is hard to reconcile with what 
Williams himself told us earlier about the result of this exploration: namely, that “[w]hat one 
would become conscious of, in so reflecting, is something like: how we go on” (1974: 153; 
Williams’s emphasis).  It is very hard to see how becoming conscious of how we go on can yield 
anything that can play an (even transcendentally) explanatory rôle vis-à-vis—what was after all 
the (transcendental) explanandum—“the fact that our language is such and such, and… that the 
world we live in is as it is.”  For the fact that our language is such and such just is a matter of 
how we go on.  These are too close together for the one to constitute an explanation of the other.  
(Whether we ought to call the fact that the world is as it is a matter of how we go on—indeed, 
whether it is properly conceived of as an explanandum at all in this connection—depends on how 
we resolve the question of idealism, which is just what is at issue.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 This observation, and more generally this paragraph and the next two, owe much to some remarks of McDowell’s. 
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And some of Wittgenstein’s insistence that we not press the search for explanation too far seems 
general enough to suggest that we ought to abandon the thought that even transcendental 
explanation is available.  Rather than quoting a barrage of well-known passages about how 
“explanations come to an end somewhere” or how “my spade is turned” (§§1, 217)—remarks 
which Wittgenstein makes, by the way, in the context of discussions of cases of how we go on—
let me quote at length one passage from the Investigations which I think illustrates nicely the 
kind of suspicion Wittgenstein would have of the idea of the availability of an explanation or 
justification (however ineffable or nonempirical) of our mindedness.  (The context is a 
discussion of the idea that, in explaining the meaning of particular words I use, I have to use 
words whose meanings might themselves be enquired into in turn; but I think the remark can be 
understood much more generally.16) 
 
“But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one?  In that case the 
explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”—As though an 
explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one.  Whereas an explanation may indeed 
rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent 
a misunderstanding.  One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding—one, 
that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not every one that I can imagine. 
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the foundations; so that 
secure understanding is possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these 
doubts.  (§87) 
 
Surely the philosophical motivation for the adoption of an idealism lies in its promise to explain 
or justify the adequacy of our thinking, of our claims to knowledge.  (Again, this is explicit in 
Kant.)  But if Wittgenstein explicitly denies the availability of such justification—and if claims 
to find, in the face of this explicit denial, an implicit (perhaps “hopeless”) pointing in the 
direction of such justification are weak—it is hard to see the grounds for attributing idealism to 
him. 
 
                                                          
16 For passages denying the possibility of justification explicitly in the case of grammatical knowledge, see Forster’s 
references at (2004: 30-31).  I shall discuss Forster’s interpretation of these passages below. 
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And it is hard to resist emphasising again the point that Stroud makes about external vantage 
points.  Lear, again, insists on the disanalogy between Kant’s willingness to advert to a 
standpoint outside our forms of thought and Wittgenstein’s refusal to allow that we can make 
sense of such a standpoint; Lear’s purportedly Wittgensteinian “transcendental deduction” thus 
makes no use of such a standpoint.17  But I find it hard to see how Lear can get around Stroud’s 
objection that, whatever reflective clarity that sort of moving around inside one’s world view can 
yield, it cannot get a grip on the question whether that world view, considered as world view, 
gets things right about the world, considered independently of any world view.  If Lear is right, 
that is, to insist on Wittgenstein’s rejection of the very idea of an “external vantage point”, it’s 
hard to see why such rejection doesn’t just come to a refusal to indulge the inclination to ask the 
sort of question to which a transcendental deduction of objective validity purports to provide an 
answer. 
 
ii. … over against alternatives?: Forster on Wittgenstein on the arbitrariness of 
grammar 
 
But perhaps we needn’t explicitly take up an “external vantage point” to get the worry about the 
adequacy of our mindedness going: perhaps the mere idea of alternative mindednesses suffices 
to get us worried—and perhaps this idea is available to us from within our mindedness.  Thus far, 
I have mostly left unquestioned Williams’s and Lear’s claim that Wittgenstein does not really 
mean the “alternative practices” he describes to be taken seriously as genuine alternatives (“to 
                                                          
17 Back in note 11 I suggested that it was anomalous for Lear to insist on the disanalogy.  But the dialectical context 
was an initial defense of Lear’s Wittgensteinian “transcendental deduction” against objections.  If one is concerned 
to establish the objective validity of our conceptual apparatus, one had better show that genuinely alternative 
apparatus are nothing (or anyway nothing to us): and both Kant and Lear’s Wittgenstein have this, in one form or 
another.  But my point here is that, for the attribution of idealism to stick, there had better be another level at which 
we can hold our own cognitive activity at arm’s length to observe how it produces the world of experience; and here, 
Lear’s own observation of the disanalogy between Kant and Wittgenstein becomes telling. 
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us” rather than merely “for us”, in Williams’s phrase).  I briefly discussed Stroud’s claim that, 
for Wittgenstein, at least the very idea of an alternative mindedness is left intact, even if the 
content of a particular alternative is in principle unavailable to us; but only to suggest that such a 
thin idea might not be enough to generate a problem for the sort of argument Lear wants to run.  
But Michael Forster has recently published work in which he argues that Wittgenstein really 
means to have shown that there are genuine alternatives to our practices, to our very mindedness: 
we can and indeed do know that ours is not the only way to think.18  Forster accepts Stroud’s 
claim that such alternative world pictures need not be accessible to us; but he takes our (alleged) 
ability to recognise their genuine possibility to be sufficient not only (as Stroud holds) to 
undercut a Lear-style “transcendental deduction” of the objective validity of our own way of 
thinking, but to establish firmly a genuine conceptual pluralism incompatible with the thought 
that there is no meaningful question to be asked about the adequacy of our thinking to reality.19 
 
I think Forster’s emphasis on our inability, by Wittgenstein’s lights, to justify our ways of 
thinking is salutary: for, though (as we saw) Lear too recognises this, he takes it to be compatible 
with an (at least implicit) transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our ways of 
understanding; and this seems like an awfully unstable position.  But Forster, before addressing 
the question of justification, argues that Wittgenstein is committed to what Forster calls “the 
diversity thesis”: argues that “Wittgenstein believes that for all grammatical principles… 
                                                          
18 (Forster 2004).  His attack on Davidson’s “On the very idea of a conceptual scheme” (Forster 1998) is of a piece 
with this work. 
19 I mean, by putting things in this way, to leave it open for Forster to claim that the (by his lights) meaningful 
question about adequacy, though askable, is not satisfyingly answerable.  (One result of denying transcendental 
idealism can of course be skepticism.)  But—though he thinks Wittgenstein is more or less on the right track in his 
doctrine of unjustifiability—Forster suggests that some considerations Wittgenstein laid down (according to 
Forster’s reading) as necessary criteria of the very meaningfulness of putative grammatical principles are better 
construed as matters of degree, deployable in limited ways in adjudicating between competing principles.  But this 
of course simply reinforces the point that, by Forster’s lights, Wittgenstein’s “conceptual pluralism” makes 
questions about adequacy intelligible. 
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govern[ing] our ‘true-false games,’ alternative but in some degree similar grammatical 
principles… either have actually been used or are at least possible and conceivable” (2004: 21).  
And this colours his understanding of the no-justification idea: for Forster understands the idea 
of justification in terms of justification over against alternatives.  He tacks this qualification on 
just about every time he speaks of justification (see e.g. 2004: 30ff.), and reads it into 
Wittgenstein’s own discussions of arbitrariness and justification even where Wittgenstein has 
said nothing corresponding.  Indeed, though Forster presents his book as an exploration of the 
sense in which, for Wittgenstein, grammar is arbitrary, its centrepiece is clearly the “diversity 
thesis”; and Forster spends ten pages adumbrating this thesis—in explicit answer to the question 
what Wittgenstein means by grammar’s arbitrariness—before he reveals that there are points in 
Wittgenstein’s texts where Wittgenstein himself explicitly raises the question what he means by 
calling grammar arbitrary, and answers that he means that it cannot be justified (often not, pace 
Forster, “over against alternatives” but simpliciter). 
 
The exegetical practice strikes me as disturbing; but presumably Forster thinks it harmless, since 
he thinks Wittgenstein holds the “diversity thesis” in any case.  I want to leave open for the 
moment the question whether this is right, and hence to avoid building the presupposition that it 
is into the discussion of the issue of justification.  But someone might ask me what on earth 
justification can be besides justification “over against alternatives”.  To this, a Lear might 
respond that, sometimes, justification can consist precisely in the demonstration that there are no 
alternatives (rather than that, say, ours is preferable to the others): the demonstration that the 
‘we’ disappears is the final step in the Wittgensteinian transcendental deduction.  (Of course, in 
claiming this Lear has to be careful about the sense of ‘justification’ at issue, since after all this 
comes to finding in Wittgenstein’s work a kind of justification of something which, Wittgenstein 
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tells us explicitly, has no justification.)  And Stroud, who resists Lear’s attribution of such an 
argument to Wittgenstein, can agree at least with the thought that justification needn’t be “over 
against (substantive) alternatives”.  Indeed, as we saw, that constitutes the basis of his claim that 
Lear’s “transcendental deduction” fails: for even having shown that any thinker must think as we 
do, it still looks askable whether how we think corresponds to how things are; questions of 
justification, that is, still arise.  (Stroud’s example is a Humean treatment of causation: we could 
imagine someone insisting that any thinker, just qua thinker, must acquire the “determination of 
the mind” which Hume describes—the custom of associating ideas of objects that occur in 
constant conjunction—while denying, to the dismay of a Kant, that any (further) “objective 
necessity” corresponds to this association.)  No doubt the (at least notional) availability of 
alternatives renders the question of justification more vivid; but it looks as though it is, strictly, 
independent of such availability. 
 
So it seems that there is room for someone to hold that there are no genuine alternatives to our 
grammar (to our mindedness), but that neither this absence of alternatives nor anything else 
justifies our grammar.  But if Forster is right that Wittgenstein espouses the “diversity thesis”, 
then Wittgenstein, at least, does not hold this.  Is Forster right? 
 
In order to establish that Wittgenstein is committed to the “diversity thesis”, Forster cites a 
number of passages in which Wittgenstein apparently commits himself to it explicitly.  Now, I 
cannot address all the passages Forster quotes (and the same goes for the less textually rooted 
arguments Forster gives, some of which I shall consider briefly below); but I think it is fair to say 
generally that Forster’s treatment of such passages is too quick, in two senses.  First of all, I 
think Forster is too easy on himself when it comes to identifying cases of—in Wittgenstein’s 
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words—“essentially different concepts” (Zettel §388; Wittgenstein’s emphasis).  For instance20, 
at several points Forster discusses the case (which Wittgenstein himself discusses at several 
points) of a different kind of negation from ours: one which does not support the rule of double 
negation elimination.  Now, wherever one stands on the question of the genuine possibility and 
intelligibility of “essentially different” conceptual systems, surely no one should deny that 
attributing to someone such a system—say, one with a different underlying logic—will be a 
sensitive matter, to say the least.  But Forster, revealingly, has this to say, in an aside, about the 
question of negation: 
 
[D]ialects of English sometimes seem to use a variant of negation which is unlike the classical logician’s 
“~,” for instance in failing to respect the law of double-negation elimination (rather as in Wittgenstein’s 
own example)—hence in dialect “He ain’t no fool” means that he is not a fool, not that he is one.  (2004: 
227n21) 
 
The idea that this is a genuine instance of “failing to respect the law of double-negation 
elimination”, and thus of a concept of negation distinct from the classical logician’s, seems too 
preposterous to bother refuting.  But just to make my thought explicit, note that Forster’s 
suggestion that the “dialect” sentence involves double negation would seem to imply that it is the 
negation of “He is no fool” (or perhaps of “He ain’t a fool”).  Would one who utters Forster’s 
sentence take himself to be negating either of these?  –Applying these principles of analysis, I 
suppose Forster would find that standard varieties of French lack negation almost altogether, 
except in the context of double negation—where (surprise!) the result of double negation is not 
equivalent to the contained, unnegated sentence. 
 
I do not take myself to have undercut everything Forster has to say about double negation.  I 
mean only to have illustrated my worry that Forster finds it easier than he ought to discover cases 
                                                          
20 This may be the least favourable instance to Forster of his entire monograph; perhaps it is uncharitable of me to 
seize on it.  But it will at least make as clear as possible the worry I have in mind. 
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of (essential) conceptual distinctness.  To give a somewhat more determinate shape to my worry, 
let me allude briefly to Forster’s allied attack on Davidson’s claim that we cannot make sense of 
the idea of radically different conceptual schemes (Forster 1998).  There Forster raises, no doubt 
properly, the question just what “radical difference” should be taken to come to in this context; 
but in his brief discussion of this question (1998: 135-136 and 170n14) he makes use of the ideas 
of quantity and quality of differences between sets of concepts without explanation, as though 
these ideas were straightforwardly intelligible.  I cannot see that they are—surely we are not, for 
instance, meant to count single words and take the result to yield a quantification of conceptual 
resources!—and indeed, I take it that it is thinking about what it would take to make such ideas 
precise that leads one down paths like Davidson’s.  I am inclined to think that Forster’s refusal to 
go down such a path rests in part on his failure to take seriously this sort of challenge.  But I shall 
have to leave detailed discussion of Forster’s piece on Davidson for another occasion. 
 
I suggested above that there were two senses in which Forster’s treatment of passages in 
Wittgenstein apparently supporting the “diversity thesis” was too quick.  I have discussed the 
first sense: he is too quick to take any old (putative) difference in conceptual apparatus to be an 
instance of “essentially different concepts”.  The second sense is simply that I think many of the 
passages in Wittgenstein’s work that Forster cites are less unambiguous than he suggests: it is 
not as clear as he claims, for instance, that they are straightforwardly opposed to the Williams-
Lear reading according to which putative alternatives are not meant as genuine alternatives so 
much as as foils for facilitating a better understanding of our own practices.  Here is an 
illustration of what I have in mind, in which Forster cites a passage from Zettel as unequivocal 
support of the diversity thesis: 
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[Wittgenstein] argues that someone might be able to dispense with our prohibition against speaking of a 
reddish green and instead recognize something of the kind:  “These people are acquainted with reddish 
green.—‘But there is no such thing!’—What an extraordinary sentence.—(How do you know?)”  (Forster 
2004: 23, citing Zettel §362) 
 
Forster does not register the delicacy with which Wittgenstein resists the objection, “But there is 
no such thing!”—indeed, he takes Wittgenstein to be arguing that “someone might be able to… 
recognize [reddish green]”!  (We can bring out Wittgenstein’s delicacy a bit by observing that, a 
few pages earlier, he has said that “‘There is no such thing as a reddish green’ is akin to the 
sentences that we use as axioms in mathematics” (Zettel §346).  It does not seem unnatural to 
remark of, say, ‘Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another’, “What 
an extraordinary sentence.—(How do you know?)”—without thereby implying that one doubts 
that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, much less that one means 
by this remark to argue that they aren’t.)  Surely what is going on in this area is that 
Wittgenstein is resisting a certain kind of explanation, that we can feel inclined to give, of the 
impossibility we find here (cf. Zettel §331)—not that he is resisting the very idea that there is a 
kind of impossibility. 
 
Forster does the same thing, in the previous chapter, with a closely related passage from the same 
discussion in Zettel: 
 
Wittgenstein’s [position] entails that many fundamental, necessary features of our experience which we are 
prephilosophically inclined to ascribe to a world independent of our minds… turn out instead to have their 
source in our minds.  (2004: 15) 
 
Forster calls this idealism, and illustrates it with this passage from Wittgenstein’s text: 
 
We have a colour system as we have a number system. 
Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things?  How are we to put it?—Not in the nature of 
numbers or colours.  (Zettel, §357) 
 
Forster, again, takes it that the quotation speaks for itself, unambiguously: he takes it, I suppose, 
that Wittgenstein, having rejected one limb of the disjunction he offered, must simply be 
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accepting the other.  This is helped along by Forster’s having misquoted the passage: where 
Wittgenstein says (as I have quoted here) “Not in the nature of numbers or colours”, Forster has 
him conclude instead “Not in the nature of things”, which really does look like one of the 
disjuncts.  But by switching from ‘things’ to ‘numbers or colours’, it is conceivable that 
Wittgenstein might be deliberately leaving open the possibility that “in the nature of things” 
wouldn’t be a wrong answer, even if “in the nature of colours” (say) is bound to be misleading.  
But even setting the problem of Forster’s unfortunate misquotation aside, and supposing that 
Wittgenstein does mean to be rejecting one of the initial disjuncts, it is surely clear that he is not 
comfortable straightforwardly accepting the other.  Surely this indicates a mistrust of the 
question: not a mere reluctance (to be overcome) to give it the “prephilosophically” more 
surprising answer.21  (Note, incidentally, the affinity of this reading of the Zettel passage with 
Sullivan’s reading of the Tractatus and Stroud’s suggestion for making sense of Wittgenstein’s 
later work, discussed above.) 
 
We have considered at some length Forster’s arguments for the claim that Wittgenstein holds the 
diversity thesis.  I cannot pretend to have dispensed with all of them (nor do I have the space to 
do so).  But Forster himself does put a lot of weight on the “textual evidence” he cites at the 
beginning of his Chapter 2, and I have suggested that it won’t bear all that weight.  He gives 
further arguments as well; I don’t find them any more convincing.  Let me discuss just one more 
instance: he asserts that, of the three purposes he finds in Wittgenstein’s discussions of 
alternative grammatical practices, two require that the alternatives be genuinely possible.  In 
brief, the three purposes in question are, first, “to discredit a form of Platonism… which holds 
                                                          
21 I shall not here pause over Forster’s further contentious move, to infer from “in our nature” to “in our minds”, and 
to call the resulting position idealism. 
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that concepts are sparse, as it were”; second, “to depict a possible22 alternative in order thereby 
to make clearer by specific contrasts or similarities some feature of our own grammar”; and 
finally (a purpose which, Forster concedes, is amenable to Williams and Lear’s reading), in “a 
small class of examples…, to unmask seemingly coherent philosophical conceptions as in fact 
implicitly incoherent” (2004: 25; italics in original).  But even granting this list of Wittgenstein’s 
purposes, I simply don’t see why Forster thinks the first two require that the described cases be 
genuinely possible, rather than (say) the kind of ultimately empty foil that Williams and Lear 
find in them.  He gives no argument for this claim; I suppose he takes it to be obvious.  But 
(taking the second purpose first) our reading in §5. a) above of Wittgenstein’s discussion of the 
slab language seems to provide a perfectly intelligible case of describing a putative “alternative” 
“in order thereby to make clearer by specific contrasts or similarities some feature of our own 
grammar”, without any implication that the “alternative” in question is a genuinely possible 
language.  (Indeed, we argued above that it is not.)23 
 
As for the first purpose, Forster does not really explain what he means by the thesis of concepts’ 
“sparseness” (and it is perhaps especially unclear given that he is at pains to distinguish the thesis 
from the (also “Platonic”) idea “that meanings are eternal objects [and] ontologically 
independent” (2004: 204n4)).  He elaborates on the thesis only as far as adding: “that there is just 
one concept of Virtue, one concept of Justice, and so on” (2004: 204n4).  But we can learn a 
                                                          
22 Of course, by inserting ‘possible’ into his statement of the purpose, Forster has settled it that the cases 
Wittgenstein describes with this purpose in mind are “possible”!—but this is clearly mere sleight of hand on 
Forster’s part.  What we ought to ask, plainly, is whether the goal of “mak[ing] clearer by specific contrasts or 
similarities [with a described alternative] some feature of our own grammar” requires that the alternative be 
genuinely possible; so this is how I shall take this second purpose in my discussion below. 
23 Does this just show that the slab language is not an alternative to ours, and hence that it doesn’t count as a case of 
Forster’s second purpose?  —But unless this worry is just the sleight of hand warned against in note 22 above, this 
can only be to say that Wittgenstein’s goal in describing the slab language is not to illuminate anything about our 
own language in contrast—but now compare Investigations §130, where Wittgenstein states in the clearest possible 
terms that that is precisely his goal in discussing the “clear and simple language-games” such as the one in §2. 
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little more about what Forster has in mind when he gives, as an example of the view that 
concepts are “sparse”, “[Frege’s] notorious judgment that even ‘and’ and ‘but’ are identical in 
sense” (2004: 205n4).24  Even this is not fully clear; it is not clear why denying Frege’s 
“notorious judgment” could not mean simply finding different (still “sparse”) concepts 
associated with the two words.25  But in any case, it is telling, I think, that ‘and’ and ‘but’ are, 
after all, both “our” concepts (or, if you prefer to think of them—with Frege—as takes on the 
same concept, both “our” takes).  Whatever precisely it comes to to find in Wittgenstein a 
rejection of the view that concepts are “sparse”, surely the discussion of family resemblance in 
the Investigations is a central expression of this rejection26; and what it is a rejection of is a 
certain picture of the working of our concepts.  That is, the thought is not that, while our 
concepts form a sharp, clear order as of the purest crystal (cf. §97 and passim), the comparison 
with others’ concepts reveals that concepts “as a whole”—“theirs” and “ours” taken together—
are not sparse: rather, it is that it is a fantastication to suppose that our own concepts form that 
sort of order.  Thus, again, I do not see why Forster believes that Wittgenstein’s motivation of 
this thought depends on the genuine possibility of the alternatives he describes. 
 
Even though it cannot be said that I have addressed every consideration raised in Forster’s 
monograph, I hope I have succeeded in making it plausible that Forster is not successful in 
establishing Wittgenstein’s commitment to the “diversity thesis”. 
                                                          
24 This is a little awkward as Frege exegesis, since for Frege what settles it that we express the same concept with 
‘and’ and ‘but’ is that they are identical in reference (that is, they refer to the same concept), not in sense (though of 
course it is also true that Frege holds them to be identical in sense).  But since Wittgenstein does not adopt this 
Fregean apparatus unchanged, we can perhaps forgive Forster for the awkwardness that arises from trying to discuss 
the two authors using the same vocabulary. 
25 I suppose the thought must be that ‘and’ and ‘but’ both express the concept of conjunction.  One who holds the 
“sparseness” thesis must either (like Frege) insist that the two words express the same concept tout court (no ifs, 
ands or buts), or else deny that they express the same one concept in any sense; whereas to let go of the “sparseness” 
thesis is to allow that ‘and’ and ‘but’ express different concepts-of-conjunction.  This is the best I can do at Forster 
exegesis; but the point I go on to make in the text stands. 
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What I hope I have made room for is a position (sketched above but threatened by Forster’s 
attribution of the “diversity thesis” to Wittgenstein) something like this:  Williams and Lear may 
well be right that we are not forced to take Wittgenstein to be committing himself, through his 
discussion of alternative practices, ways of thinking, and so on, to the genuine possibility of 
thinkers for whom those alternatives are real (much less to their straightforward intelligibility to 
us)—and so we are not forced to find in him a simple conceptual relativism, and a concomitant 
crude empirical idealism, as Forster does.27  But at the same time, we can agree with Stroud (and 
against Lear) that the disappearance of the ‘we’ does not in itself constitute any kind of 
justification of our ways of thinking: for, precisely because (as Lear recognises) no external 
vantage point from which to consider the question of the fit between our concepts and the world 
enters into the considerations leading up to the ‘we’’s disappearance, no answer to that question 
is either intelligible or required.  But such justification is what idealism is after: to suppose that 
we constitute the fit between our concepts and the world only has an appeal for us if we begin by 
finding them at a distance from one another. 
 
6. Motivations for finding idealism in Wittgenstein 
 
Perhaps my suggestion that the later Wittgenstein’s work is best not thought of as idealist will be 
a little more satisfying if I say a bit more, in an accommodating sort of spirit, about why it is 
tempting to find a kind of idealism there.  There is no doubt, first of all, that Wittgenstein looks 
idealist sometimes: for instance in those Zettel discussed above, where he discourages finding 
(the basis of) our systems of colours and numbers “in the nature of numbers or colours.”  
Anscombe, in her discussion of such passages as these (1976), distinguishes between holding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 E.g., §69: “We do not know the boundaries [of the concept ‘game’] because none have been drawn….  [W]e can 
draw a boundary—for a special purpose.  Does it take that to make the concept usable?  Not at all!” 
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that “essence is expressed by grammar” (Investigations, §371, emphasis altered) and holding that 
essence is created by grammar: and suggests that in a great many cases, there is no need to infer 
the second from the first.  But she is surely a bit quick in her insistence on this point.  For 
example, she tends to make the point in terms of counterfactuals, in this sort of way (the context 
is a discussion of different concepts of pain): 
 
Now what is there in all this to make a difficulty about saying: “Even if there had never been any human 
language so that there was ‘no concept of pain’ at all – still, if there were animals, there would have been 
pain?”  Nothing…. 
And similarly, if there never had been humans around talking about horses, that is not the slightest reason 
to say there wouldn’t have been horses.  (1976: 114) 
 
But (though this is less clear in the case of the sort of idealism that Forster wants to attribute to 
Wittgenstein) Williams made explicit—and Lear picked up on this and emphasised it further—
that the idealism they find in Wittgenstein’s work is from the beginning not such as to imply the 
truth of any such counterfactual.  (Perhaps it expresses this to say it is transcendental, not 
empirical, idealism.)  As we saw Williams put it before: 
 
… our language, in [the] sense in which its being as it is has no empirical explanation, shows us everything 
as it appears to our interests, our concerns, our activities, though in the only sense in which we could 
meaningfully say that they determined everything, that statement would be false….  [T]hat provides 
grounds, I suggest, for calling such a view a kind of idealism….  (1974: 153) 
 
In any case Anscombe herself concludes that there is an element of idealism to be found in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as well: for even if statements about horses, for instance, and 
their colours and so on are not impugned by the considerations touched on in the Zettel passages 
(among others), grammatical propositions themselves are (expressions of) rules, and 
Wittgenstein, says Anscombe, “was a linguistic idealist” about rules.28  She arrives at this result 
by recommending the following “test question”: “Does this existence, or this truth, depend upon 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 I suppose Forster would resist this characterisation of the idealism he imputes to Wittgenstein.  (For instance, he 
emphasises that it is of substantially the same character as Kant’s.) 
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human linguistic practice?” (1976: 116).  And no doubt Wittgenstein held that the existence of 
rules depends upon human practice. 
 
Certainly Wittgenstein held that “‘obeying a rule’ is a practice” (Investigations, §202)—and, 
further, this is not to say just that obeying a rule is a practice (one, say, to be understood as 
guided by “the rule itself”, intelligible independently of a grasp of the practice), but that obeying 
a rule is a practice: that to grasp a rule is to grasp the practice in which it has its home.  But this 
is meant as a reminder, not as a heavy thesis: we learn rules by learning the practices they guide, 
and we know “what a rule is” because we know what a rule-governed practice is.  (On the 
commonplace-ness of this idea, compare Anscombe on Hume’s claim that “promises have no 
force antecedent to human conventions”: “If moralists have found this offensive, this will have 
been by misunderstanding it” (1976: 119).) 
 
But just this commonplace-ness should tip us off to the fact that there is something odd in 
finding here an idealism.  Doing so would suggest that there is a peculiar puzzle about the 
relation between us and rules—a chasm between us and them—which we can fill by seeing that, 
as it’s we who create the rules, it’s no surprise that we can know them and act in accordance with 
them.  No doubt one can get puzzled in this sort of way when one realises that one cannot license 
a rule about, say, refusing to call anything reddish green simply by pointing at red and pointing 
at green.  (Cf. Zettel, §331.)  But compare Wittgenstein’s treatment of rules, sign-posts and so on 
in the Investigations.  If one thinks of a sign-post as itself “normatively inert,”29 one will be 
puzzled as to how we succeed in settling on one interpretation of it rather than on any of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 Forster argues that if Anscombe concedes this much, she ought to recognise that such idealism will infect even 
ordinary empirical statements: for by Wittgenstein’s lights, our grammatical principles are not merely laid over an 
independently given reality, they “[regulate] which… factual judgments it is appropriate for us to make” (2004: 17). 
29 I owe the phrase to John McDowell.  It will be seen that this and the next few sentences are meant to follow 
McDowell’s account of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations as he puts it forward in e.g. his (1993). 
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countless others (and as to how we settle on an interpretation without needing to interpret it in 
turn).  But Wittgenstein’s solution isn’t to suggest that our experience of sign-posts as 
normatively potent is, at a transcendental level (where, I suppose, the sign-posts “really are” 
inert), constituted by our activity.  It is simply to refuse to allow that the sign-post is, at any level, 
normatively inert: it is (ultimately) to refuse the puzzlement.  It has a place in our activity as a 
sign-post; and so understood, it is normative “all the way down”.  “[T]here is a way of grasping a 
rule which is not an interpretation” (Investigations, §201).  Returning to our original case: it’s 
not that we start with inert stuff—things with colours, which we can recognise as things with 
colours independently of any grasp of rules for the use of colour concepts—and then ask: “How 
do we know there’s no reddish green?  Does that—red—somehow tell us?”  (If we get as far as 
asking this question, we have to answer No: if we “run up against existence and non-existence”, 
it will be “against facts, not concepts”: Zettel §364.  But—the point—to answer ‘No’ here isn’t to 
answer ‘Yes’ to the next question:)  “If not, do we as it were tell it?: do we make it so?”  Surely 
this is no more satisfactory.  Just as “the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt” 
(Investigations, §85)—it points the way, and I go—so my interactions with and judgments about 
things proceed according to rules.  (Asked of olive green to “Name two sensations which this is 
between,” “one will not get ‘red and green’” (Zettel, §§360-361).)  We cannot effect the 
separation that the puzzlement presupposes.  But I cannot see why it is perspicuous to call a view 
idealism unless it purports to provide a bridge across a gap it construes in that sort of way. 
 
7. Is the Investigations in need of a transcendental vindication? 
 
We have so far not addressed directly the question I with which I began this chapter: namely, 
whether Rödl’s complaint against Wittgenstein is well placed.  We have focused our attention on 
the more limited goal of determining just what Wittgenstein’s understanding is of the place of 
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“vindication” in his own work, against which understanding Rödl aims his complaint.  But I 
think we have amassed the resources required to make a start, at least, at addressing the bigger 
question.   
 
Consider, first, what it would come to to “adjudicate” between Wittgenstein’s self-conception (as 
we have now understood it) and Rödl’s claim that further justification of the grammatical 
remarks is required.  There is something puzzling about the very demand even to do this: after 
all, to argue (successfully) in favour of Wittgenstein here would surely constitute a kind of 
justification of the “grammatical remarks”—but it is precisely this whose feasibility Wittgenstein 
denies!  It seems as though, whichever side we set out to defend, Rödl is somehow guaranteed to 
end up vindicated—but this is surely a kind of sleight of hand.  Surely “explanations come to an 
end somewhere” (Investigations, §1); the question can only be where.30  To put the distinction 
between Wittgenstein’s and Rödl’s conceptions of the status of the Investigations’s “grammatical 
remarks” in slightly different terms, then, it must simply be the difference between comfortably 
accepting them, without feeling as though they call out for further justification (especially on the 
basis of some one principle), and (on the other hand) finding oneself warranted in demanding 
further explanation of their grounding.  (Presumably part of Wittgenstein’s point in calling them 
“reminders” (§127) is to flag them as remarks whose truth we instantly recognise, rather than 
feeling any inclination to doubt.)  But how can we go about settling this difference in turn? 
 
Well, the considerations I’ve been developing at least suggest that there’s room for a kind of 
accommodation of Rödl’s project in Kategorien des Zeitlichen, which he conceives of as part of 
“transcendental logic”, that doesn’t concede his main complaint.  These considerations suggest 
that we needn’t be haunted by the spectre of competing, (“essentially”) alien ways of thinking 
148 
about, and moving about in, the world—and, of a piece with this, that our “ways of thinking 
about, and moving about in, the world” are not something from which we can separate ourselves, 
or the world, far enough to allow ourselves to be troubled by the prospect of their marching out 
of step with the world.  But this isn’t at all to say that those “ways” have no structure: as we saw 
at the beginning of this chapter (and in Investigations §92), there is structure there, indeed 
structure “worthy of recovery” (so long as we understand ‘recovery’ in a sense not so much of 
revelation as of recollection).  But then perhaps the thoughts upon which Rödl himself insists in 
his work on temporal categories—for instance, the thought that the threefold formal distinction 
among “is doing”, “was doing” and “did” cannot profitably be reduced to the twofold distinction 
between “is” and “was”; the thought that that twofold distinction in turn cannot profitably be 
reduced to tenseless “is”; and so on—constitute a part of just this exploration. 
 
Rödl takes it that if an aspect of a judgment of experience is not part of its content, it must be 
part of its form, and hence—the punch line (for my purposes)—“in us”.31  Though the distinction 
between content and form is perhaps innocuous32—Rödl argues persuasively (in his Ch. 3) that 
to let this lapse entirely is to fall into a jejune kind of Quinean across-the-board empiricism—the 
phrase ‘in us’ seems to demand an (idealist) justification of objective validity, or else to leave us 
with skepticism.  But if the reading of Wittgenstein I’ve been pushing is right, he is, precisely, 
guided by a vision according to which the alternatives “content of experience” and “in us” aren’t 
exhaustive: compare the discussion of Zettel §357 at the end of §5 c) ii) above. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30 After all, even a transcendental deduction must start somewhere. 
31 This locution comes from personal communication with Rödl. 
32 I don’t mean to trivialise this: obviously work is required to explain this distinction (and Rödl’s claim is precisely 
that his conception will result from such work, if it is rightly done).  I mean that the reading of Wittgenstein I have 
been urging at least purports to contain resources to reconstruct a parallel distinction: notably, in the distinction 
between factual and grammatical remarks. 
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Now, Rödl motivates his demand for a justification on the basis of some principle with the 
observation that the status of the “grammatical knowledge” (as Rödl calls it) explored in the 
Investigations is synthetic a priori: 
 
[Wittgenstein’s] grammatical remarks have all the traditional attributes of logical knowledge.  They are 
pure—they do not describe sensuous experience; they hold (if they hold) a priori—they can be neither 
proven empirically nor disproved empirically; and they are synthetic—they do not hold on the basis of 
arbitrary meaning assignments.  (2005: 9) 
 
And as we have seen, Rödl moves from the fact that Wittgenstein seems “to want to reject… the 
very idea of a general form of thinking” to the claim that: 
 
… an obscurity is cast over that strand of the analytic tradition which arises from the Philosophical 
investigations, an obscurity over the nature and possibility of ‘grammar’ and thus over the object of 
philosophical investigation.  (2005: 10) 
 
But the whole thrust of the chapter so far has been to show how reflection “from within” on the 
structures of our practices—that is, reflection that progresses piecemeal, on different practices, 
without beginning from some one principle or some “idea of a general form of thinking”—is 
nevertheless a conceptual, not (say) a merely empirical, exploration; and, more to the point, that 
the concepts at issue are in some sense necessary concepts. 
 
I realise that I haven’t put entirely to rest Rödl’s complaint against Wittgenstein.  But I have tried 
to bring out the difficulty of adjudicating the dispute, and I have suggested that, when we 
appreciate this difficulty, we might come to find Rödl’s demand for further justification less 
pressing.  In any case, I hope I have said enough to justify looking for an understanding of the 
origin of the Investigations’s “grammatical remarks” alternative to Rödl’s claim that they are 
implicit (and as yet unjustified) appeals to transcendental logic, awaiting the development of a 
system of grammar from a principle to serve as their foundation.  It is to the task of looking for 





Chapter Five.  From Frege and Russell to the Tractatus and beyond. 
 
Our task in this chapter is to account for Wittgenstein’s development from the views articulated 
in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, as they arose out of engagement with those of Frege and 
Russell, in the direction of the ones in Philosophical investigations discussed in the previous 
chapter.  For we argued there that Rödl’s doubly contentious interpretative claim about the 
Investigations—to the effect that it consists in transcendental-logical investigations but that, 
failing to recognise this in itself, it owes us a justification of its categories—fails to do justice to 
Wittgenstein’s claim that the search for such foundations is misplaced.  Rödl’s claims appeared 
to presuppose an exhaustive dichotomy between Frege’s deductive and Kant’s transcendental 
conceptions of logical form: it was on this basis that he could hold that, if Wittgenstein after the 
Tractatus abandoned the Fregean conception, but retained, however unreflectively, the project of 
exploring logical form in some sense, that sense must be the transcendental one.  The previous 
chapter gave reasons for thinking that what Wittgenstein is doing in the Investigations is, 
anyway, not meant to be transcendental logic, at least not if this ascription brings with it, as Rödl 
implies, the need for a deduction of the validity of its categories.  But it might well be asked why 
the enquiries of the Investigations should be conceived as “logical”, as consisting in explorations 
of “logical form” in any sense, at all.  The present chapter will therefore address this question, 
through a historical approach.  If we can see the Investigations as engaged in an enquiry 
recognisable as the descendant of Wittgenstein’s engagement in the Tractatus with Frege’s and 
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Russell’s manifestly logical works, we shall have some grounds for holding that the former do 
not represent a mere change of subject, but rather a change in conception of the subject matter, 




1. Frege on quantification 
2. Russell on “logical forms” 
3. Forms of object and configurations of object 




iv. Wittgenstein’s illustrations 
b) The “Russellian” reading 
c) Excursus on kinds of evidence: “textual”, not “circumstantial” 
d) Against the “textual” arguments for the “particularist” reading 
e) Agnosticism about objects and configurations 
4. Functions in the Tractatus 
5. Formalisability and the route to Wittgenstein’s later work 
 
1. Frege on quantification 
 
It has often been noted that Frege’s treatment of the truth functions and quantifiers is as 
particular (though quite abstract) contents, in some tension with the commonplace that logic is a 
purely formal discipline.1  Thus conjunction, for instance, is on his account a particular function 
from pairs of objects to objects (in particular “truth values”, though for Frege this is only to 
specify further its content, not its logical type), while the first-order universal quantifier is a 
second-level function from first-level functions (that is, functions from and into the set of 
objects) into the set of objects (also always having as its value a truth value). 
 
                                                 
1 MacFarlane (2000) constitutes an admirable study of this constellation of notions.  Somewhat oddly to my ear, he 
understands Frege’s conception of logic as a discipline which “provides constitutive norms for thought as such” as a 
perfectly intelligible thing to mean by ‘formal’, indeed making it one of the three competing conceptions of the 
formality of logic among which he adjudicates.  It strikes me as odd, though, as I say, to call a conception one of 
formality if (as MacFarlane recognises explicitly) it does not involve a contrast between form and content or matter. 
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Now, it is famously a guiding thought of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus that this 
treatment of logical notions as particular contents cannot be right.2  Thus, as the Tractatus’s 
proposition 4.0312 tells us: “My fundamental thought is that the ‘logical constants’ do not 
represent.”  The fact that the truth functions are interdefinable—which Frege already 
recognised3—leads Wittgenstein to conclude that a sign for a truth function in a sentence does 
not characterise the sense of that sentence.  (For if we can express a given proposition 
indifferently as ‘~(A ∨ B)’, ‘~A & ~B’, or ‘A ↓ B’, then none of ‘~’, ‘∨’, ‘&’ or ‘↓’ is essential 
to the expression of, and hence to the sense of, the proposition.)  What is essential is the one truth 
function that each of these combinations of symbols expresses: that is, the truth function that is 
expressed in the truth tables for all of these sentences.  But then, Wittgenstein argues, the task of 
logic must not be the study of the various truth-functional “logical constants” which can (but 
need not) be used to express those truth functions, but rather the study of the way in which 
propositions can be built truth-functionally out of elementary propositions. 
 
Something similar happens to quantification.  Wittgenstein “separate[s] the concept all from the 
truth-function” (§5.521); but as in the case of the truth-functional “logical constants”, he rejects 
the Fregean approach to the quantifiers according to which a quantifier is treated as a particular 
function from concepts to truth values.  Let us consider Frege’s approach a bit more closely, in 
order to appreciate better Wittgenstein’s rejection of it. 
                                                 
2 The remarks in the text to follow treat the content of the doctrine of the Tractatus.  But is what’s presented in the 
Tractatus a doctrine?  Not if we’re meant to take seriously, as we surely are, the claim that “he who understands me 
finally recognizes [my propositions] as nonsensical” (§6.54) (not to mention the string of remarks on the nature of 
philosophy found in the comments on §4.11).  Still, as we read the book, we are surely invited to think through the 
propositions as we would those of a doctrine; here I shall therefore, reasonably I think, abstract from the book’s 
puzzling frame. 
3 as we mentioned briefly in Chapter II. See e.g. Frege (1880-81: 37): “Now to obtain a sign joining two contents of 
possible judgment whose meaning was as simple as possible, I had four choices open, all from this point of view 
equally justified: I could have adopted as the meaning of such a sign the denial of any one of the four [combinations 
of affirmation and denial of the two contents].  But it suffices to choose one, since the four cases can be converted 
into one another.…” 
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A list of the symbolic apparatus of Frege’s begriffsschrift might lead one to expect that Frege’s 
explanation of his symbols would include a single, univocal treatment of the “concavity” he uses 
to express generality.  But in fact in Grundgesetze he introduces the concavity first in its 
application only to generality over objects (§8).  Part 1.iv) of that work is titled “Extension of the 
notation for generality,” and its first section, §19, indeed makes use of what appears to be the 
same concavity (with, indeed, some of the same rules for its use, e.g. the rule for determining 
what the “corresponding function” is to which it is applied in a given case).  But his explanation 
of the Bedeutung of an instance of the use of the concavity to express generality over first-level 
functions is given entirely independently of the analogous explanation for generality over objects 
back at §8.  And this is no coincidence.  We discussed in Chapter II the pressure on Frege to 
understand his symbolism function-analytically.  But on such principles, the distinction between 
generality over objects and generality over first-level functions, cashed out as it is in terms of the 
distinction between second-level and third-level functions, is (to adapt slightly the words from 
his paper “Function and concept” we quoted in that chapter) “not made arbitrarily, but is founded 
deep in the nature of things.” 
 
But the following words from the Tractatus (although its author illustrates them using a different 
example) contain the material for an objection to just this approach to generality: 
 
If logic has primitive ideas these must be independent of one another.  If a primitive idea is introduced it must 
be introduced in all contexts in which it occurs at all.  One cannot therefore introduce it for one context and 
then again for another.... for it would then remain doubtful whether its meaning in the two cases was the 
same, and there would be no reason to use the same way of symbolizing in the two cases.  (§5.451) 
 
One might see Frege’s repeated use of the concavity, and some of his patter surrounding it, as 
indicative of a conception of a unitary notion of generality as a primitive idea of logic.  But this 
is then betrayed by the fact that the notation needs to be reintroduced, and given a fresh 
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explanation, for each level over which it is to be used to range.  One way of understanding the 
treatment of generality in the Tractatus—and of putting in some context the account of “forms of 
object” in the book’s opening pages—is to recognise it as an attempt to give a genuinely unitary 
account of generality, in contrast to Frege’s. 
 
There are remarks about generality scattered through the Tractatus, but it is most instructive to 
consider the rôle it is meant to play in “the general form of proposition”, namely  “[⎯p, ⎯ξ, 
N(⎯ξ)]” (§6), which “says nothing else than that every proposition is the result of successive 
applications of the operation N' (⎯ξ) to the elementary propositions” (§6.001).4  “N(⎯ξ) is the 
negation of all of the values of the propositional variable ξ” (§5.502); in other words, it is a 
generalisation of the NOR operator in terms of which, just as in terms of the Sheffer stroke 
(NAND), Sheffer showed it possible to define all of the truth functions.  But if N is in this way 
truth-functional (and ⎯p represents the totality of elementary propositions), where does generality 
come into this purported representation of “that which all propositions, according to their nature, 
have in common with one another” (§5.47)?  In the notation of §6, it comes in through the 
variable ξ.  About this, Wittgenstein tells us: 
 
The values of the variable are stipulated. 
The stipulation is a description of the propositions for which the variable stands. 
How the description of [these propositions] takes place is inessential. 
We may distinguish three kinds of description:  1. Direct enumeration.  In this case we can simply give its 
constant values instead of the variable.  2. Giving a function fx whose values for all values of x are the 
propositions to be described.  3. Giving a formal law according to which those propositions are constructed.  
In this case the [propositions] are all the terms of a formal series.  (§5.501) 
 
The notation of §6, in other words, has the following import: to construct any proposition 
whatever, we are to begin with the elementary propositions, take a selection of them (by 
whatever means we wish) and jointly negate that selection; then, if we wish, we may repeat the 
                                                 
4 I have derived much help in my understanding of Wittgenstein’s account of generality in the Tractatus from an 
unpublished paper by Thomas Ricketts, “Logical segmentation and generality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” 
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procedure, now starting with the elementary propositions together with the result of the previous 
application of the operation.  Generality comes in through the selection: for we may, for instance, 
begin by selecting all the elementary propositions; or we may select all the elementary 
propositions containing a given expression; or again, we may select all the propositions that 
result from repeated application of a given operation to some beginning proposition. 
 
What should be striking about this account of generality, especially against the background of 
the Fregean approach we sketched a few paragraphs back, is that it makes no essential reference 
to the structure of the propositions providing the basis for a given generalisation.  Whereas 
Frege’s principles lead him to understand all propositional articulation in function-analytical 
terms, so that he must explain generality over objects separately from generality over functions 
(and indeed separately for each level of function)—that is to say, must explain generality by 
making explicit reference to the other aspects of the structure of the propositions in which it is 
involved—Wittgenstein “locates” generality once and for all in the selection of propositions for 
joint negation, however that selection is carried out.  Indeed, he tells us explicitly, as we just 
quoted, that the procedure involved in this selection is “inessential” (§5.501).  He goes on, we 
saw in the same section, to give examples of how it may go—examples which reveal that the 
“general form of proposition” can indeed encompass (at least some of) the propositions which 
Frege and Russell would express using quantifiers—but he emphasises that it is not essential to 
an account of generality to spell these examples out: “We may distinguish three kinds of 
description,”5 but it is not incumbent upon the logician to do so; and by the way, nothing is said 
to suggest that there aren’t other kinds besides these three. 
 
                                                 
5 Ogden’s translation omits the emphasis on ‘können’, but it is clear in the German. 
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And this helps explain the fact that the book appears to lack the kind of attention to categorial 
analysis that Frege’s work might have led us to expect.  Atomic facts, we are told, consist of 
“combination[s] of objects” (§2.01) (rather than, say, combinations of objects with functions 
taking those objects as arguments6).  We are also told that these objects “contain the possibility 
of” the states of affairs in which they can occur, the range of such possibilities being “the form of 
the object” (§§2.014f.); this is perhaps suggestive of categorial distinctions such as Frege’s (for 
we may think of first-level one-place functions, for example, as “objects” which can occur 
together with (Fregean) objects to form facts; second-level functions as “objects” which may 
combine with first-level functions; and so on).  But very little is said definitively7 about the 
particular forms of object there are: examples such as those I just gave are absent.  And all this is 
recapitulated at the level of propositions.  An elementary proposition is “a connexion, a 
concatenation, of names” (§4.22); while the ranges of possibilities of combination of simple 
names with one another in elementary propositions are isomorphic with the forms of the objects 
for which they go proxy, we are again given no details about these ranges.  We are not given a 
distinction between singular term and predicate, any more than between object and function. 
 
It is important to the Tractarian account that there is structure in atomic facts and in elementary 
propositions.  That “the proposition is articulate” (§3.141), and the related notions that the 
picture is a fact (§2.141) and that the fact is a connection of objects (§2.01), is a leitmotiv of the 
book.  It has particular relevance to the present discussion, in so far as generality, as opposed to 
the “direct enumeration” of propositions that results in a straightforward, non-general truth 
                                                 
6 I don’t mean to suggest that the parenthetical alternative is a gloss of Frege’s view; on the contrary, Frege’s 
extensionalism leads him, famously, to hold that the reference of a thought is a truth value.  The realm of reference, 
though it does contain objects and functions, does not contain “facts” composed of them. 
7 I phrase this a little weakly because Wittgenstein does give us a handful of examples, but they are problematic.  I 
return to the discussion of his examples below. 
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function of elementary propositions, is bound to proceed, by one or another means, through the 
collection of propositions on the basis of something they have in common with one another; and 
that two distinct symbols have something in common will be true in virtue of their being 
composite (§5.5261).  But, again, while the fact of elementary propositional articulation is 
important to the account of generality in the Tractatus, the particular nature of this articulation is 
held not to be a matter of interest to logic.  This is made explicit in the stretch of text beginning 
with §5.55: 
 
[W]e cannot give the composition of the elementary proposition…. 
The enumeration of any special forms would be entirely arbitrary…. 
It is clear that we have a concept of the elementary proposition apart from its special logical form. 
Where, however, we can build symbols according to a system, there this system is the logically important 
thing and not the single symbols.  (§§5.55, 5.554, 5.555) 
 
2. Russell on “logical forms” 
 
We can arrive at something like the same view of the rôle of a categorial analysis in the 
Tractatus if we consider its evolution from an engagement with the views of Bertrand Russell.  
Though it was fashionable among some Tractatus scholars in the latter half of the twentieth 
century to downplay the influence of Russell on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in favour of that of the 
“great works of Frege,” there is no doubt that many of the problems Wittgenstein wrestled with 
during his writing of the Tractatus arose from Russell’s treatment of similar problems.  I have in 
mind, as particularly relevant to the present study, the issue of logical forms, as it arose in 
Russell’s struggles during the early nineteen-teens over the nature of propositions.  Historians of 
Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s thought such as David Pears, Brian McGuinness, Peter Hylton and 
Thomas Ricketts8 have told much of this story admirably well, so I shall confine myself to a 
brief outline (credit for the content of which, indeed, is due in large part to them, in particula
Hylton). 
r to 
                                                 
8 Pears (1981); McGuinness (1974); Hylton (1984, 1990); and Ricketts (1996). 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, G.E. Moore9, and Russell following him10, found 
themselves resisting the subjectivism they thought they perceived in idealism, by (in particu
for our purposes) understanding propositions not as mind-dependent syntheses of elements, but 
rather as mind-independent, objective furniture of the world.  However, the account of judgment 




                                                
11—made no reference to the structure of the propositions in question; and 
likewise, there appeared to be no room in such a conception of propositions for an account of 
truth besides as a brute, inexplicable property holding of some propositions and not of others, 
propositions which were otherwise on an ontological par.  This consequence was in fact 
embraced explicitly by both Moore and Russell. 
 
Russell’s development of his “multiple relation theory of judgment” (1906-1913)12 was a result 
of his having come to realise the inadequacy of the accounts of judgment and truth resulting from 
this conception of propositions.  The multiple relation theory in fact dispensed with propositions 
altogether as basic ontological elements, in favour of the acts of judgment on the part of judging 
subjects.  These acts of judgment (or, more generally, of any “propositional attitude”) are 
understood, in the first version of the theory, as relations in which the judging subject stands at 
 
9 “The nature of judgment” (1898). 
10 See e.g. Principles of mathematics (1903); Hylton also provides some delightful quotations from Russell’s 1904 
paper “Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions.” 
11 This may not seem quite to capture the structure of Moore’s theory, in which “concepts” are more fundamental 
than “propositions.”  But “a proposition is nothing other than a complex concept” (¶12), and though the account of 
propositions’ truth and falsity makes some reference to their composition out of concepts, it is entirely schematic: 
“A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them; and 
according to the nature of this relation the proposition may be either true or false. What kind of relation makes a 
proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must be immediately recognised.”  So I think the 
simplification in the text is harmless.  As for Russell, on the one hand Principles of mathematics Ch. IV is an 
enquiry into the “philosophical grammar” of the proposition; but on the other hand, Russell there makes it explicit 
that propositions are no less terms than their constituents.  It is Russell himself who later describes his view from 
this period as a dyadic theory of judgment. 
12 The earlier version of the theory is expounded in Russell’s (1910); the later version is given in the 1913 
manuscript Theory of knowledge. 
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once to (what would, before the multiple relation theory, have been called) the elements of the 
proposition.  Russell next modified the theory of judgment to include, as one of the relata 
involved in a propositional attitude, the “logical form” itself.  Russell explains that mere 
entertainment of (what would hitherto have been called) the elements of the proposition does not 
suffice for its understanding; one must also know how they are to be put together.13  As he 
explains, “when all the constituents of a complex have been enumerated, there remains 
something which may be called the ‘form’ of the complex, which is how the constituents are 
combined in the complex” (1913: 98).  Such forms are “logical objects” acquaintance with which, 
as we just saw, forms a part of an act of judgment—but “[i]t would seem that logical objects 
cannot be regarded as ‘entities’” (1913: 97): “the form is not a ‘thing’, not another constituent 
along with the objects that were previously related in that form” (1913: 98).  Russell suggests 
that when we existentially generalise on every contentful element of a proposition, we arrive at 
its form: thus 
 
… ‘something has some relation to something’ contains no constituent at all.  It is, therefore, suitable to serve 
as the “form” of dual complexes.  In a sense, it is simple, since it cannot be analyzed.  At first sight, it seems 
to have a structure, and therefore to be not simple; but it is more correct to say that it is a structure.  (1913: 
114) 
 
Nevertheless, (∃x)(∃R)(∃y)xRy is also a judgment; indeed a true one. 
 
However, though the multiple relation theory brought back into focus the constitution of a 
proposition out of elements, in contrast with Moore’s and Russell’s earlier view, it recognised no 
restrictions on the range of collections of elements so unifiable into propositions—or, in 
Wittgenstein’s words, it did not “show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense” (Tractatus 
§5.5422).  The modification of the theory to include “logical forms” as relata in acts of judgment 
                                                 
13 I am omitting from this summary the way Russell, in earlier versions of the theory, tried variously to appeal to 
what he called the “sense” of the relating relation in the judgment and to the order of the relata in order to settle the 
question how the elements are to be put together in the judgment.  Ricketts (1996) is helpful on this. 
160 
does not help it to avoid this objection14, for no mechanism is provided to ensure that the other 
relata involved in a given judgment actually conform to the requirements of the “logical form.”  
That is, Russell gives no account of how the presence of a “logical form” as one of the relata 
involved in a propositional attitude places constraints on the other relata.  And it is very difficult 
to see how such an account could go, in view of, on the one hand, the apparently incoherent and 
in any case vague account of “logical forms” themselves, and on the other hand the fact that, 
given that the point of the multiple relation theory was to account for propositions in terms of 
more basic propositional attitudes in order to avoid the pitfalls of the earlier anti-idealist theories 
of propositions as basic entities, Russell has prevented himself from making reference to the 
nature of propositions in an account of the possible combinations of relata available to judgment. 
 
Now, it is clear, for instance, that Wittgenstein is engaging with just these puzzles when he 
writes these words (from which we quoted above): 
 
The correct explanation of the form of the proposition “A judges p” must show that it is impossible to judge a 
nonsense.  (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this condition.)  (§5.5422.) 
 
But when one looks for them, one can find hints of this engagement in the early part of the 
Tractatus as well.  Indeed, a way of expressing what Wittgenstein is doing in these opening 
pages is to say: he is locating form in the objects themselves—in their possibilities of 
combination—rather than in mysterious further objects serving (on a plane with particulars, 
properties, relations etc.) as relata involved in acts of judgment, belief and so on.  The following 
Tractatus propositions, for instance, can be seen to speak directly to Russell’s puzzles: 
 
It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact.  (§2.011) 
If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts.  (§2.0123) 
The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object.  (§2.0141) 
                                                 
14 Indeed, as several commentators note, Wittgenstein apparently made his objection upon reading the 1913 
manuscript, which contains the version of the multiple relation theory including “logical forms”. 
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And in a passage from an early notebook, Wittgenstein gives this approach clear expression: 
 
The logical form of the proposition must already be given by the forms of its component parts…. 
In the form of the subject and of the predicate there already lies the possibility of the subject-predicate 
proposition, etc….  (Notebooks, p. 23) 
 
It is clear that, having in place this conception of objects as carrying with them the range of 
possibilities of combination with other objects, the picture theory is designed to place the sort of 
constraint on the possible objects of judgment of whose absence from Russell’s account §5.5422 
complains.  For since (in the elementary case15) we entertain propositions by “mak[ing] to 
ourselves pictures of facts” (§2.1), but pictures consist of elements going proxy for objects with 
which they share the same ranges of possibilities of combination, “[w]e cannot think anything 
unlogical” (§3.03).  To stand in some kind of cognitive relation to a set of elements in which the 
possibility of combination one with another does not lie is, anyway, not to picture anything: and 
that is, not to think (§3).16 
 
For my purposes here, the point of rehearsing this history of Wittgenstein’s engagement with 
Russell’s work of the nineteen-teens has been to bring out, from another direction, the 
importance of the following aspect of the Tractarian approach.  Where Russell takes himself to 
be obliged to provide an account of the logical categories, as well as an account of the logical 
forms in which elements of those categories are unified into propositions, the Tractatus aims to 
provide an account of propositions sufficient for the purposes of logical theory without having to 
enter into the details of the types of object or of combination at all.  And again, a recurring theme 
                                                 
15 The case of non-elementary propositions is more complicated to describe; but since my goal here is only to show 
how Wittgenstein is engaging with Russell’s problems about “logical forms,” and those problems are already patent 
at the elementary level, it suffices for us to confine our attention to this level. 
16 Indeed, it would not be too strong to say that, in such a case, one is not “in some kind of cognitive relation” with 
meaningful elements at all.  The import of the Tractatus’s version of Frege’s “context principle” (§3.3) and its 
ensuing discussion, including the distinction between symbols and mere signs (see especially §§3.32ff.), secures this 
result.  Cf. Diamond (1981).  (However, a distinction such as this one is not available in Russell’s framework, since 
the relata involved in Russell’s account of judgment correspond more closely to the Tractatus’s “objects” than to its 
symbols.) 
162 
of the Tractatus is the importance of that which is most general, which makes the more specific 
possible. 
 
Indeed, the parallel between “logical forms” and the truth-functional “logical constants” is close 
indeed.  As a matter of fact, Russell in the Theory of knowledge manuscript treats his “logical 
forms” as of a piece with the truth functions and quantifiers, under the heading of “logical 
constants”; he supposes that analogous problems are associated with the epistemological status 
of all of these.  Wittgenstein’s claim that logic needn’t and hence oughtn’t treat the “logical 
constants” as separate special contents is more explicit in the case of the truth functions; but we 
can see in the light of the story I’ve just rehearsed that he holds the same view of Russell’s 
“logical forms.”17  Wittgenstein’s view is that, as soon as we have available an account of 
elementary propositions that explains their fitness to be truth-bearers, we thereby also secure, at 
once, the whole of the truth-functional and quantificational apparatus for them.  (Compare 
§5.442, though similar ideas are expressed frequently in the vicinity.)  Necessary for this, 
Wittgenstein takes it, is the picture theory.  The picture theory explains why truth and falsity are 
(unlike on Moore’s and Russell’s early view) not brute, inexplicable properties of propositions. 
 
(Here compare §6.111: 
 
One could e.g. believe that the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ signify two properties among other properties, and 
then it would appear as a remarkable fact that every proposition possesses one of these properties.  This 
now by no means appears self-evident, no more so than the proposition ‘All roses are either yellow or red’ 
would sound even if it were true. 
 
The example of the roses echoes explicitly a paper of Russell’s from 1904, in which he embraces 
just this consequence of his own view.  In this connection it is worth remarking that Moore’s and 
Russell’s account of truth from that period made the possibility of an account of the inferential 
                                                 
17 McGuinness makes this clear in his (1974). 
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relations in which propositions stand to one another also utterly obscure; from this angle, too, we 
can see how Wittgenstein takes it that a correct account of truth will bring an account of logic 
with it.) 
 
The picture theory also provides an account of the impossibility of nonsensical thought, as we 
have seen.  But the picture theory can be articulated without entering into details about the nature 
of the categories of object—without, that is, a classification of the various ranges of possibility 
of combination into which objects can enter one with another—and likewise without giving a 
specific account of the forms of elementary proposition.  In this way, again, the Tractatus 
presents a conception of logic according to which, though the very fact of categorial structure is 
essential (for essential to the picture theory is the idea that facts, and pictures, and propositions, 
are articulate), it is beyond the purview of logic to give the details of that categorial structure.  
(Cf. §5.5571: “If I cannot give elementary propositions a priori then it must lead to obvious 
nonsense to try to give them.”)  And as we saw in Chapter II, this is sharply opposed to Frege’s 
conception of propositional articulation: for Frege’s view was that to give an account of the 
inferential behaviour of propositions, elementary or not, is at once to give an account of their 
internal structure—and that is to say, a substantive account, not merely a reference to whatever 
structure they might have. 
 
3. Forms of object and configurations of object 
 
The difference I am pointing to between Frege and Russell on the one hand and Wittgenstein on 
the other vis-à-vis the categorial analysis presupposed by logic is more than a simple matter of 
the difference between spelling the analysis out explicitly and leaving it—that very same 
analysis—unsaid.  For it is a real question whether the categorial analysis alluded to so abstractly 
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in the opening pages of the Tractatus is indeed the same as Frege’s (or Russell’s18) at all.  Indeed, 
there is a long tradition of esteemed commentators on the Tractatus who have maintained that 
we are given enough information about that categorial analysis—that is (to put it clumsily), 
about the range of objects’ ranges of possibilities of combination with one another—to know that 
it cannot be Frege’s or Russell’s.  I have in mind the claim, to be found in work of Anscombe, 
Sellars, Ishiguro, and Ricketts19 (among others), that (to a first approximation) the “objects” of 
the Tractatus are particulars—that is, more or less, what Frege too called objects—and the 
“configurations” of these objects that constitute atomic facts (§2.0272) correspond to (some of) 
Frege’s concepts.  If the author of the Tractatus is merely abstracting from (by which I mean, in 
this case, refraining from stating, while all along presupposing) a categorial analysis along the 
lines of Frege’s or Russell’s, then this claim cannot be correct.  For to do this would be to use 
‘object’ to range over Fregean objects, first-level functions (of one place, two places, etc.), 
second-level functions (ditto), and so on—covering the differences among these categories under 
the catch-all idea “form of the object” (§2.0141), that is, “[t]he possibility of its occurrence in 
atomic facts.”  But the readings advanced by Anscombe, Sellars, Ishiguro, and Ricketts depart 
radically from this: for on their readings, the “form of an object” is (in nonTractarian 
terminology) the range of predicates (including relations with other objects) an object admits, 
while predicates themselves vanish entirely from the ontological scene.  As the place of 
                                                 
18 There are significant differences between the categorial structure with which Frege works and that treated by 
Russell.  For example, Hylton has a very helpful paper (1994) discussing the ramifications of the fact that Russell, 
unlike Frege, takes the idea of propositional functions, and not of functions generally, as primitive.  (And in his 
(1997), Hylton argues that we can make good sense of many puzzling passages of the Tractatus if we understand 
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘function’ as of a piece with Russell’s rather than with Frege’s.)  Still, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, I think we can abstract from these important differences between Frege and Russell, and see that 
the concerns motivating Wittgenstein arise equally from both Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of structure. 
19 Anscombe (1959); Sellars (1962); Ishiguro (1969); Ricketts (1996).  Ricketts has told me that he no longer 
subscribes to the claim in question. 
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categorial analysis in the Tractatus is central to our concerns in this enquiry, it is worth pausing 
to assess this claim. 
 
For the sake of having a pair of labels, I shall call readings such as Anscombe’s, Sellars’s, 
Ishiguro’s, and Ricketts’s “particularist”, and any reading according to which Tractarian 
“objects” include properties, relations and so on “Russellian”.  (I use ‘Russellian’ with some 
reluctance, as I don’t wish to communicate the impression that, were the reading I’m calling 
“Russellian” correct, it would imply that Wittgenstein’s conception of categorial structure is 
entirely indistinguishable from Russell’s.  On the contrary, on any reading, there will be 
differences between Wittgenstein and Russell (and Frege) vis-à-vis the place of categorial 
analysis in logic.  Still, the point of the label is to remind us that, however we’re to account for 
the categorial analysis, anyway what categories it consists in lines up more or less with the 
categories employed by Russell (or Frege).20) 
 
a) Objects as particulars, forms as universals: the “particularist” reading 
i. Sellars 
 
Wilfrid Sellars (1962)—although his article is centred around the question whether we should 
think of Tractarian objects as only particulars or else as including also universals—takes §3.1432 
as incontrovertible evidence for the view that Wittgenstein’s account, anyway, is the former.  
§3.1432 reads as follows: 
 
Not: “The complex sign ‘aRb’ says that a stands in the relation R to b,” but rather: that ‘a’ stands in a certain 
relation to ‘b’ says that aRb. 
 
                                                 
20 In view of footnote 18, and since I shall tend in what follows to speak of functions generally rather than of 
propositional functions, the label ‘Fregean’ might have been better than ‘Russellian’.  However, I will frequently use 
‘Fregeanism’ as a label for the view discussed in Chapter II of the relation between categorial analysis and the 
systematisation of inference.  For the sake of disambiguation, then, I’ll use ‘Russellian’ for the reading of the 
Tractatus now under discussion. 
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Sellars does not offer a long argument for his reading of the Tractatus; he simply quotes §3.1432, 
and tells us what it means: 
 
Now in Frege’s system, ‘R’ would be said to stand for (bedeuten) a concept, whereas ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for 
objects.  Thus what Wittgenstein puts by saying that configurations of objects are represented by 
configurations of names (3.21)… could also be put by saying that to represent that certain objects satisfy an 
n-adic concept, one makes their names satisfy an n-adic concept.  Roughly, Wittgenstein’s configurations are 
the counterparts of a sub-set of Frege’s concepts, and Wittgenstein is taking issue with Frege by insisting that 
a perspicuous language would contain no concept words functioning predicatively….  (1962: 227) 
 
Sellars discusses at length a language, which he calls “Jumblese” (and which we touched on in 
our discussion of the functional structure implicit in a begriffsschrift in Chapter II), which 
adheres strictly to this principle: thus, for instance, one might express that a certain object is 
green by writing its name in green ink, or express that one object is beside another by writing 
their names beside each other.  (Note that his claim is not that the linguistic expression of the 
instantiation of a concept must recapitulate precisely the content of the concept itself, as in these 
two examples; on the contrary, Sellars’s own favoured example is the expression of the fact that 
an object is green not by writing its name in green ink but by writing it in boldface.)  I’ll return 
later to some interesting consequences of Sellars’s discussion of this language; for now, I just 
want to record that Sellars takes it as unequivocal that this yields a perspicuous representation of 
Wittgenstein’s account of atomic facts and the elementary propositions that picture them, and 




Elizabeth Anscombe also rejects the view that Tractarian objects might include indifferently 
particulars and universals, or Fregean functions; as she writes: 
 
What… has become of Frege’s ‘concepts’ in Wittgenstein’s theory?  They seem to have disappeared entirely; 
actually, however, instead of making concepts or universals into a kind of objects…, Wittgenstein made the 
gulf between concepts and objects much greater than Frege ever made it….  [I]n respect of having argument-
places, concepts go over entirely into logical forms.  In the ‘completely analysed proposition’, which is ‘a 
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logical network sprinkled with names’, the Fregean ‘concept’, the thing with holes in it, has become simply 
the logical form.  (1959: 108-109) 
 
Now, her view isn’t exactly Sellars’s: for, while Sellars, as we saw, takes §3.1432 at face value, 
and jumps into a discussion of the proper understanding of ‘aRb’ without any preliminaries, 
Anscombe carefully adds the qualification: “in the ‘completely analysed proposition.’”  Thus, for 
instance, while Sellars is happy to treat ‘a is green’ as a proposition whose perspicuous, 
Jumblese (and hence Tractarian) presentation would involve just one name, ‘a’, Anscombe in 
contrast recalls the discussion of colour at §6.3751, which implies that colour ascriptions are not 
elementary propositions, and hence puts her point as follows: 
 
… for Wittgenstein the two facts: A is red, and: B is red, would be analysed into (1) facts corresponding to 
the descriptions of the complexes A and B, and (2) facts about the elements of the complex A along with 
certain further elements, say a, b, c, for A’s redness, and exactly corresponding facts about the elements of the 
complex B along with certain other elements, say d, e, f, for B’s redness.  There is no need for a, b, c, to be 
the same as d, e, f, respectively; for it is only the ‘logical network’ that is ‘universal’.  (1959: 110) 
 
Thus Anscombe does not claim that just anything Frege would regard even as a first-level 
concept is to be understood as a configuration of simple objects.  (And this refinement of 
Sellars’s view will become important for us later.)  But it is clear that Anscombe is still in the 
same camp as Sellars with respect to our question.  For what plays a predicative rôle in the 
propositions with which analysis terminates is the configuration.  And in case our first quotation 
from Anscombe doesn’t make this clear enough, she says explicitly that properties and relations 
cannot be included among Tractarian objects, adding as argument the observation that “if 
Wittgenstein held that objects fell into such radically distinct categories as functions and 




More recently, Thomas Ricketts has given an exposition of the picture theory of the Tractatus 
according to which the ways objects hang together in the atomic fact constitute as it were 
168 
material properties of those objects: thus he works with the example ‘a envies b’, and, like 
Sellars, explains how the Tractatus treatment of such a proposition would find in it just the two 
names ‘a’ and ‘b’, “hanging together” in the proposition in such a way as to represent that the 
two objects named “hang together” in a certain way, namely, that of envying.  This hanging 
together, this configuration, is, as Ricketts flags, “not ‘purely formal’” (1996: 76).  Moreover, 
like Anscombe, he is sensitive to the importance of the assumption that the proposition in 
question is elementary; indeed, parallel to Anscombe’s discussion of colour ascriptions, Ricketts 
argues that the logical structure of ascriptions of spatial relations such as to the right of show that 
they cannot be elementary.  Ricketts motivates his reading of the Tractatus primarily through a 
rich account of its development from Wittgenstein’s unpublished 1913 manuscript “Notes on 
logic,” and a discussion of what certain Tractatus propositions come to on his reading: not 
through outright argument against the “Russellian” alternative, according to which (at least 
some) properties and relations, too, are Tractarian “objects”.  But he gives a quick, suggestive 
argument in a footnote.  In response to the suggestion that a given elementary two-place 
relational proposition should not be understood as consisting in “two things connected by a 
relation”, but rather simply as three objects hanging together as in a chain, Ricketts responds: 
 
This is a peculiar remark.  If an atomic fact is not two objects connected by a relation, then there seems to be 
no ground for calling any constituent thing in it a relation….  This view of relations is utterly unlike either 
Russell’s or Frege’s.  (1996: 98n32.) 
 
iv. Wittgenstein’s illustrations 
 
Finally, Wittgenstein’s own illustrations of his notion of the form of an object seem to offer 
some support for the “particularist” reading.  Consider: 
 
A spatial object must lie in infinite space….  A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a 
colour; it has, so to speak, a colour space round it.  A tone must have a pitch, the object of the sense of 
touch a hardness, etc.  (§2.0131) 
Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.  (§2.0251) 
169 
 
Although it is conceivable that we are not to hold Wittgenstein to these particular examples—and 
his discussion of colour ascriptions at §6.3751, which (as we saw in connection with Anscombe) 
seems to imply that they cannot be elementary, renders the colour examples here rather hard to 
understand—still, it would be odd if these examples were all wildly misleading.  But if the 
“Russellian” reading is right, then the forms of object should be such as: “particular”, “property”, 
“two-place relation of particulars” and so on—quite different from, and quite a lot thinner than, 
anything Wittgenstein adduces in this vicinity as an illustration of his meaning. 
 
b) The “Russellian” reading 
 
Nevertheless, advocates of the “Russellian” reading have shown how good sense can be made, 
after all, of much of the material in the opening pages of the Tractatus even on such a “thin” 
account of forms of object and of configuration (and hence of forms of elementary proposition).  
As we have already seen, historians of Wittgenstein’s thought such as David Pears, Brian 
McGuinness, Peter Hylton and indeed Ricketts have shown how much of it can be seen to 
emerge from his engagement with Russell in the early nineteen-teens, and in particular with the 
problems which prompt Russell to keep changing his mind about the nature of propositions and 
their form from about 1910-1913.  The examples of space, time, colour and tones remain 
puzzling.  But it should be noted that there are other places in the book where Wittgenstein 
adduces examples that line up perfectly with the “Russellian” reading.  Thus: 
 
The elementary proposition consists of names.  Since we cannot give the number of names with different 
meanings, we cannot give the composition of the elementary proposition.  (§5.55) 
Russell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (individuals).  But between 
what numbers?  And how should this be decided—by experience?  (§5.553) 
The enumeration of any special forms would be entirely arbitrary.  (§5.554) 
How could we decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to symbolize 
with a sign of a 27-termed relation?  (§5.5541) 
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The last quoted sentence here gives a concrete, and fully “Russellian”, example of a form.  
Indeed Russell is mentioned in this stretch of text by name.  And if the sort of forms 
Wittgenstein were imagining were not “Russellian” but rather “particularist”, it is hard to see 
how the reasoning contained in the first paragraph quoted here would even join the question 
what elementary forms there are. 
 
And finally, there is, in fact, a good deal of evidence for the claim that, for much of the time 
Wittgenstein is doing his preliminary work for the Tractatus, and indeed writing it up, he has in 
mind what we have been calling “Russellian” forms.  A natural place to look for evidence that 
would help to resolve this dispute would be in the notebooks Wittgenstein kept, and letters he 
wrote, while he worked on what would become the Tractatus, as well as at the records his 
students have kept of the remarks about the Tractatus he made after its publication.  And this sort 
of evidence seems to provide nearly unequivocal support for the “Russellian” reading.  It is true 
that, in a letter to Russell from the beginning of 1913, he wrote: 
 
I have changed my views on “atomic” complexes: I now think that qualities, relations (like love) etc. are all 
copulae!  That means I for instance analyse a subject-predicate proposition, say, “Socrates is human” into 
“Socrates” and “something is human”, (which I think is not complex).  The reason for this is a very 
fundamental one: I think that there cannot be different types of things!  (1914-1916: 120-121 (16.1.13)) 
 
And we find what appear to be echoes of this thought—antecedents of the proposition §3.1432, 
of which we saw Sellars make so much—in his two sets of “Notes on logic” from 1913 and early 
1914.  Indeed, Ricketts, in his 1996 paper expounding a “particularist” account of the picture 
theory, draws a good deal on these notes, before hooking his discussion up with the Tractatus 
itself.  However, we find no trace of this thought in the notebooks from the period 1914-1916, 
which contain the thoughts he recorded between the time of writing of those earlier notes and the 
time of final composition of the Tractatus.  On the contrary, the notebooks open in 
August/September 1914 with frequent reference to “subject-predicate propositions”; the passage 
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quoted earlier from October 1914 also contemplates a “Russellian” form; and later, in June 1915, 
we get the totally explicit remark, “Relations and properties, etc. are objects too” (1914-1916: 61 
(16.6.15)). 
 
And after the publication of the Tractatus—when Wittgenstein is after all very well placed to 
explain what he had in mind in writing it!—he remarks explicitly (in a conversation recorded by 
Desmond Lee in 1930-31), “Objects [as the word was used in the Tractatus] also include 
relations; a proposition is not two things connected by a relation.  Thing and relation are on the 
same level.  The objects hang as it were in a chain” (Wittgenstein, 1930-1932: 120). 
 
c) Excursus on kinds of evidence: “textual”, not “circumstantial” 
 
Now, much of the evidence just canvassed goes a long way to showing what Wittgenstein was 
thinking about as he worked on what would become the Tractatus: namely, quite likely, about 
forms of fact individuated roughly along the lines Russell did (even if not at all conceived as 
Russell conceived of them).  But our real interest is in the question (as we might put it) what he 
should have been thinking about.  That’s a flippant way to put my point: but I mean something 
like, where does the train of thought that he started with—namely, quite probably, with Russell’s 
puzzling doctrines of “logical objects”, and in particular logical forms—properly end up?  Which 
way of understanding the notion of an object, and the correlative notion of a configuration of 
objects, sits better with the other doctrines of the Tractatus?  (Thus, for instance, the mere fact 
that he gives a “Russellian” example of an elementary form at §5.5541 doesn’t by itself tell for 
or against anything—especially in view of the fact that the examples from earlier in the book 
sounded “particularist.”  What we must ask is: whether anything of importance hangs on the 
examples’ being one way or another.)  I don’t want to say that questions of textual interpretation 
are entirely independent of the kind of “intellectual biography” I’ve been discussing—or, more 
172 
generally, of questions of the historical context out of which the ideas under examination arise.  
But I do want to say that the latter can’t exhaust the former: can’t, in this case, straightforwardly 
provide an answer to our interpretative question.  This sort of evidence is suggestive, but it can’t 
be definitive. 
 
To illustrate my point here, it helps to observe that Anscombe and Ricketts both notice this 
textual evidence but take themselves to be justified in dismissing it: thus Anscombe, in response 
to Wittgenstein’s Notebooks remark that “Relations and properties, etc. are objects too,” 
postulates that Wittgenstein must have changed his mind between the Notebooks and the 
Tractatus (though she doesn’t register the similar remarks he makes about the Tractatus post-
publication!), arguing, as we saw earlier, that “if Wittgenstein held that objects fell into such 
radically distinct categories as functions and individuals, it is an incredible omission not to have 
made this clear” (1959: 109n1).  Meanwhile, Ricketts, in the face of the remark Wittgenstein 
made after the Tractatus was published, to the effect that Tractarian objects include relations, 
and “a proposition is not two things connected by a relation,” simply records bafflement at the 
notion of a “relation” that would result, without relenting in his “particularist” reading.  As 
Ricketts puts it: 
 
This is a peculiar remark.  If an atomic fact is not two objects connected by a relation, then there seems to be 
no ground for calling any constituent thing in it a relation.  Whatever Wittgenstein may have had in mind here, 
this view of relations is utterly unlike either Russell’s or Frege’s.  (1996: 98n32) 
 
d) Against the “textual” arguments for the “particularist” reading 
 
Let me start by considering the quick textual argument we just saw Ricketts give: the claim that, 
if relations are to be just another sort of Tractarian object, we can no longer recognise them as 
relations, in anything like Russell’s sense.  I think that the story I told earlier, drawing on the 
work of Pears and McGuinness for instance, about Wittgenstein’s engagement with Russell’s 
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thought equips us to dismiss this argument, by showing us what the point of calling a certain 
object a relation might be. 
 
Consider the crude model of a world with simple objects {a, b, c, d, F, G, R, S}, and with 
existent atomic facts Fa, Fc, Ga, Gb, aRb, bRa, bRc, dRa, aSb, bSa, bSc, bSd, cSd, dSa, dSb, dSc 
and nonexistent atomic facts Fb, Fd, Gc, Gd, aRc, aRd, bRd, cRa, cRb, cRd, dRb, dRc, aSc, aSd, 
cSa, cSb.  Now, the typographical distinctions among the names I’ve given the objects are 
inessential: they’re just a visual aid.  The point is to see that we can reconstruct notions of 
particular, property, and two-place relation from these patterns of combination.  For example, R 
only appears in facts involving two other objects, and F only appears in facts involving one other 
object, while a appears in facts involving either one or two other objects.  On this basis we can 
distinguish among the forms of these objects, in the sense of §2.0141: among the possibilities of 
their occurrence in atomic facts.21 
 
Now, Ricketts would perhaps respond that, nevertheless, what is missing is an account of these 
systematic differences, by appeal to, say, what Frege would call R’s “unsaturatedness”, or as 
Russell might put it, its capacity “actually to relate objects.”  It is presumably in this sense that, 
as Ricketts wrote, “there seems to be no ground for calling any constituent thing in [one of these 
facts] a relation…. [T]his view of relations is utterly unlike either Russell’s or Frege’s.”  But of 
course a “Russellian” reader of the Tractatus, far from hearing it as a criticism, will happily 
embrace this latter implication.  It is Wittgenstein’s “Grundgedanke”, his fundamental thought, 
that the logical constants do not represent: or, otherwise put, that logic is not the science of a 
particular class of objects at all.  And it is on this sort of ground that he rejects both Frege’s 
                                                 
21 Stenius (1960: 69ff.) presents a similar model to illustrate the notion of “forms of object”, though he takes what 
we have been calling the “Russellian” reading to be unequivocally correct. 
174 
account of the functional structure of atomic propositions and Russell’s inclination to explain the 
theory of types in terms of ontological categories rather than simply laying it down as a set of 
symbolic rules (cf. §§3.33f.).  Ricketts’s correct observation that the treatment of relations 
implicit in the “Russellian” understanding of Tractarian objects is very unFregean, and indeed 
unRussellian, is in this sense no objection to the reading. 
 
Let me move on to the solidly “textual” argument with which we began our discussion of the 
“particularist” reading: Sellars’s conviction that §3.1432 is unequivocal: 
 
Not: “The complex sign ‘aRb’ says that a stands in the relation R to b,” but rather: that ‘a’ stands in a certain 
relation to ‘b’ says that aRb. 
 
Now, the first thing to note here, as in fact we did in our discussion of the difference between 
Anscombe’s “particularism” and Sellars’s, is that there is nothing in the text to ground the 
supposition that ‘aRb’ is an elementary proposition.  In fact, §3.1432 appears in a context which 
is palpably a discussion of propositions in general; indeed the possibility of a “completely 
analysed” proposition has not yet been broached. 
 
The second thing to note is that the central point of §3.1432 is the distinction between fact and 
object.  The point is that the picture, like “what’s pictured”, is a fact; and that it pictures by being 
a fact of the same form as the possible fact it pictures.  But this general point can be made 
without any commitment as to which elements of the picture stand for objects and which indicate 
how the objects are with respect to one another. 
 
Now put these two points together.  A theme running through the Tractatus is the idea that: 
 
From [colloquial language] it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logic of language. 
Language disguises the thought: so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the 
thought they clothe….  (§4.002) 
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If what is at issue in §3.1432 is an ordinary-language proposition of the (superficial) form ‘aRb’ 
(and again, there is nothing in the context to suggest that ‘aRb’ is a fully analysed form), then we 
cannot even be sure that ‘a’ and ‘b’ name Tractarian objects, let alone that ‘R’ doesn’t (or 
doesn’t only do this—recall the way Anscombe thinks of  ‘ξ is red’).  Again, without even 
knowing what constituents will show up in the full analysis of a given proposition, I can make 
the general point that displaying expressions in combination (§3.14) constitutes displaying a fact 
(§3.14), and in virtue of that is capable of expressing some other fact.  (This rests ultimately on 
simple names’ going proxy for simple objects, and the proposition’s portraying those objects as 
being a certain way by itself being a certain arrangement of those names—but only ultimately, 
because one cannot tell from the unanalysed proposition what the simple names in question are.)  
But in order to illustrate the point with an example, one must still treat some aspect of one’s 
notation as that which (ultimately) shows how the objects hang together.  This is the rôle that ‘R’ 
is playing at §3.1432.) 
 
Anscombe herself sees something like this—at least, she sees that ‘aRb’ as it occurs in §3.1432 
needn’t be understood to be fully analysed—but she nevertheless argues, as we saw, that “if 
Wittgenstein held that objects fell into such radically distinct categories as functions and 
individuals, it is an incredible omission not to have made this clear” (Introduction, 109n1).  But 
our discussion of Ricketts’s similar rejection of this idea shows also why a “Russellian” can 
simply take Anscombe to be misguided here.  The distinctness of particulars and universals is of 
radical importance for Frege and for Russell (in different ways), but—so the “Russellian” may 






e) Agnosticism about objects and configurations 
 
In short, the case the “particularists” make for their reading(s) of the Tractatus isn’t compelling.  
But the fact that the book even appears to admit of this reading is significant.  As we have 
already noted, one of the steps that Wittgenstein takes to be necessary for a proper understanding 
of the nature of the proposition, of truth and falsity, and of the relation of logic to propositions, is 
the refusal to give an account of the elements of the apparatus of logic—the truth-functional 
operators, the quantifiers, even Russell’s “logical forms”—as though they had (even peculiarly 
“general”) content.  I have been arguing that an analogue of this point applies to the logical 
categories in terms of which one gives an account of elementary propositional articulation as 
well.  Frege, like Russell, takes himself to be obliged to provide a specific account of categorial 
structure as a framework for his logical apparatus; Wittgenstein holds that this is more than 
necessary (and hence impossible).  But by abstracting from the details of the nature of 
propositional articulation, and referring only to the mere fact of such articulation, Wittgenstein 
lays the ground for the possibility that such articulation may not be as either Frege or Russell 
envisions it.  Even if, as a matter of biography, Wittgenstein happened to have in mind, during 
most (but not all) of the period during which he was composing the Tractatus, a categorial 
analysis along the lines of Russell’s or Frege’s (and even if traces of this fact of biography 
remain in some of the wording of the text), the train of thought he pursued ends up at a point 
where, for all logic has to say about it, the structure of elementary propositions might be quite 
other than that. 
 
4. Functions in the Tractatus 
 
We have seen, first by reflection on the contrast between Frege’s treatment of quantification and 
Wittgenstein’s, then by considering how the remarks in the early pages of the Tractatus on 
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“forms of object” and the picture theory emerged from an engagement with Russell’s puzzles 
over “logical forms,” that an important element in the Tractarian account of logic—indeed, one 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s “Grundgedanke”—is its refusal to give a specific account of the 
categories of “object” in which elementary propositions are articulated.  Now, this is significant 
because it represents, precisely, a divergence from “Fregeanism” as I characterised it in Chapter 
II.  As we saw then (e.g. in our discussion of the work of Ricketts and Dummett), Frege’s 
functional distinction between object and concept (and its generalisation up the hierarchy) is of a 
piece with his account of quantification.  But Wittgenstein, in response to the difficulties Russell 
faced in giving an account of propositions in terms of their categorial articulation, means 
explicitly to refrain from getting into the details of this categorial articulation.  Logic begins with 
the capacity for propositions to be true or false22, which is explained in terms of picturing; the 
account of this in turn is explicitly given in terms of articulation, but that is to say, in terms of the 
very idea of articulation, not of a particular account of it.  And as we saw in the first section of 
the present chapter, Wittgenstein’s account of generality, too, does indeed rely on the notion of 
articulation at the level of the elementary proposition; but it refrains, again, from giving an 
account of that articulation (except to “locate” it, as it were, in the objects, in contrast with 
Russell’s attempt to make “logical forms” further relata involved in propositional attitudes). 
 
In short, while both Frege’s remarks about objects and functions and the notion of the form of an 
object deployed in the opening pages of the Tractatus speak to the question of the articulation of 
elementary propositions, indeed in both cases on the basis of considerations deriving from 
reflection on inference, the significant difference (from the point of view of the present enquiry) 
is that Frege takes the content of the categorial analysis, even at the level of elementary 
                                                 
22 I take it that this is the import of §5.5521, for instance: “… if there were a logic, even if there were no world, how 
then could there be a logic, since there is a world?” 
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propositions, to be settled by that reflection on inference, while the doctrine of the Tractatus is 
precisely the reverse of this.  And it is in this sense that I reject Rödl’s claim that the Tractatus is 
a more thorough expression of Fregeanism about the structure of thought than Frege’s own work.  
We saw in Chapter II that the controlling thought of Frege’s account of propositional articulation 
was precisely that it could provide the framework for a systematisation of inference—if not, 
indeed, that it would be yielded by such a systematisation.  But what we have just seen about the 
Tractatus is that its conception, sketched in the opening pages, of the unity of the elements of an 
elementary thought does not fit that description. 
 
However, there is one serious objection I must consider to this contention of mine that the 
Tractarian conception of elementary propositional structure is unFregean.  For Wittgenstein 
writes, “I conceive the proposition—like Frege and Russell—as a function of the expressions 
contained in it” (§3.318); and later and more generally, “Where there is composition, there is 
argument and function” (§5.47).  It thus sounds as though, even if Wittgenstein does not 
conceive of it as logic’s task to specify the particular categories into which simple objects fall, 
still those categories must be such as to be susceptible of an analysis in functional terms.  If 
indeed he is not thinking of the very same categories as Frege—the only difference being that, 
where Frege took the explicit specification of the categories to be a necessary part of logical 
theory, Wittgenstein is claiming that it is unnecessary and hence inappropriate—then, at any rate, 
even so, he is not thinking of them as unamenable to the sort of function-argument analysis I 
claimed in Chapter II was characteristic of the Fregean conception of propositional articulation. 
 
The point perhaps appears more acute when we see, in the sections following §5.47, that the 
appeal to function-argument analysis bears even more similarities to Frege’s than so far recorded.  
Thus at §5.523 we are told that “The generality symbol occurs as an argument”: and this point 
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appears to be akin to Frege’s, that the attribution of function-argument structure to a content of 
possible judgment becomes univocal when that content involves generality.23  Now, of course, 
this is not to say that Wittgenstein’s conception of the functional articulation of elementary 
propositions is Fregean in every detail; on the contrary, for instance, it is well-known that 
Wittgenstein utterly rejects Frege’s conception of propositions as having truth values as 
Bedeutungen, and so the particular account Wittgenstein would give of the functional 
composition of an elementary proposition (if he thought it proper to give one at all) would be 
different from Frege’s.  Instead, as §3.318 implies, in understanding a Satz as composed of 
function and argument, it is the proposition itself, not a truth value, that is the value of the 
function in question.  This is of a piece with Hylton’s observation (mentioned in note 18 above) 
that frequently for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, as for Russell in Principia mathematica, 
‘function’ tout court means propositional function.  However, in explicating “Fregeanism” in 
Chapter II, I explicitly included as exemplars approaches that refrained from understanding 
predicates, with Frege, as functions into the set of truth values.  What I argued there was of a 
piece with Fregeanism about the relation between propositional articulation and the 
systematisation of inference was the bare idea that the former was to be understood in function-
analytical terms.  And this, §§3.318, 5.47 and 5.523 suggest, appears to be present in the 
Tractatus as well. 
 
(Another way of putting this objection would be to say that, contrary to the thrust of this chapter 
so far, the fact that the author of the Tractatus neglects to give a specific account of the 
categorial structure of elementary propositions is after all inessential: for the various remarks just 
                                                 
23 “For us the different ways in which the same conceptual content can be taken as a function of this or that 
argument has no importance so long as function and argument are fully determined.  But if the argument becomes 
indeterminate… then the distinction between function and argument acquires significance with regard to content” 
(Begriffsschrift, §9; emphasis in original). 
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quoted reveal that he takes it to be functional—if not in exactly Frege’s sense, then anyway in a 
sense sufficient to brand his view a version of “Fregeanism” as we used that term in Chapter II.) 
 
A quick response to this objection might run as follows:  We have already seen that 
Wittgenstein’s account of generality, though it makes reference to the articulation of elementary 
propositions, makes no reference to the particular way(s) in which they are articulated.  Whereas 
(again recalling Ricketts’s and Dummett’s expositions) the grounds for Frege’s distinction 
between singular terms and predicates appear to lie in his treatment of inferences involving 
generality—or, if that is too much to say, it is at least the case that the two notions are 
profoundly linked—Wittgenstein treats all elements of atomic facts as “objects”, likewise all 
elements of elementary pictures as “names”, and any expression characterising the sense of an 
elementary proposition as a potential basis upon which to launch a collection of propositions 
over which to generalise, by replacing that expression with a (propositional) variable.  If 
Wittgenstein persists in using function-argument vocabulary to speak of the elements of 
elementary propositions, goes the quick response to the objection, this is an inessential relic from 
his having inherited his problems from Frege and Russell.  If the claim that elementary 
propositional structure is functional in character does no work, then (by the Tractatus’s own 
principles) it should be abandoned. 
 
Now, it would be more satisfying if we could somehow demonstrate that the function-argument 
vocabulary of the Tractatus is inert.  (The quick response just sketched would, after all, 
otherwise be rather uncharitable: for §§3.318, 5.47 and 5.523 (as well as other passages 
involving the same vocabulary) are awfully unambiguous.)  And to this end, we can put a finer 
point on our question:  Can we have, on the Tractarian conception of propositional articulation, 
two propositions consisting of the very same elements, where what differentiates between them 
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is only the mode of combination?  (Compare our parallel enquiry in Chapter II vis-à-vis Frege.)  
If not, then there can be no harm in Wittgenstein’s references to the articulation of elementary 
propositions as functional. 
 
The assertion that the elementary proposition “is a connexion, a concatenation, of names” 
(§4.22) may suggest that the answer to this question is no: the mode of combination alone will 
never distinguish two elementary propositions consisting of the same elements.  (I am setting 
aside the case of a difference in order, which we may suppose can serve to indicate the 
difference between propositions—of the same logical form, of course—involving asymmetrical 
relations relating objects of the same form: e.g. the difference between ‘a is darker than b’ and ‘b 
is darker than a’.)  The word ‘concatenation’, after all, suggests that there is just one mode of 
combination of names.  And recalling our discussion of Wittgenstein’s engagement with 
Russell’s puzzles about “logical forms”, it may seem as though this is the shape the Tractarian 
account must take.  For if, even having settled the question what objects (with what forms) 
constitute a certain proposition, we have not yet identified the proposition, on the grounds that 
different propositions with different forms can consist of the very same objects, it is hard to see 
how we have any advance over Russell: it looks as though, to characterise the proposition 
completely, we must describe, over and above its objects, its form. 
 
However, first of all, we oughtn’t get too hung up on ‘concatenation’.  It (more properly, the 
word in German it renders, ‘Verkettung’) appears in the book only once.  The proposition 
commenting directly on §4.22 adds: elementary propositions “consist of names in immediate 
combination” (§4.221).  To say that the combination of names is immediate (“unmittelbar”), not 
mediated, is to say that no further element provides the link between name and name.  But all the 
other discussions of the structure of atomic facts, elementary pictures and elementary 
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propositions fulfil this requirement while having no implication that there need be only one mode 
of combination for a given (ordered) collection of elements: 
 
An atomic fact is a connection of objects (entities, things)…. 
The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact. 
In the atomic fact objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain. 
In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way. 
The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact…. 
The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way…. 
That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things 
are so combined with one another…. 
The propositional sign consists in the fact that its elements, the words, are combined in it in a definite way…. 
The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial 
objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. 
The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.  (§§2.01, 2.0272ff., 
2.14, 2.15, 3.14, 3.1431) 
 
None of these ways of expressing the idea of atomic or elementary articulation implies that there 
can be only one “definite way” for a given set of elements to be combined; indeed many of them 
positively suggest that there can be many.  This is entirely compatible with the essence of 
Wittgenstein’s resolution of Russell’s puzzles about “logical forms”, which is to dispense with 
the idea that they are further constituents of propositions needing their own substantive account.  
There are objects, which have it in them to hang together with one another in various ways (and 
again, the point is that the ranges of such possibilities “lie in the nature of the objects”, and do 
not need to be accounted for separately from them); there are facts, which consist of objects’ 
doing so; there are pictures of such facts, in which pictorial elements go proxy for the objects and 
hang together with one another in the same ways in which the objects can do so; and in particular 
(an instance of this last) there are elementary propositions, in which the pictorial elements are 
names.  And this is enough, according to the Tractatus, to secure propositions’ position as truth-
bearers, which is in turn enough to bring with it the whole of logic. 
 
If this is right, then the abstraction from the details of categorial structure with which, since the 
beginning of this chapter, we have been dealing, can be understood to extend even as far as 
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abstracting from the question whether elements can be combined in more than one way—and 
that is, whether such combination is susceptible of analysis in functional terms.  That 
Wittgenstein (once) chooses the word ‘concatenation’ is meant to remind us not to look for a 
further element mediating the combination of names in an elementary proposition (and objects in 
an atomic fact), not to insist that there can be only one mode of combination.  And that 
Wittgenstein (rather more than once) speaks about elementary propositional structure in terms of 
function and argument can be interpreted not as an essential feature of his account (for he does 
not make use of it24) but as a relic of the way in which his interlocutors had framed the 
discussion. 
 
5. Formalisability and the route to Wittgenstein’s later work 
 
But if the details of the categorial structure of elementary propositions (though not the very fact 
of that structure)—even the question whether that structure is functional in character—are 
beyond the scope of logical theory, what becomes of the idea of the formalisability of formal 
inference?  For recall our argument from Chapter II: we maintained there that formalisability 
presupposes amenability to some form of function-argument analysis. 
 
Essential to the Tractatus’s conception of inference is the dictum, “[t]hat the truth of one 
proposition follows from the truth of other propositions, we perceive from the structure of the 
propositions” (§5.13).  Together with the idea that “[w]e can bring out these internal relations [sc. 
                                                 
24 Does he not make use of it even in his account of expressions?  Again, §3.318: “I conceive the proposition—like 
Frege and Russell—as a function of the expressions contained in it.”   But the account of expressions itself, 
immediately preceding this proposition, makes no essential use of the notion of a function.  True, “[a]n expression 
is… presented by a variable, whose values are the propositions which contain the expression” (§3.313)—but 
Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the approach of giving an account of such a propositional variable as a function from 
some class of arguments into the set of propositions.  What is essential to the idea of a propositional variable is 
simply that it has a list of values.  “What values the propositional variable can assume is determined.  The 
determination of the values is the variable.  The determination of the values of the propositional variable is done by 
indicating the propositions whose common mark the variable is….  The determination will therefore deal only with 
symbols not with their meaning….  The way in which we describe the propositions is not essential” (§§3.316f.). 
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those in which the structures of propositions stand to one another] in our manner of expression, 
by presenting a proposition as the result of an operation which produces it from other 
propositions” (§5.21), this sounds very much like an expression of the idea that a notational 
system can be devised so as to render all such inferential relations patent.  And this in turn 
sounds like a version of the Fregeanism we described in Chapter II.  Indeed, after discussing the 
fact that, in ordinary language, we often use the same sign with different meanings (indeed, as 
his examples suggest, with meanings of different logical categories, though he does not say this 
explicitly), he continues: 
 
In order to avoid these errors, we must employ a sign language [Zeichensprache] which excludes them, by 
not applying the same sign in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which signify in 
different ways.  A sign language, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar—of logical 
syntax.  (§3.325) 
 
And if this very “sign language” is to be the one in which we bring out the internal relations 
among propositions so as to reveal their inferential connections—and there is no indication in the 
work that it is not—then it looks very hard indeed to maintain that his conception of logical 
structure is meant to be any less of a piece with the systematisation of inference than the 
conception discussed in Chapter II. 
 
This may well seem unsurprising if (as suggested by our discussion of the “biographical” 
question what categorial analysis he had in mind when writing the Tractatus, even if the official 
Tractatus doctrine is to abstract from its content) Wittgenstein is taking Frege’s and Russell’s 
notational systems as for the most part acceptable, and jibbing primarily at the explanations they 
give for their systems.  Passages such as the following (picking up where the previous quotation 
left off) reinforce this impression: 
 
The logical symbolism [Begriffsschrift] of Frege and Russell is such a language [sc. one which obeys the 
rules of logical grammar], which, however, does still not exclude all errors.  (§3.325) 
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(It “does still not exclude all errors” because, for instance, Wittgenstein appears to advocate for 
the elimination of the identity sign, on the grounds that, “Roughly speaking: to say of two things 
that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say 
nothing” (§5.5303).  But even in this case, the conclusion of his discussion is simply that ‘=’ “is 
therefore not an essential constituent of logical notation” (§5.533), not that everyone ought to 
stop using it.  And as for the case of the truth-functional connectives, Wittgenstein nowhere 
insists that they would be absent from an ideal notational system; his claim is merely that they 
“do not represent”, that is, that the explanations Frege and Russell give with their introduction of 
the logical constants are illegitimate.  Analogously, Hylton has suggested, plausibly, that 
Wittgenstein does not reject the import of Russell’s theory of types, but only his explanation of 
it.) 
 
But it is worth keeping in mind that the goal of the Tractatus is not, after all, to devise a 
begriffsschrift, as it was quite clearly Frege’s goal to do, for instance.  Wittgenstein’s goal for the 
work is to enquire into the nature of logic, motivated by dissatisfaction with some of Frege’s and 
Russell’s remarks—made, as it happens, in the course of devising begriffsschriften.  In this sense, 
Wittgenstein was not setting out to revise the notational systems of Frege and Russell, much less 
to argue against the very possibility of such a system—but nor was he closed to the prospect that 
his enquiries might result in the requirement of some revision (as the case of identity suggests).  
Thus, even if we shouldn’t be surprised that he begins by taking for granted, in some sense, the 
availability of an adequate formalisation of inference, indeed one which at once yields an 
exhaustive account of propositional articulation, we can still ask whether the philosophy of logic 
to which he is driven doesn’t risk undermining it. 
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And again, we have argued that reflection on logic—on generality, and on the way in which the 
nature of propositional unity secures the aptitude of propositions for truth and falsity, and so the 
applicability to them of logic itself—leads Wittgenstein to generalise the idea of elementary 
propositional structure.  We have argued, indeed, that this idea is generalised to a point where 
(even if Wittgenstein does not notice this) even the question whether it can be construed in 
functional terms (in such a way that it is even available for the kind of integration into a broader 
account of inference that Frege’s approach constitutes) is left open. 
 
And indeed, the examples Wittgenstein gives in the opening pages of the Tractatus of this now 
broadened notion of elementary propositional structure—or rather, the examples he gives of the 
forms of object occurring in atomic facts, whose forms are shared with the names going proxy 
for them in elementary propositions—betray some tension with the account of inference to 
follow.  Wittgenstein tells us that “[s]pace, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects” 
(§2.0251).25  We might have expected this to hook up with the account of inference to follow: 
 
If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this expresses itself in relations in which the 
forms of these propositions stand to one another… these relations are internal, and exist as soon as, and by 
the very fact that, the propositions exist.  (§5.131) 
 
That is, since the notion of the form of an elementary proposition of course moves in tandem 
with the notion of the forms of the names occurring in it, the examples of forms of object cited 
above might lead us to suppose that such forms are relevant not just to inference involving 
generality but also to immediate inferential relations among elementary propositions.26  But it is 
                                                 
25 I don’t mean to suggest that Wittgenstein is absolutely committed to this list; indeed the result of our discussion 
above of the “particularist” and the “Russellian” readings suggests that he can’t be (though he certainly does state it 
categorically enough, at least at this stage in the dialectic).  But the examples are instructive, regardless whether we 
are eventually intended to throw them away. 
26 After all, space, time and colour have structure, and indeed internal structure, in the sense used at §5.131 (and 
explicated at §§4.122ff.).  “We [could not] present spatially an atomic fact… which contradicted the laws of 
geometry” (§3.0321)—but if “the laws of geometry” are included in the form of spatial objects—and it is hard to see 
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well known that the Tractatus denies that any such relations obtain: “[f]rom an elementary 
proposition no other can be inferred” (§5.134).  More generally, the talk of particular forms 
seems to disappear when we get to the account of inference in terms of truth operations offered 
in the §§4s and 5s.  Again, the very fact of elementary propositional structure is relevant to 
inference, in the sense that we can form general propositions by deploying truth operations on a 
set of elementary propositions collected in virtue of some structural property they have in 
common—some shared expression, for instance; and of course general propositions will, in 
general, stand in inferential relations with the elementary propositions that constitute the bases of 
their formation, as well as with other results of truth operations on those elementary propositions.  
But there is no room in this account of inference for systematic differences in the rôles names of 
different forms play in inference.  Indeed, this much follows immediately from what we saw in 
the §§5.55s about how it is not for logic to canvass the forms of elementary proposition. 
 
But what these reflections highlight is an incipient tension within the Tractatus.  On the one hand, 
it is true that the details of the account of inference are given exclusively in terms of the general 
theory of truth operations, and indeed the term ‘logical’ tends to be reserved for this sort of 
context.27  But on the other hand, the examples Wittgenstein feels inclined to give of objects’ 
forms in the early pages bring out the sense in which elements of the Tractatus picture contain 
the resources for recognising the relevance of particular forms for inference (that is, not merely 
for inference involving generality, drawing on the abstract notion of elementary propositional 
structure but not on its details; but also for inference whose validity depends precisely on those 
particular details).  It is a further commitment to the idea that truth operations exhaust inference 
                                                                                                                                                             
what the point of such a notion of form would be otherwise—then “we could not present” such a (putative) atomic 
fact in any way. 
27 But there are exceptions: e.g., in §§2.012 and 2.0233, before a word has been breathed about the truth functions 
and such, the word ‘logic’ is quite explicitly associated with forms of objects. 
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which leads Wittgenstein, in conflict with those elements of the picture, to adopt the axiom of 
independence of elementary propositions, and hence for instance to claim that what at first 
appears to be (and indeed, as we saw, was given explicitly as an example of) a particular form of 
objects, namely colour, must in fact resolve into truth-functional relations: at §6.3751. 
 
Now, by the words “further commitment” I do not mean to suggest that the commitment to the 
truth-operationality of inference is superficial or gratuitous.  On the contrary, its motivation runs 
quite deep.  Briefly, I think it runs something like as follows:  We have seen that Wittgenstein’s 
“Grundgedanke” is that the “logical constants” (taken in a suitably broad sense) do not represent: 
that what is most unsatisfactory about both Frege’s and Russell’s approaches to explaining their 
notation is the implication that logical notions have content, and that logic is thus just the special 
science of this (admittedly very “general”) content.  His response to this is, in broad strokes, 
what he refers to as “our fundamental principle [Grundsatz]”: “that every question which can be 
decided at all by logic can be decided off-hand” (§5.551).  A bit more explicitly: 
 
It  is clear that everything which can be said beforehand about the form of all propositions at all can be said 
on one occasion…. 
One could say: the one logical constant is that which all propositions, according to their nature, have in 
common with one another.  (§5.47) 
 
His N-operation is designed to show how he can derive both truth-functional and (he believes) 
quantificational inference in this way, all at once, from the mere idea of truth- and falsity-
aptitude.  His pre-Tractatus notebooks contain much agonising over identity in this connection: 
and the solution upon which he eventually hits, which we have already discussed, is to argue that 
identity isn’t essential to logic at all.  But the thought that the particular forms of simple object, 
and so of elementary proposition, could also be relevant to inference would immediately and 
obviously undermine this approach.  (For one thing, such forms are not something “which all 
propositions, according to their nature, have in common with one another.”)  Indeed, the 
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“Grundsatz” quoted above is given, precisely, as a reason to hold that giving a catalogue of the 
elementary forms is not part of the province of logic. 
 
Even so, as I say, the axiom of independence for elementary propositions stands in some tension 
with the picture theory, as is illustrated by his seemingly contradictory approach to colour 
discussed above.  It is telling that his attempt at the resolution of colour ascriptions into more 
elementary, logically independent propositions fails—and more telling still that, once 
Wittgenstein recognises this tension in his work, he rejects, precisely, the axiom of 
independence, and embraces the relevance of particular forms for inference.  This is perfectly 
explicit in “Some remarks on logical form,” a paper written in 1929.  There he realises that 
(contrary to the doctrine of the independence of elementary propositions) there are propositions 
which can’t be construed as truth-operational combinations of simpler propositions, but which 
stand in logical relations one to another: in particular, propositions involving matters of degree—
and he gives as his example colour ascriptions to places in the visual field.  The conception of 
inference as a matter of the structure of propositions is there retained; the claim that there are 
“ever so many different logical forms”28 is emphasised—even the truth-table method is retained 
(albeit in a modified form: for the non-independence of elementary propositions, Wittgenstein 
sees, requires us to discount those rows of a truth table which don’t represent “actual 
possibilities”29). 
 
This post-Tractatus rejection of the independence axiom is momentous, as is to be expected in 
the light of the sketch of its motivation I gave above.  In that same paper Wittgenstein writes: 
 
… we can only arrive at a correct analysis [of a proposition into its elementary constituents] by, 
what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e.,  in a certain 
                                                 
28 (1929:31, Wittgenstein’s italics).  The context makes clear that what is meant is forms of elementary proposition. 
29 We shall examine this point more closely below. 
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sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori possibilities….  An atomic form cannot 
be foreseen.  (1929: 30) 
 
This echoes language from the Tractatus: the §§5.55s, as we have already seen, answer in the 
negative the question whether elementary propositional forms can be given a priori, adding the 
remark, “Only that which we ourselves construct can we foresee” (§5.556).  So the claim, new to 
the 1929 paper, that, nevertheless, this analysis of elementary propositions is necessary for logic 
is in effect a concession that the “Grundsatz” of that book was misguided: logical questions 
cannot all be decided off-hand, and their answers do not all fall out, at once, of the very nature of 
the proposition.  We may need to reflect on (sc. our thought about) the subject matter in question 
in order to arrive at its form—but this reflection is a logical, not an empirical, investigation. 
 
This last claim is important.  Wittgenstein is by no means intending to abandon the study of logic 
with this turn to the “in a certain sense a posteriori” investigation of the phenomena.  On the 
contrary, the importance of the fact, if not the content, of elementary propositional structure has 
been present from the beginning of Wittgenstein’s enquiries; and the shift of attention now under 
consideration to the content of that structure was also driven by considerations of inference.  
What I argued earlier in this chapter was that, unlike Frege, whose conception of (even 
elementary) propositional structure equated it with the structure assigned to propositions by a 
systematisation of inference, the Tractatus holds that elementary propositional structure is not a 
matter relevant to logical enquiry.  Whereas Frege (and, in his own way, Russell) finds among 
the logical categories into which elementary propositional elements fall only those austere 
enough to be (allegedly) common to all judgments, whatever their subject matter—(Fregean) 
object, first-level function of one or two places, etc.—the author of the Tractatus (even if 
perhaps tacitly supposing that categorial analysis to be correct) makes room for the possibility of 
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a much wider, and richer, range of categories.  And the author of “Some remarks on logical 
form” embraces this possibility. 
 
Now, “Some remarks on logical form” may appear “Fregean” in its attitude toward logical 
categories after all—for it suggests that the systematic treatment of inference in the form of the 
truth-tabular method can accommodate this enrichment of the logical categories, by (as described 
briefly above) crossing out the rows of a truth table whose putative truth-value assignments have 
been revealed, through our “logical investigation of the phenomena,” not to be genuine 
possibilities.  But quick reflection on this idea exposes its bankruptcy—or, at least, its distance 
from anything like the kind of formal system that is at the heart of the “Fregeanism” we 
discussed in Chapter II.  When we recognise that the logic of truth functions is not sufficient to 
validate the argument attributed to De Morgan, “Every horse is an animal, so every horse’s head 
is the head of an animal”, we do not simply enrich the truth table for the two sentences by 
discounting the row where the premise is true and conclusion false.  If we knew to do that, we 
would already know that the argument was valid, and would not need the truth-tabular method to 
begin with.  On the contrary, we abandon the truth tables and deploy the finer-grained method of 
quantificational proofs.  The case here is analogous: if, before we can “apply the truth-tabular 
method” to arguments involving logically dependent elementary propositions, we must know in 
what logical relations the propositions stand, then we are not obviously in need of the truth-
tabular method; and even if we should choose to use it, the procedure as a whole—drawing up 
the table, enquiring into the “phenomena” and crossing out rows of the table accordingly, and 
192 
then checking the values in the remaining rows—does not itself amount to a mechanical method, 
even if the last step does.30 
 
Analogous considerations, by the way, hold of the “system” Sellars attempts to derive from the 
Tractatus itself.  We saw earlier that Sellars reads the Tractatus not as refraining from settling 
the question how to understand elementary propositional forms but rather as, quite explicitly, 
placing everything predicative in the “form”, leaving only particulars as objects.  Observing that 
Wittgenstein’s own displays of notation in the Tractatus tend not to respect this reading (but 
rather are in “PMese”, that is, the notation of Principia mathematica), Sellars describes a 
language, “Jumblese”, which would more perspicuously illustrate Tractarian doctrines about 
elementary propositions, in which (as, again, we discussed above) one expresses that two objects 
stand in a certain relation by placing their names in a certain relation without using a further 
symbol to “stand for” that relation, and one expresses that an object has a certain property by 
writing its name in a certain way, again without using a further symbol (but rather, perhaps, 
using a special typeface or colour).  He recognises that this raises the following problem: how 
are we to understand second-order quantification, if elementary propositions perspicuously 
written do not contain predicate symbols?31  How will we indicate what a quantifier “over 
predicates” binds, if predication is represented not by separate symbols standing for predicates 
but by the manner in which we write the names in the proposition? 
                                                 
30 One reason for which Wittgenstein repudiated this paper as “weak” so soon after he wrote it might be that he saw 
just the point made in the text: namely, that the recognition of the logical significance of elementary structure had 
much deeper implications for formalisability than the paper registered.  (Another reason—closely enough related to 
the first that they could both be right—may be that he realised, a little belatedly, the deep implications the 
abandonment of the independence axiom would have for what we referred to above as the “Grundsatz” of the 
Tractatus.) 
31 That this question has the force that it surely does is related to the point I made earlier, to the effect that, for the 
most part, Wittgenstein is taking for granted the essentials of the begriffsschriften of Frege and Russell, and 
enquiring primarily into the account to be given of them.  A reading of the Tractatus according to which higher-
order quantification is a flat-out impossibility would be, ceteris paribus, quite awkward—not least because 
Wittgenstein occasionally refers to second-order quantification without remark, as e.g. at §5.5261, but also because 
a divergence that fundamental from Frege’s and Russell’s logic would surely warrant some comment. 
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Sellars sketches an answer to this question by presenting the following “schema for translation 
from PMese into Jumblese”:32  
  PMese     Jumblese 
 
I.  Names of particulars 
a, b, c, … The same letters written in a variety of neutral 
styles, the variety being a matter of height, the 
neutrality a matter of the use of the ordinary font: 
 a, b, c, …; a, b, c, …; a, b, c, … 
 
II.  Statements (not including relational statements, which will be discussed shortly) 
 Green a, red a, …   a, a, … 
 
III.  Statement functions 
 (1)  Predicate  constant, individual variable: 
 Green x, red y, …   x, y, … 
 (2)  Predicate  variable, individual constant: 
 fa, gb, …    Names in neutral styles (see I): 
a, …; a, …; a, … 
 (3)  Predicate  variable, individual variable: 
 fx, gy, …    Name variables in neutral styles: 
x, y, z, …; x, y, z, …; x, y, z, … 
 
IV.  Quantification 
 (∃x) green x   (∃x) x 
 (∃f) fa, (∃g) ga, …   (∃() a, (∃() a, … 
 (∃f) (∃x) fx, (∃g) (∃x) gx, … (∃() (∃x) x, (∃() (∃x) x, … 
 
[V.  Relational statements] 
 Larger (ab), Redder (ab)  ab, ba 
 R(ab), S(ab), T(ab), …  ab, a b, a  b, … 
 Larger (xy), Redder (xy), … xy, yx, … 
 R(xy), S(xy), …   xy, x y, x  y, … 
 (∃x) (∃y) Larger (xy)  (∃x) (∃y) xy 
 (∃R) R(ab), (∃S) S(ab), …  (∃ ..) ab, (∃ . .) a b, … 
 (∃R) (∃x) (∃y) R(xy)  (∃ ..) (∃x) (∃y) xy 
 
 
But it is surely clear, though Sellars appears not to register the fact, that this is not a formal 
system (unless we are to constrain its expressive power very sharply, by setting limits on the 
                                                 
32 The following is, apart from a couple of inessential notational modifications, a quotation from Sellars (1962: 14-
15, 16). 
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number of predicates and predicate variables it contains).  For consider: we could perhaps agree, 
in the case of monadic predicate variables, to vary the height of the names we write by (say) one 
millimetre at a time: so that, in place of a standard system’s infinite number of predicate 
variables φ1, φ2 and so on, we would write names (or parentheses, in the case of predicate 
quantification) 1mm high, 2mm high and so on.  This would of course be wildly impractical, but 
would not be at variance with the principle of a formal system.  And we could do something 
analogous for the dyadic predicate variables: settling on a horizontal distance between names of, 
say, 1mm at a time to correspond with ψ1, ψ2 and so on.   However, consider the case of 
particular dyadic relational predicates: we must have an unending range of orientations in which 
to write two names, and we must be able to discriminate among them. The case of particular 
monadic predications is, if anything, even worse: we must have an unending supply of different 
fonts, provided in advance (since one hallmark of a formal system is that it is settled what counts 
as a formula of the system) and discriminable one from another.  –In case it should appear that I 
am being unduly harsh on Sellars by quibbling with his decision to represent different predicates 
by writing names in different fonts, consider the point in this way.  Suppose we chose, instead, to 
write an object’s name in a given colour to say that the object was of that colour.  We would 
have to have at our disposal the whole range of colours—and we would have to be able to 
discriminate between any two colours, however close to one another they are.  In short, to 
exchange “PMese” for “Jumblese” is to replace the countable sets of predicates of each n-arity 
with “manners of writing names” which will have to have all the richness, all the “mathematical 
multiplicity” in Wittgenstein’s phrase, of the properties they’re meant to express—where this can 
involve (since after all predicates do involve) structures as rich as the real numbers (for instance).  
Whatever interest Sellars’s system of notation holds, it does not show that the conception of 
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predication underlying “Jumblese” can provide a basis for a formalisation of higher-order 
quantification analogous to Frege’s or Russell’s. 
 
I don’t know whether, presented with this objection, Sellars would have bitten the bullet and held 
that the conception of elementary structure in the Tractatus tacitly undermined the idea of 
formalisability (though the fact that he felt constrained to provide the account of second-order 
quantification he provided, such as it was, suggests that he would at least have felt 
uncomfortable about this).  My claim is weaker than this: my claim is that, though Wittgenstein 
proceeds in the Tractatus as though formalisability along the lines of Frege’s (or Russell’s) 
begriffsschrift is unproblematic, he generalises the notion of elementary structure sufficiently to 
render the question of formalisability, as a matter of fact, open; and in his next work, he does 
embrace a conception of such structure that, indeed, is recalcitrant to formalisation in this sort of 
way (though he doesn’t register the fact in the paper itself). 
 
And (as a very rough sketch of the next stage in the train of thought represented by 
Wittgenstein’s career), once this recalcitrance to formalisability sinks in, the “logical 
investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e.,  in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by 
conjecturing about a priori possibilities” takes centre stage, now with no presumption that the 
result of the investigation must be a systematisation of inference.  Once the project of 
constructing a begriffsschrift is abandoned—or, at any rate, once this “logical investigation of 
the phenomena” ceases to be conceived as of a piece with the construction of a begriffsschrift—
the very distinction between “elementary” and other propositions loses some of its point.  But 
this doesn’t imply that the investigation of (to put it roughly) how the elements of our thought 
hang together must not be considered a logical enquiry, or an enquiry into the structure of 
discourse (or, perhaps better, structures, now that we have made room for the possibility that 
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different “phenomena” will evince different logical behaviour), rather than a psychological or 
anthropological one.  As we discussed in the chapter on Wittgenstein’s later work, §92 of the 
Philosophical investigations acknowledges the appropriateness of the term ‘structure’ (of 
language) for the description of the object of those investigations, even while insisting that their 
context is quite different from the investigation of a complete, unitary inferential system. 
 
And it is in this context that we can understand, finally, the sense in which Thompson, though he 
gives us no materials for the construction of a formal treatment of natural-historical judgments, 
can still be said to be engaged in an investigation of their logical form.  In the coda that follows, I 





Coda.  The conception of logical form that emerges from our reflections. 
 
I embarked on this project with a view to explaining the sense of ‘logical form’ at issue in 
(among other places) Thompson’s claim that what he calls natural-historical judgments have a 
distinct logical form, partly by hooking it up with (not only the later but also the earlier) work of 
Wittgenstein.  So far (and we are almost at the end of the investigation), our results have been 
primarily negative.  I began, in Chapter II, by describing, for the purposes of contrast, what I take 
to be, at least in abstraction from differences in detail, the mainstream understanding of the way 
in which the notion of logical form is applied to the compositional structure of a judgment, with 
its roots in Frege’s invention of the begriffsschrift (recognising all the while, as discussed in 
Chapter I, that ‘mainstream’ does not mean “universal”, since many philosophers of logic and 
language working today would consider that the presumption of unique reference contained in 
the definite description ‘the compositional structure of a judgment’ is false).  Next, in Chapter 
III, I argued, following Thompson, that that mainstream understanding cannot give a satisfactory 
account of the structure of natural-historical judgments.  In Chapter IV, I made a modest attempt 
to cast doubt on a proposal of Rödl’s to understand the sense of “logical form” at issue in 
Thompson’s work, as well as the idea of grammar as it is deployed in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical investigations, as having its home in the Kantian notion of transcendental logic.  In 
Chapter V, I  gave grounds for holding that the trajectory from Wittgenstein’s early work to his 
later constituted not so much a radical break with “Fregeanism” after the Tractatus as a 
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development of a nonFregean conception of logical articulation already present, if muted, in that 
work. 
 
But if the sense of ‘logical form’ in which I am interested is not the Fregean one that emerges 
from the location of a judgment in an inferential system, nor the Kantian one that emerges from 
reflection on what is required for judgment to refer to intuition… then what is it? 
 
My readers will be disappointed to learn that I do not have a full answer to this question.  This is 
partly just the effect of my having had to spend as much time and space as I have on ground-
clearing in the previous chapters.  But it is not entirely explained by that.  If my conjecture—for 
such is all it is at this point, since I have not yet carried out the thorough archæological 
examination of Wittgenstein’s writings from the period between “Some remarks on logical form” 
and the Investigations that would warrant any more confidence—is correct that the conception of 
grammar under investigation in the latter work is an evolution, with certain important 
modifications, of the idea expressed in the former of “the logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves, i.e.,  in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori 
possibilities” (1929: 163); if, more generally, as I emphasised in Chapter IV, the sort of 
reflection on grammar carried out in the latter work does not proceed from, nor is justified by, 
any one principle—then I can certainly not give the principle of the conception of logical form in 
which I am interested, to hold it up for neat comparison with its “Fregean” and transcendental 
alternatives. 
 
But there are some things I can say, both in specification of the conception and in justification of 
the idea that it is (still) a conception of logical form.  First, we saw in the previous chapter how it 
grew out of Wittgenstein’s reflection on the idea of the forms of elementary proposition.  
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(Compare Thompson: “It is because in the end we have to do with a special form of judgment, a 
distinct mode of joining subject and predicate in thought or speech, that I am emboldened to say 
that the vital categories are logical categories” (1995: 267-8; emphasis added and removed).)  
This was an issue with which Russell engaged explicitly, and indeed conceived of as a problem 
of logic: “[T]he way in which the constituents are combined in [a] complex… may be called the 
‘form’ of the complex….  It is such pure ‘forms’ that occur in logic” (1913: 98).  (The example 
with which Russell goes on immediately to illustrate these words is an atomic proposition.)  
Frege, too, took his account of inference involving generality to yield an answer to the question 
of the nature of the elementary proposition (to the point, indeed, at which the very idea of an 
“elementary proposition” has little significance in his framework, since the type of combination 
involved there is precisely the same as in compound propositions: viz., functional application1).  
And it is an old problem in philosophy—older, actually, than the project of the systematisation of 
inference.2 
 
(It is worth observing that, at least prima facie, the question how the elements of thought hang 
together in a judgment looks to be orthogonal to the question which laws or norms govern 
thought just as such.  We observed as an aside in the previous chapter that MacFarlane (2000) 
takes the idea that the norms of logic are, distinctively, constitutive of thought as such (“as 
opposed to a particular kind of concept use” (2000: 51)) to spell out one sense in which logic has 
been called “formal”, indeed the sense which he goes on to champion.  But if there are a range of 
                                                 
1 This is quite clear, funnily enough, in his “Compound thoughts”: where (as we saw in Chapter II) we are told that 
“it is natural to suppose that, for logic in general, combination into a whole always comes about by the saturation of 
something unsaturated,” of which the phenomenon of compound thoughts is then singled out as a “special case” 
(1923-26: 37). 
2 Consider Plato’s Sophist and Aristotle’s De interpretatione and Categories.  Though it would be a spurious 
etymology to take our word ‘logic’ to have been derived from hē epistēmē logikē—in fact it comes from hē logikē 
technē—one can’t resist thinking that there would have been nothing unusual in Plato’s or Aristotle’s using the 
former phrase to denote those enquiries. 
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distinctive types of elementary combination, specific to distinct regions of discourse, then those 
forms of combination, it seems, will not be “formal” in this sense.3  I observed, though, the 
oddness involved in using the word ‘formal’ to express this idea; and it is clear that the idea of 
forms of elementary combination does after all line up perfectly nicely with the notion of a 
distinction between form and content or matter.  If we are for this kind of reason suspicious of 
MacFarlane’s favoured account of the formality of logic, we can hold on to the idea of a life 
form as a formal idea, and the idea that the fact that a judgment is a natural-historical judgment is 
a formal (logical) matter, without affirming that “the norms constitutive of thought as such” 
make special reference to these notions.4) 
 
Of course, the Investigations famously casts doubt on the idea of “a final analysis of our forms of 
language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression” (§91; cf. §47); and with 
it, on the very idea of an elementary proposition.  So if we mean the present discussion to give an 
account of a conception of logical form also at work in the Investigations, we must modulate it to 
take account of this change.  But note, first, that our own account in the previous chapter of the 
trajectory from the Tractatus through “Some remarks on logical form” and to the Investigations 
makes good sense of the rejection of the notion of an elementary proposition.  The suggestion of 
§47 is that “elementary” and “simple” make sense only in the context of a given analysis, for a 
given purpose; and we have seen that the result of thinking through the realisation expressed in 
“Some remarks on logical form” is that it is not in the context of some one such totalising 
analysis of language that we are to carry out an enquiry into the structure of propositions.  (One 
                                                 
3 I say “it seems” in order to leave open the possibility that one may attempt, perhaps along Hegelian lines, to show 
that any account of “thought as such” must contain an account of the range of elementary forms after all.  This is 
explicitly denied by Tractatus §§5.55ff., of course; whether it is more apt as a description of the view implicit in the 
method of the Investigations depends on whether there would be any point in calling the result of the piecemeal 
explorations of the structures of our thought “an account of thought as such.” 
4 Of course, I cannot pretend to have engaged with the details of MacFarlane’s argument, much less to have 
defended an alternative, fully worked-out conception of the formality of logic. 
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goal of the reflections in the Investigations on meaning and understanding is to see how to avoid 
supposing that “if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus 
according to definite rules” (§81), at the uncovering of whose structure our logical enquiry is 
aimed.)  There is no reason to conclude from this that we must stop thinking about how our ideas 
hang together; on the contrary, it should be plain that, at that level of abstraction, that description 
applies quite well to what Wittgenstein is doing in the Investigations.  (To put it in a slogan: this 
is after all surely what he means by ‘grammar’.) 
 
It is true that Wittgenstein occasionally invites us to consider apparently structured utterances on 
the model of inarticulate exclamations: for instance, “‘Now I know how to go on!’ is an 
exclamation; it corresponds to an instinctive sound, a glad start” (§323).  But he can hardly be 
taken to mean that articulation is inessential to language, even to these particular uses of 
language: for not only is that a preposterous view in any case, but his own discussions of the 
very same utterances elsewhere draw on their articulation, for example by putting them in the 
past tense (§660, and indeed in the same §323).5  The point must surely be to invite us, again, to 
consider these utterances in that new light, in order to shake ourselves loose of certain habits of 
thinking with respect to them—not to lay down once and for all that that is the only correct way 
to consider them.  So the fact that, once in a while, Wittgenstein urges us not to think in terms of 
propositional articulation is an example of the way in which, on the approach of the 
Investigations, propositions are to be considered from a range of points of view, for a range of 
purposes; but it should not discourage us entirely from thinking in terms of “the ways in which 
our ideas hang together.”  
 
                                                 
5 I owe this general point, as well as the specific example of §§323 and 660, to John McDowell. 
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With the shift away from the idea of a complete analysis (and so also from the idea of elementary 
propositions), we get instead a focus on regions of discourse.  This is clear at Investigations §90 
(which comes smack in the middle of the discussion of the idea of a “final analysis” of 
language): 
 
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.  Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by 
clearing misunderstandings away.  Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other 
things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. 
 
And it is clear, more generally, from the way in which the Investigations proceeds: through 
“sketches of landscapes” traveled over “criss-cross in every direction” (Preface).  Thus, for 
example, with respect to the “misunderstanding” alluded to above in the quotation from §81, 
about the connection between using language with meaning and using a calculus, Wittgenstein 
attempts to “clear it away” not by giving, once-off, a definitive analysis of “meaning” and a 
definitive analysis of “calculus” and showing just how they differ, but by describing a great 
range of our uses of a wide variety of related expressions: ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, 
‘proposition’, ‘name’; ‘mental process’; ‘game’; ‘rule’; and so on—bringing out the ways in 
which they hang together, and also the ways in which they come apart. 
 
Though Thompson places at the centre of his enquiry the “natural-historical judgment”—which 
may make it seem as though his aim is the “final analysis” of some particular construction—he 
makes clear from the beginning that the fundamental interest the isolation of the natural-
historical judgment holds for him is in the fact that it enables us to isolate the region of thought 
of which it is a part.  Before even introducing the “natural-historical judgment”, Thompson is at 
pains to bring out the battery of concepts necessary for an appreciation of the phenomenon of 
life, a grasp of no one of which is possible independently of a grasp of the others.  The 
irreducibility of vital concepts points up the autonomous status of discourse containing them; the 
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centrality of the “look to a wider context” required to establish even that the matter one finds 
before oneself constitutes a living organism, not to mention that it is eating (say), brings out this 
irreducibility, this autonomy of judgments made in one of these regions from those made in some 
other.  (And the idea of the “look to the wider context,” which Thompson derives explicitly from 
Anscombe’s work, is just as clear in the Investigations, e.g. in the discussion of expectation.) 
 
It is with this in mind that Thompson introduces the notion of a natural-historical judgment: that 
is, in the context of the search for definitions of the various “vital categories” which “together 
form a sort of solid block” (266).  He tells us that the isolation of the natural-historical judgment 
will allow us to define ‘life form’ non-circularly as something which can be the subject of a 
natural-historical judgment; and once we’ve defined ‘life form’, we will have broken into the 
circle.  His model here is Anscombe’s enquiry into the region of discourse that is talk of 
intentional action; her isolation of a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ allows her to give an 
account of the sense of ‘reason’ at issue in discourse about intentional action, and thence of the 
whole battery of concepts essential to that region of discourse.  In each case, Thompson suggests, 
the concepts at issue—life form, reason for (intentional) action—are formal, logical concepts 
because to bring something under one of them is not to say something substantive about it but 
simply to indicate in what region of discourse it has its home.  We understand these concepts not 
by giving Merkmale for them but by grasping the respective forms of judgment in which 
instances of them can feature: a life form just is that which can be the subject of a natural-
historical judgment; a reason for action just is that which can be given as an answer to the 
question ‘Why?’ in the sense Anscombe elucidates.  “It is because in the end we have to do with 
a special form of judgment, a distinct mode of joining subject and predicate in thought or speech, 
that I am emboldened to say that the vital categories are logical categories” (Thompson 1995: 
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267-8; his emphasis).  And we might as well recall that part of what in turn emboldens 
Thompson to hold that the natural-historical judgment is a special form of judgment is the 
negative result of his discussion of the ways in which one might try to reduce it to forms of 
judgment recognisable to standard quantification theory—a discussion which we have attempted 
to fill out in Chapter III of this dissertation, and a discussion which, in large part, turned (again 
negatively) on considerations of inference. 
 
I alluded briefly above to the prominence of the notion of grammar in the Investigations (and the 
quotation from §90 is of course a canonical expression of its centrality to the method of that 
work).  But this may seem, like the repudiation of the notion of an elementary proposition, to 
indicate a sharp break from Wittgenstein’s early work, including “Some remarks on logical 
form”—which paper, we have seen, spoke of “the logical investigation of the phenomena 
themselves, i.e.,  in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by conjecturing about a priori 
possibilities” (1929: 163; emphasis added).  After all, §90 begins as follows: 
 
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, 
but, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.  We remind ourselves, that is to say, about 
the kind of statement we make about phenomena. 
 
And this may seem to cast some doubt on the emphasis I have been placing on the continuity of 
the trajectory from the Tractatus, through that paper, and into Wittgenstein’s later work.  But, 
first of all, the “Some remarks on logical form” quotation isn’t as straightforward as it seems.  It 
speaks of a logical investigation; and “a posteriori” is qualified with “in a certain sense.”  
Admittedly, the previous sentence speaks of “inspecting the phenomena which we want to 
describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity” (1929: 163; emphasis added).  But 
when we are given some examples, their description includes the following: 
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One shade of colour cannot simultaneously have two different degrees of brightness or redness, a tone not 
two different strengths, etc.  And the important point here is that these remarks do not express an experience 
but are in some sense tautologies.  (1929: 167; emphasis added) 
 
The 1929 paper gives none but the vaguest account of the requisite “logical investigation of the 
phenomena.”  But I hope it is clear that the method of the Investigations—the reflective 
exploration of the structures of our thought, disconnected from the idea of a total systematisation 
of inference (which would bring with it a single notion of “elementary proposition”) as well as 
from the idea that the only structure to be investigated is the structure shared by all thought 
whatsoever, regardless of subject matter—can be understood as a more precise account of just 
the sort of investigation called for.  Again, “Some remarks on logical form” shares with the 
Investigations the second of these “disconnects” from earlier conceptions of logic and logical 
form.  It does not yet contain the first: on the contrary, the idea of a “total analysis” is front and 
centre.  But I argued in the previous chapter that the shape the second “disconnect” takes is such 
as incipiently to undermine that idea; that is, to lay the ground for the first. 
 
In any case, both Anscombe and Thompson have something analogous: that is, if we are after all 
to hear a contrast between the logical investigation of the phenomena, in a sense in which logic 
would be driven by something like “ontology,” and (on the other hand) the investigation of our 
grammar, the two of them are solidly in the latter camp.  For Anscombe explicitly repudiates the 
approach to the enquiry into the nature of the intentional that would seek some “extra feature 
which exists when [an intentional action] is performed” (1957: §19); and Thompson, explicitly 
following her, “reject[s] what may be called a purely metaphysical approach” to his own subject 
matter and “takes refuge instead in the representation” of life (1995: 267). 
 
It may also be supposed that, despite the opening sentences of §90 quoted above, Wittgenstein’s 
use of ‘grammar’ is also, indeed perhaps primarily, meant to remind us that his method is one of 
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reflection on our use of language, and not on a system of thoughts, “pure intermediaries” (§94) 
between language and the world.  (In other words, when Wittgenstein tells us that “Our 
investigation is... a grammatical one,” the contrast is not only between language and ontology, as 
the two preceding paragraphs have presupposed (inspired by Wittgenstein’s own wording at 
§90), but also between language and thought.)  But this, too, is of a piece with the move away 
from the idea of a single system of inference (and its concomitant notion of an elementary 
proposition) to the idea of the exploration of regions of discourse.  (The discussion of “pure 
intermediaries” comes at the heels of that of the idea of a “final analysis” of language.)  That is, 
there can hardly be a problem with recognising that one can sometimes just think what, at other 
times, one speaks or writes; the problem is with supposing that (of course “fully analysed”) 
thoughts constitute a single super-system, in virtue of its relation to which we can use our 
language as we do.  And I have already discussed the shift in focus from single unitary system to 
regions of discourse, and I have given reasons for understanding Anscombe and Thompson’s 
work to be on board with this shift—despite (especially) Thompson’s liberal talk of thoughts and 
concepts, for example, in place of sentences and predicates. 
 
Finally, let me address briefly one likely question a skeptical reader will be entertaining with 
respect to the conception of logical form I have been sketching in these pages: namely, what 
good is it?  What is it for?6  (And this question may seem especially pressing in light of the fact 
that, in the Investigations—the work which (I am suggesting) constitutes a canonical expression 
of this conception—no explicit reference is actually made to a notion of form used in the way in 
which I use it!)  Now, of course, the contrast implicit in the question is with “logical form” on 
the “Fregean” conception: where the very idea of form has its home in, and gets its point from, 
                                                 
6 Both Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap pressed me on this question. 
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an account of valid inference.  And in fact, our own conception has at least negative significance 
with respect to this very account: for if it is true to say that the sort of generality exhibited in a 
natural-historical judgment is, anyway, not of the sort to be treated by any of the approaches 
canvassed in Chapter III, then that is at least to say something (negative) about how such 
judgments figure in such an account. 
 
But to expect me to be able to give an answer to the “What good is it?” question strictly parallel 
to that of the “Fregean” conception of form—something of the shape, “I use the notion of form 
to sort between Xs and Ys”—would perhaps be to presume too much in favour of that 
conception.  As we have said (citing Plato and Aristotle as examples), the enquiry into the 
structure of discourse is an old enquiry indeed, and has been driven by its own concerns: notably, 
puzzles about meaning, the possibility of false judgment, and so on, which puzzles appear to be 
pressing whether or not they are posed in the context of the idea of a complete formal 
regimentation of the inferential behaviour of the sentences of a language (or of the thoughts they 
express).  If it turned out that a single, fully general, one-off account of discursive structure, 
applicable indifferently to judgments from all regions of thought, were not available, this fact 
would not of itself dissolve those puzzles.  On the contrary, the piecemeal, region-sensitive 
account of discursive structure we would be pressed to give instead would appear to inherit 
whatever claim the one-off account was originally conceived to have to be a matter of logic.  
And the same thought applies when we shift from giving such an account for judgments one at a 
time, to giving an account for whole batteries of fundamental concept, each group of which is 
essential and categorial for its region of discourse.  At least, such has been the whole force of the 
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